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This thesis focuses on how entrepreneurial cognition interacts with internal 
stakeholder perception in established entrepreneurial organizations.   In addition, 
the influence of interdependent factors of cognitive biases, temporality, growth 
and performance on the interaction has been examined.   
 
The study is exploratory, phenomenological and framed within an interpretive 
research paradigm.  Primary data was gathered using a qualitative multiple case 
study methodology. Semi-structured interviews were conducted every three 
months over an eighteen-month period with entrepreneurs and internal 
stakeholders of nine organizations in Phase I and three organizations in Phase II.  
 
This research is original because it focuses exclusively on the interaction 
between concepts of entrepreneurial cognition and biases, temporality, internal 
stakeholder perception, organizational factors, growth and performance for 
established entrepreneurial organizations.  The empirical evidence highlights that 
cognitive diversity and differences in perception and expectations have an impact 
on entrepreneurial and internal stakeholder interrelationships in established 
entrepreneurial organizations.  Furthermore, entrepreneurial decision-making 
leads to the Icarus Paradox of confidence-success-attribution cycle that either 
moderates or mediates organizational growth and performance.  The 
consequence of longer communication chains is limited information flow that 
results in cognitive dissonance.  
 
The research contributes to closing the gap in literature on the interdependent 
nature of entrepreneurial cognition and internal stakeholder perception on 
organizational growth and performance.  The contribution to practice therefore is 
that in established entrepreneurial organizations the entrepreneurs and internal 
stakeholders can focus on performance by understanding the cause and effect 
influence of their interactions.   This sets the foundation for further research on 
the interaction between entrepreneurial cognition and other organizational 
concepts.  
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1.  Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Synopsis   
 
This thesis explains how entrepreneurial cognitive processes interplay with 
internal stakeholder perception.  Entrepreneurial cognitive processes of decision-
making, opportunity recognition, alertness and schemas research emphasise 
individual differences (Busenitz and Barney, 1997; Baron, 1998; Haynie et al., 
2009), but fail to investigate the impact of these differences on interrelationships, 
growth and performance.  Although this research recognizes the centrality of the 
entrepreneur (Gregoire et al., 2010), the interdependency of entrepreneurial 
autonomous decision-making, growth and performance are considered as 
influencing factors.  In addition, the research is contextualised by organizational 
theory related to the cognition-success-attribution cycle (Miller, 1992) of 
feedback that is characterised by limited information flow and top-down 
communication, and conceptualized in open systems thinking (von Bertalanffy, 
1968). 
 
The aim of the research is to progress knowledge on the interaction of 
entrepreneurial cognition with internal stakeholder perception.  By combining 
disparate concepts in new ways, my research contributes original knowledge to 
this interrelationship.  The contribution to practice may be beneficial to expert 
entrepreneurs with more than seven years experience (Sarasvathy, 2008) from 
established entrepreneurial organizations in which the entrepreneurs and the 
internal stakeholders can focus on growth and performance by understanding the 
cause and effect influence of their interactions.  Established entrepreneurial 
organizations are regarded as continuous-growth organizations in excess of ten 
years and are differentiated from early or high-growth companies (Achtenhagen 
et al., 2010) in lifecycle and stage models.   
 
In drawing on cognitive science, this research will contribute empirical evidence 
to the literature on entrepreneurial cognition, perception aspects of the internal 
stakeholders to the entrepreneurs and organizational theory.  
 
   2
1.2 Background to Research 
 
I spent ten years of my career consulting as an Organizational Psychologist on 
international projects for large corporations across both private and public 
sectors nationally and internationally.  These projects included organizational 
and team development, leadership and management development, organizational 
redesign, culture audits post mergers and acquisition, and psychometric design 
and delivery.  During this time, I found that management was largely driven by 
growth and performance measurement, and my role as a consultant included the 
alignment of stakeholder values, motivation, roles and responsibilities with the 
organizational strategy.  The challenges that emerged during these interventions 
encompassed a lack of communication and honest interaction between the 
management and the employees.  In addition, it emerged that decision-making 
was concentrated in middle or senior management levels, and employees were 
driven by meeting departmental goals and objectives with little perceived 
autonomy.  During this period the dichotomy between organizations operating as 
a whole system and collective team decisions versus individual decision-making 
materialized. 
 
This dichotomy in my observation continued as a business founder of a start-up 
business that manufactured, marketed and retailed natural beauty products in 
Europe and Canada.  My discussions with other business founders with regards 
to a perceived lack of employee decision-making ability and opportunity 
recognition reinforced the duality between individual and team cognition.  My 
own interaction and experience with management and employees resulted in 
frustrated interrelationships in which communication was top-down, and 
decision-making was more directive than participative.  In addition, there was 
relationship conflict caused by different perceptions with regards to open and 
shared discussion between employees and management.   
 
I became increasingly aware of the affect of individual differences in thinking, 
the impact of these different perceptions and interactions on interrelationships, 
and the subsequent influence on growth and performance of the organization.  
However, I found that the differences in cognitive or structural complexity 
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(Kelly, 1955), referred to in psychological theory, did not explicitly inhibit 
organizational growth and performance in the literature.  In addition, business 
and academic literature centred on underperforming or fast growth organizations, 
with the result that the interaction of entrepreneurial and internal stakeholder 
cognition was largely ignored in established organizations.  
 
My grounding as a consultant in classic organizational theory such as lifecycle 
growth models, psychological contract, systems thinking and traditional models 
on management and leadership provided an intellectual context in which I started 
to consider the above issues.  I subsequently embarked on academic research and 
decided to study the topic of how successful entrepreneurs and managers’ 
cognitive differences influenced their interrelationships in the organizational 
context.  In doing this I was able to bring together my knowledge and experience 
in organizational development theory (Senge, 1990; Handy, 1995) and cognitive 
psychological theory to provide insight into the phenomenon.    
 
I began to extend my reading to include how interrelationships and information 
flow link individuals within the organization, and why it forms an integral aspect 
of organizational growth and performance.  I found that much of academic 
literature in entrepreneurship focuses on either the centrality of entrepreneurial 
cognition and biases (Mitchell et al., 2002; Baron and Ward, 2004; Baron, 2006), 
the entrepreneurial team (West, 2007), or the entrepreneurial organization as 
separate units of analysis (Gregoire et al., 2010) and entrepreneurial orientation 
(Covin and Slevin, 1991) in large corporate organizations.   
 
The definition adopted in my research of the entrepreneur as the founder of a 
new business and an innovator is derived from Schumpeter (1934).  Consistent 
with my experience and reading, Schumpeter also drew a distinction between 
managers and entrepreneurs.  My context of the entrepreneurial organization is 
defined by Knight (1921), who extended the centrality of the individual to 
organizational theory by focusing on uncertainty, risk and profit.  While these 
two economists contributed to research by focusing on economic development, 
dominance of the entrepreneur personality developed as an additional perspective 
from cognitive scientists.   Psychologists focused on individual differences in 
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personality traits during 1970-1980, but it became clear to me that research into 
entrepreneurial personality was inconsistent and inconclusive across 
entrepreneurship studies.   
 
My understanding of the literature is consistent with Sarasvathy’s (2008) view 
that the trait approach to entrepreneurship has been largely abandoned and can be 
attributed to the lack of consensus.  Scholars have subsequently turned to 
cognitive psychology as a theoretical perspective to understand entrepreneurial 
differences further.  In order to focus my literature critique on entrepreneurial 
cognition, entrepreneurial personality and its influence on internal stakeholders is 
not explored.  Instead, based on the literature and the gaps in knowledge, the 
research supports Mitchell et al.’s (2002) assertion that the cognitive lens is an 
effective tool in understanding the entrepreneurial process.    
 
The starting paradigmatic perspective of my research therefore is that the agent 
(the entrepreneur) sits within a social context (the organization) in which they 
influence others, by enacting entrepreneurial cognitive processes.  In turn, the 
social structure has an influence on the entrepreneur, which will affect the way in 
which the organization grows and performs.  The view that these two processes 
are not mutually exclusive is consistent with my personal and professional 
experience as well as academic researchers on open systems thinking (von 
Bertalanffy, 1968; Senge, 1990).    
 
My reading showed that there were a variety of significant influences on 
entrepreneurial cognition literature.  I found that decision-making literature is 
dominated by traditional, rational and heuristic decision-making models 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985; Busenitz and 
Barney, 1997; Sarasvathy, 2001, 2008; Vermeulen and Curseu, 2008) and forms 
a solid empirical and conceptual foundation for this research.  In addition, 
Tversky and Kahneman (1973) identified biases that influence entrepreneurial 
cognitive processes more than non-entrepreneurs, this alerted me to consider and 
include these differences.  
 
   5
I discovered that Neisser (1967) had earlier defined cognition as the 
transformation, reduction, elaboration, storage, and recovery of information.  
This definition is consistent with my psychological studies on the individual.  
The use of the phrase ‘entrepreneurial cognition’ refers to the mental 
representations or schemas that entrepreneurs use to represent new and existing 
information, decision-making and opportunity recognition.  My research also 
considers Busenitz et al.’s (2003) definition that the way in which entrepreneurs 
connect new and existing information enables them to recognize opportunities.  
Although I undertook the cognitive lens in my research, I have adopted the 
process approach used by Sarasvathy (2001, 2008) to study entrepreneurial 
activity.  The process approach captures the interaction between entrepreneurial 
cognition and internal stakeholder perception in the context of the organization. 
 
My paradigmatic perspective that the entrepreneur operates in a context provides 
me with a wider research base within which to explore entrepreneurial 
interactions.  Covin and Slevin’s (1991) organizational research into 
entrepreneurial orientation and Greiner (1972) and Levie and Lichtenstein’s, 
(2010) stage models of organizational growth provide empirical and conceptual 
evidence for the influences of the environment on the entrepreneur in the context 
of the organization.   
 
The definitions of business growth used in my research reflects what the 
entrepreneurs perceive as central to their organization’s growth.  Growth in my 
research denotes an increase in amount and size due to internal process of 
development where growth is considered as a process and not a static point 
(Penrose, 1959).  Achtenhagen et al. (2010) argued that the growth literature is 
fragmented and academic research needed to be more aligned with practitioner 
definitions of growth to create value and impact.  This argument is in keeping 
with my own experience as a business founder and researcher. 
 
For the purposes of my study, the concept of established entrepreneurial 
organizations as continuous-growth organizations is derived from the lifecycle 
and stage literature (Achtenhagen, 2010).  Early or high-growth organizations 
continue to dominate the literature, while continuous-growth organizations are 
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1.3 Research Questions   
 
The primary research question is: 
 
How and why does entrepreneurial cognition affect the interaction with 
internal stakeholder perception in the organization? (Q1) 
 
 
There are three supplementary questions that address supporting issues: 
 
 What are the temporal issues regarding the interaction between 
entrepreneurial cognition and internal stakeholders? (Q2) 
 
 How do biases affect the interaction between the entrepreneur and 
internal stakeholders? (Q3) 
 
 How does this interaction occur within the context of organizational 
growth? (Q4) 
 
 
These questions provide the scope of my research which will explore the ways in 
which entrepreneurs’ thinking affects the interaction with internal stakeholders’ 
perception, focusing on the cognitive aspects of decision-making, opportunity 
recognition, schemas, and alertness (Q1).  The temporal aspects of the decision-
making, and opportunity recognition process are considered (Q2).  The third 
question explores the influence of cognitive biases such as counterfactual 
thinking, representativeness, over-optimism and over-confidence (Q3), whilst the 
final question draws attention to the interplay in the context of organizational 
growth and performance (Q4).    
 
The derivation and use of the primary research question and supplementary 
questions will be explained and justified in Section 5.2 of Chapter 5. 
 
1.4 Research Propositions 
 
The aim of my research propositions is to clarify the important areas of the study 
that have guided the development of the research questions.  In this way the 
relevant research considered in this study shows how my reading informed and 
influenced my doctoral journey.  Yin (2008: 28) purported that research 
propositions “guide attention to something that should be examined within the 
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scope of the study”.  In this way, by stating the propositions they help to focus 
attention on relevant literature in the selection of the concepts in the conceptual 
framework and shape the data analysis.  Furthermore, Yin suggested that 
research propositions are a helpful way in which to create research boundaries 
and place limits such as time and activity (Stake, 1995; Creswell, 2007), as well 
as definition and context (Miles and Huberman, 1994) on the study.  The 
research propositions include the assumptions within which the research takes 
place, and are clarified in the literature critique in a detailed review providing the 
justification for the research focus. 
 
These six research propositions below in Table 1.1 are derived from the research 
questions and from the specific literature discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. 
 
TABLE 1.1 RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS 
 
Propositions Source 
(these represent examples from the 
literature) 
1.  Entrepreneurs use different 
cognitive processes to managers (Q1) 
Busenitz and Lau (1996); Gaglio and 
Katz (2001); Mitchell et al. (2002); 
Busenitz et al. (2003) 
2.  Entrepreneurs are more affected 
by cognitive biases than others (Q3) 
Tversky and Kahneman (1973); 
Busenitz and Barney (1997); Baron, 
(1998); Mitchel et al. (2004); Baron, 
(2004) 
3.  Experienced entrepreneurs use 
their prior knowledge and prior 
experience to make decisions and 
spot new opportunities/develop new 
patterns (Q1) 
Gregoire et al. (2010) 
4.  Entrepreneurs’ timing around 
decision-making reflects their 
experience (Q3) 
Tversky and Kahneman (1973); Plous, 
(1993); Bluedorn and Martin (2008) 
5a).  Sensemaking is composed of 
communication (Q1) 
5b). Sensegiving is different for 
entrepreneurs and other stakeholders 
Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991); Weick, 
(2009) 
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(Q1) 
6.  Entrepreneurs interact with their 
business in a mutually reinforcing, 
interrelated way (Q1, Q4) 
von Bertalanffy (1968); Senge (1990); 
Covin and Slevin (1991); Markman and 
Baron (2003); Shepherd et al. (2010); 
Vaghely and Julien (2010)  
 
 
1.5 Justification for Research Focus 
 
1.5.1 The Practical Significance of the Interplay between Entrepreneurial 
Cognition and the Internal Stakeholder Perception 
 
The research approach is in line with the earlier 1930’s non-reductionist 
argument (Bygrave, 1989) to studying entrepreneurship, which states that 
individual entrepreneurs operate as part of a complex system in mutual 
relationships with each other and nature.  In addition, earlier studies have 
identified that the frequency of interaction affects the identification of 
organizational issues (Dutton and Duncan, 1987; Thomas and McDaniel, 1990).    
 
The paradox between the entrepreneur as autocratic decision-maker (Likert, 
1967) versus the benefits of shared cognition (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000), are 
regarded in this research as critical to the organization’s growth and 
performance.  Entrepreneurs are alert to new opportunities and create economic 
wealth, it is therefore considered important that we understand how they use, 
share and integrate existing information and knowledge with internal 
shareholders when making decisions.  Understanding these interrelated concepts 
is also relevant for organizational succession planning and learning.  The 
influences on cognitive interactions, shared cognition and an understanding of 
entrepreneurial cognitive success need to be understood, and the limitations 
made explicit.  Von Bertalanffy’s (1934) open systems approach to 
entrepreneurial cognitive processes has wider reach in the organization than  
Schumpeter's (1934) earlier economic perspectives that have centralised the 
entrepreneur in generating growth.  In this way the practical significance of 
   10
expert entrepreneurs with an excess of seven years experience as defined by 
Sarasvathy (2008) and their interactions with internal stakeholders can be 
examined. 
 
This conceptual grounding is especially significant in entrepreneurial cognition 
research because of the gap in a systematic and an integrated approach to 
entrepreneurship studies identified by Gregoire et al. (2010).   For the purposes 
of this study the words interplay or interaction are used interchangeably to 
describe the reciprocal action between the entrepreneur and internal stakeholders. 
 
1.5.2 The Theoretical Contribution of Entrepreneurial Cognition and 
Internal Stakeholder Interplay 
 
Entrepreneurs are often known to cognitively construct their worlds based on 
their own perceptions, which are different from those around them (Russell, 
1999).  This involves being alert to new opportunities and making decisions in 
uncertain and ambiguous environments with little resources.  Much is known 
about the decision-making and opportunity recognition (OpR) of entrepreneurs 
and managers within larger organizations, but little academic knowledge can be 
found regarding the interplay between entrepreneurial cognition and other 
stakeholders in small-medium enterprises (SME’s) and its reciprocal effects. 
 
At present, entrepreneurial cognition and biases are disparate concepts with 
regards to the impact it has on interrelationships with internal stakeholders.  Even 
more disparate are the temporal, growth, performance and organizational 
interlinking concepts.  By exploring how these interrelationships respond and are 
affected by each other, these concepts can be linked to form a conceptual 
foundation for investigation. Mitchell et al. (2007) suggest that the cognitive 
approach to entrepreneurship is still in its early stages of development and 
provides an under-researched area to explore the gap in knowledge regarding 
multi-levels of study.  The theoretical gap identified justifies the need for this 
research into the interaction of entrepreneurial cognition on interrelationships, 
growth and performance.   
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1.5.3 The Relevance of Internal Stakeholder Perception in Organizations 
 
There are widely accepted studies (Miller, 1992; Busenitz and Barney, 1997; 
Sarasvathy, 2001, 2008) that entrepreneur’s decision-making and opportunity 
recognition are the main drivers of growth in their organization.  However, in 
established SME’s, management teams form part of the organization’s 
operational and strategic decision-making with responsibility to execute these 
decisions.  Therefore, it is significant for the growth and performance of these 
organizations to understand the different cognitive processes, expectations, 
perceptions and experiences affecting the interaction between the entrepreneur 
and the management team in executing these decisions.   
 
Baron (2004) showed that cognition can affect the success of the entrepreneur 
and cognition has also been used in organizational studies to change the mindset 
of internal stakeholders (Barley, 1986; Gioia et al., 1994).  However, the 
exploration of the interaction between the entrepreneur and internal stakeholders 
in SME’s attracts limited attention in studies of established entrepreneurial 
organizations (Gregoire et al., 2010).   
 
The significance of internal stakeholders is that they are interacting regularly 
with the entrepreneur in key decisions within the business.  In addition, the 
entrepreneurial organization is repeatedly producing and delivering ideas and 
opportunities for new products and services (Jelinek and Litterer, 1995: 137) that 
involve interrelationships with stakeholders and decision-makers.   
 
1.6 Methodology  
 
The research is a qualitative exploratory study, framed within an interpretive 
constructivist paradigm.  This paradigm allowed for interpretations and meanings 
of cognitive constructs such as decision-making and opportunity recognition of 
the entrepreneur and internal stakeholders to be captured and explored (Gioia and 
Thomas, 1996).  A case study methodology was adopted with semi-structured 
interviews of the entrepreneur and the internal stakeholders in Phases I and II.  In 
Phase I nine cases were selected using contacts within the Entrepreneur in 
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Residence network1 within the Centre for Enterprise Development and Research 
(CEDAR) of Lord Ashcroft International Business School, Anglia Ruskin 
University, Cambridge, United Kingdom.  In Phase II, three cases were 
interviewed every three months for twelve months. 
 
1.7 Outline of the Thesis 
 
The thesis consists of 12 chapters.  Chapter 1 introduces the personal impetus for 
the research topic and provides the academic context.    
 
Chapter 2 explores the literature on entrepreneurial cognitive psychology and 
individual differences.   Chapter 3 provides a critical review of psychological and 
management literature that focus on the interplay of entrepreneurial 
interrelationships within an organizational context. 
 
Chapter 4 introduces the conceptual framework derived from the literature and 
my own experience.  Five disparate concepts of cognition, temporality, biases, 
growth and performance and organizational factors are interlinked in order to 
explore the interaction between the entrepreneur and internal stakeholders.   
 
Chapter 5 presents the research philosophy, design and methodology and 
research methods.  Chapter 6 describes the data collection processes from Phases 
I and II. 
 
Chapter 7 presents a descriptive account of the nine cases in Phase I based on the 
selection criteria and research questions.  The chapter describes the criteria by 
which the three cases where chosen and the subsequent thematic analysis used in 
Phase II.   
 
                                                 
1 Entrepreneur in Residence is a Cambridge network of (primarily) Cambridge based 
entrepreneurs involved with (Centre for Enterprise Development and Research) 
CEDAR, Lord Ashcroft International Business School 
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Chapters 8, 9 and 10 present the empirical findings of the longitudinal study in 
Phase II over a period of twelve months.  Set I, II and III data points reflect the 
temporal aspects of the data.  
 
Chapter 11 uses both an individual and organizational level perspective to 
interpret the empirical data using cognitive psychology, classic organizational 
theories and analytical tools to provide meaning.  In addition, The Icarus Paradox 
is used as a metaphoric conceptualisation, and open systems thinking is used to 
provide a framework for the modification of the conceptual framework in 
accordance with the findings and the literature. 
 
Chapter 12 concludes by answering the four research questions, stating both 
factual conclusions that arose from the findings, and conceptual conclusions.  A 
contribution to knowledge and justification for the claim is presented, followed 
by modified propositions.  In addition, an agenda for future research and my 
reflections on learning are presented. 
 
Having presented my personal background and curiosity at the interrelatedness 
of entrepreneurial cognition, management, growth and performance, a brief 
summary of the academic literature was presented in this chapter.  In order to 
further refine the research area, the following two chapters examine specific 
literature to identify the gap in knowledge.  In this way, the reasons why these 
research questions were designed and how they were informed are explained in 
Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 2 Entrepreneurial Cognition 
2.1 Introduction   
 
The substantive literature on entrepreneurial cognition contributes to our 
understanding of information processing, decision-making and opportunity 
recognition. This chapter reviews the chronological journey that led to the 
argument that entrepreneurs use different cognitive processes than do others, and 
demonstrates the contradiction in empirical studies.  In addition, the literature 
that suggests these differences have other influences on the entrepreneurial 
process is considered. 
 
2.2 Entrepreneurial Decision-Making 
 
Research that has attempted to understand, define and categorise entrepreneurs 
has dominated literature since the 1920’s (Knight, 1921; Schumpeter, 1934; 
Kirzner, 1973; McClelland, 1987a).  Early economic literature defines the 
entrepreneur as the creator of a new venture (Schumpeter, 1934; Low and 
MacMillan, 1988), centralizing the entrepreneur in this process.  Others define an 
entrepreneur as one who searches, discovers and exploits fresh opportunities, 
creating new products and services in order to commercialize it (Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000).    
 
However, early economic theorist definitions of entrepreneurs had little 
empirical basis (Baumol, 1993; Bull and Willard, 1993) for their argument and 
failed to develop a consistent trait-based typology that depicted the entrepreneur 
accurately, and resulted in non-significant results (Brockhaus and Horowitz, 
1986; Sexton and Bowman-Upton, 1991; Shaver, 1995).  In addition, trait 
theories failed to explore the value of entrepreneurial interactions between traits 
and context (Herron and Sapienza, 1992) and were not regarded as dynamic 
(Pervin, 1996).  Bandura (1999) also questioned the scientific utility of the 
centrality of the entrepreneur.  
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Craik (1943) was the first to introduce the concept of mental models and use 
cognitive studies in order to understand how people think, behave and act in an 
environment.  The dominance of inconclusive typologies on entrepreneurial 
personality officially came to an end with Neisser (1967) who changed the way 
the entrepreneur was studied by shifting the research from the behaviourist to 
cognitive perspective.  Neisser also concluded that cognitive psychology needed 
to focus less on linear information processing models and include the study of 
perception and behaviour.  The historical roots of the cognitive perspective thus 
lies in cognitive psychology developed furthered by Comegys’s (1976) focus on 
cognition style, offering a continuous way to study entrepreneurial cognitive 
processes and the interactions with others (Mitchell et al., 2004; Baron, 2004).   
 
The distinct manner in which individuals process information in order to 
recognize opportunity brings with it a research debate on differences between 
entrepreneurs and others in terms of their cognitive or thinking styles.  Miller 
(1987) claimed that analytical cognitive style was risk-averse and that problem 
solving and decision-making was incremental.  This was in contrast to a holistic 
cognitive style, which is less risk-averse, goes beyond the norm of existing 
frameworks and makes larger steps in decision-making.  The consistency in 
definition is represented further by Streufert and Nogami (1989) and later by 
Riding and Rayner (1998) who added that cognitive style is defined as the way 
people process and arrange information in order to reach a decision.   
 
The Cognitive Style Index (CSI) is classified under the Holistic-Analytic family 
of styles (Kirton, 1976; Allinson and Hayes, 1996; Sadler-Smith and Badger, 
1998), which suggested that these dimensions interact with the external 
environment to affect behaviour and attitudes.  The CSI is a tool for measuring 
cognitive style and it suggests that the way in which individuals process 
information can be at either end of the continuum between intuitive and 
analytical.  Intuitivists tend to have an open-ended approach to problem solving, 
relying on random methods of exploration requiring a broad perspective, whilst 
analysts tend to be more compliant and prefer a structured and systematic 
approach to problem solving (Allinson and Hayes, 1996).   
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Overall, cognitive style is regarded by some researchers as the more stable aspect 
of entrepreneurs (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001; Mitchell et al., 2002; Katz and 
Shepherd, 2003).   Kozhevnikov (2007) suggests that although cognitive style is 
theoretically and methodologically challenging to assess, it is consistently 
regarded as a psychological dimension representing the acquisition and 
processing of information.  Furthermore, there is a lack of literature that links 
cognitive style with growth.  Although studies by Sadler-Smith et al. (2004) and 
Dutta and Thornhill (2008) found that organizational growth was more 
influenced by entrepreneurial behaviour than cognitive style. 
 
The two dimensions of CSI have some similarity with Mintzberg’s (1978) 
‘entrepreneurial’ and ‘planning’ modes.  He observed growth in an 
entrepreneurial organization and found different modes of decision-making 
amongst the entrepreneur and managers.  He claimed that the entrepreneur 
thought in terms of ‘sprints’ and ‘pauses’ with regards to growth.  By studying 
the changing growth patterns, he was able to contrast the entrepreneurial mode 
with the planning mode and showed how entrepreneurs moved adeptly between 
narrow and broader perspectives. Furthermore, Gardner (1985) emphasised that 
intimate knowledge of the organization overlapped with expertise and did not 
necessarily equate to success and is this way support Mintberg’s (1978) study. 
 
Although the CSI dimensions of intuitive and analytical, and Mintzberg’s (1978) 
entrepreneurial and planning modes are similar in definition, the arguments 
contradict each other.  Through a longitudinal study, Mintzberg demonstrated 
that because expertise knowledge can reside within the entrepreneur and 
management by engaging intimately with the detail of products, both are able to 
switch between entrepreneurial and planning mode.  The CSI argument by 
contrast, positions the entrepreneur in either the analytical or intuitive modes 
irrespective of product or organizational knowledge.   
 
Mintzberg’s (1978) decision-making theory showed less applicability across a 
cross-cultural study undertaken by Pearson and Chatterjee (2003).  In addition, 
Cecil et al. (2003) conducted a study looking at managerial roles and found that 
although there was a degree of overlap, the findings did not apply in South-East 
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Asia.  They concluded that Mintzberg’s (1978) principles were not culture-free 
or cross socio-cultural applicable and were specific to a Western culture.  One of 
the key differences identified by Cecil et al. (2003) relevant to this research is 
that they found communication flow and dissemination of information by 
managers were entrenched in the organization’s culture and managerial work.  
Although Mintzberg’s argument offered less support for cognitive differences, 
cognitive psychologists continue to argue for individual differences in the way 
information is captured, recognized and processed (Miller, 1987).   
 
In this way, several researchers have specifically highlighted cognitive 
differences between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs (Fredrickson and 
Mitchell, 1984; Smith et al., 1988; Busenitz and Lau, 1996; Busenitz and Barney, 
1997; Mitchell et al., 2000; Gaglio and Katz, 2001; Mitchell et al., 2002).  Other 
empirical work by Markoczy and Goldberg (1995) found that there was a 
significant cognitive difference between managers at the same level of the same 
organization. Although, Fiet (2002) contradicts cognitive differences and argues 
that successful entrepreneurs, like managers, routinely employ linear rational 
thinking in the opportunity discovery process.   
 
Cognitive differences were also underscored by Kaish and Gilad (1991), who 
assessed the number of materials, and the length of time that entrepreneurs and 
managers took to read it.  They found that entrepreneurs use non-verbal 
scanning, and paid special attention to risk cues, whilst managers focused on the 
economics of the opportunity.  However, Busenitz (1996) did not achieve these 
results with a repeat study on assessing the entrepreneurial alertness hypothesis.  
Although, studies by Bird (1988), Esienhardt (1989) and Stevenson et al. (1999) 
confirmed that entrepreneurs, unlike non-entrepreneurs, made quick decisions 
and recognized patterns in their field.   
 
Researchers continued to find that entrepreneurs used more heuristic based 
(mental short cuts) decision-making than managers (Busentiz and Lau, 1996; 
Busenitz and Barney, 1997; Mitchell et al., 2002; Busenitz et al., 2005).  In other 
studies, Sarasvathy et al. (1998) used think-aloud verbal protocols to show that 
entrepreneurs and bankers think and process information differently. However, 
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Markman and Baron (2003) recognized the need for further study into 
differences such as how entrepreneurs used configurations to identify 
opportunities. 
 
The specific risk and uncertainty characteristics of decision-making also form 
part of entrepreneurial cognition literature.  General decision-making called 
‘prospect theory’ states that entrepreneurs place more weight on losses than on 
gains (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973).  Tversky and Kahneman argued that this 
aversion to loss was the opposite of the certainty effect that has an affect on 
decision-making.   
 
Kahneman et al. (1982) argued that loss aversion, which can be viewed as a risk 
calculation by the decision-maker, is a reason to maintain the status quo within 
an organization.  However, Weber et al. (2004) and Hertwig et al. (2004) 
challenged prospect theory claiming that an entrepreneur’s experience in 
different events will determine how accurately they define risk.  Nevertheless, 
there is still a lack of empirical research as to whether the risk-seeking 
entrepreneur is more likely to start their own business, than manage the downside 
of losing the opportunity (Baron, 2004).   
 
Entrepreneurial cognition research continued to gain momentum between the 
1990’s and early 2000 as a framework within which to investigate how 
entrepreneurs think (Baron, 1998), and how it influenced communication and 
action (Baron, 2004).  The framework is purported by Mitchell et al. (2002, 
2007) to be the knowledge structures entrepreneurs use to make assessments, 
judgments or decisions for opportunity evaluation and growth.  By this 
definition, the researchers contextualised entrepreneurial cognition within their 
own unique domain of opportunity evaluation and growth, thus externalising 
entrepreneurial cognition.  The externalising and interplay of these concepts of 
opportunity tension later became central to the Levie and Lichtenstein’s (2010) 
dynamic state model discussed in Chapter 3.   
 
Mitchell et al. (2007) in a special journal review on entrepreneurial cognition, 
extended the research area by setting research boundaries and clarifying the use 
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of definitions.  They firstly examined four approaches that dominated the 
literature at that time: heuristic based logic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, 
1974); perception processes and alertness (Kirzner, 1973; Kaish and Gilad, 
1991); entrepreneurial experience in information processing (Mitchell, 1996) and 
effectual reasoning (Sarasvathy, 2001).  Although the four approaches were 
different, the authors acknowledged the commonality in the explanations of these 
approaches.  In their review they also examined the discussion on cognitive style 
fit between entrepreneurs and the organization (Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Allison 
and Hayes, 1996; Markman and Baron, 2003; Brigham et al., 2007) using the 
intuition-analysis continuum.   
 
Mitchell et al. (2007) then considered West’s (2007) empirical work in which he 
developed entrepreneurial team collective cognition (ETCC) that extends 
entrepreneurial cognition research and is discussed further in Chapter 3.  They 
included a path for a cross-disciplinary approach for easing tensions (Aldrich, 
1999) in the review from contributing fields of entrepreneurial and cognition 
research.  They subsequently produced the illustration in Figure 2.1 after 
considering the progression in the entrepreneurial cognition domain to show how 
the field has developed.  The illustration shows how innovations in 
entrepreneurial cognition emerged out of a diffusion of cross-disciplines in 
which concepts are exchanged after tensions are resolved.   
 
Mitchell et al.’s (2007) use of innovation and diffusion as a framework to explain 
the emergence of entrepreneurial cognition was adopted from Rogers (2003) who 
presented the factors and timeline involved that emerge when a new idea, or 
product, becomes accepted by a wider audience.  The use of this framework by 
Mitchell et al. (2007) reflects the peer-to-peer nature of academia that Rodgers 
argued produced higher levels of diffusion sooner than mass-market discussions 
of an innovation.  In this way, the application of the innovation and diffusion 
framework to academia offers insight into how new fields of research becomes 
accepted. 
 
By using this framework, Mitchell et al. (2007) was able to highlight the need for 
further research on the interaction of the entrepreneurial context and individual 
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cognitive mechanism to create entrepreneurial attitudes, intentions and 
behaviours. 
 
FIGURE 2.1 FIELD DEVELOPMENT IN ENTREPRENEURIAL COGNITION 
RESEARCH 
 
Source: Mitchell et al. (2007) 
 
Vaghely and Julien (2010) later contributed to entrepreneurial cognition 
literature by concluding that entrepreneurs engaged in decision-making by 
changing from using information that they have rationally internalized to 
information that is subconsciously made up through reconstruction.  This 
conclusion fits within the four approaches stated earlier by Mitchell et al. (2007) 
on the use of information processing in entrepreneurial experience. 
 
2.3 Rational versus Effectuation  
 
The rational decision-making model that has been extensively challenged by 
entrepreneurial cognition researchers cannot describe the realities of strategic 
decision-making (Simon, 1959; Allison, 1971).  Rational decision-making 
assumes that individuals make rational decisions and behave on purpose 
(Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992).   Historically however, the rational model of 
decision-making dominated strategic and entrepreneurial decision-making 
 21
literature and assumed that choices are made on the basis of the entrepreneur’s 
probability judgments and by maximizing expected utility (Alvarez and Barney, 
2006; Ye et al., 2008).  Alvarez and Barney’s (2006) suggestion that the 
entrepreneurial process of creating firms to maximize value and reduce 
transaction costs was opposite to Sarasvathy’s (2001) earlier effectuation 
reasoning theory that differs fundamentally from the rational decision-making 
model.   
Effectuation posits a strategic approach typified by a response, which is adaptive 
and follows the Knightian (1921) uncertainty logic.  In contrast to effectual 
reasoning, Wiltbank et al. (2006) claimed that the causal reasoning approach is 
one of planning even in uncertain environments.  This continuum is similar in 
character to the earlier approaches of CSI (Sadler-Smith and Badger, 1998), and 
Mintzberg (1978).  This said, effectuation theorists have built on previous 
research of cognitive differences, that entrepreneurs use very different decision-
making processes and redraw existing information into new opportunities 
(Sarasvathy, 2004; Wiltbank et al., 2006).   
Sarasvathy’s (2001) research was a cognitive science-based study of 27 expert 
entrepreneurs who through success and failure developed a total of $200 million 
to $6.5 billion organizations.  Each entrepreneur had an excess of 15 years of 
experience through success or failure.  This is a significant study for the support 
of cognitive differences highlighted earlier (Smith et al., 1988; Busenitz and Lau, 
1996; Busenitz and Barney, 1997; Gaglio and Katz, 2001), that entrepreneurs 
used effectual reasoning while managers used causal reasoning in decision-
making. 
Although the study results support cognitive differences between entrepreneur 
and others, Sarasvathy (2001) argued that successful entrepreneurs are not 
genetically developed through personality traits. She asserted that novice and 
experienced entrepreneurs could use a ‘common logic’, or thinking process, to 
solve entrepreneurial problems.  In addition, through failure and the use of a few 
resources, a novice entrepreneur can learn and quickly become an expert. 
Although there are differences in cognition and managers can learn the 
entrepreneurial approach to decision-making, this argument still supports 
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Mintzberg’s (1978) earlier claim that the entrepreneurial mode of thinking can be 
learned.   
Furthermore, based on her findings, Sarasvathy (2001) asserts that managers use 
causal reasoning in which they focus on a given set of means to achieve the most 
efficient result while entrepreneurs limit the downside by focusing on the 
possible effects that can be achieved through their individual means (Sarasvathy, 
2001; Davidsson and Wiklund, 2001).  These findings offer support for prospect 
theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973).   
Although Sarasvathy (2001b) proposed that the causal model of rational thinking 
does not adequately describe how entrepreneurs actually behave, her study 
supported other empirical studies by Allinson et al. (2000). Supporting 
Sarasvathy, Corbett (2002) also found that successful entrepreneurs 
demonstrated a greater intuitive thinking style versus managers who prefer an 
analytical or linear approach to information processing and decision-making. 
Table 2.1 identifies separate schools of thought in entrepreneurial decision-
making with opposing ends of a continuum over a period of more than thirty 
years of research. 
 
TABLE 2.1 ENTREPRENEURIAL DECISION-MAKING  
Concept Researchers 
Entrepreneurial and planning mode Mintzberg (1978) 
 
Heuristic and analytical 
 
Allinson and Hayes (1996); 
Vaghely and Julien (2010) 
Effectual and causal Sarasvathy (2001) 
 
Intuitive thinking style Allinson et al. (2000);  
Corbett (2002) 
Intuitive and rational; automatic and controlled 
Vermeulen and Curseu 
(2008) 
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Linear and nonlinear thinking  Groves et al. (2011)  
 
Sarasvathy’s effectuation (2008) also looked at the constraints that entrepreneurs 
face in uncertain conditions and how others adopt and share in the vision.  In a 
different study, Sarasvathy et al. (2009) used Masters of Business Administration 
(MBA) students and experienced entrepreneurs as their respondents.  They found 
that entrepreneurs framed the hypothetical problem they were given by using 
effectual rather than predictive reasoning.  The two groups were diametrically 
opposed with experienced entrepreneurs resisting taking predictions seriously 
and MBA students following a path that would lead them towards goals they had 
set for themselves.  These results reinforced early studies of cognitive 
differences. 
Gibcus et al. (2006) extended Sarasvathy’s (2001) effectuation theory by 
developing a typology of entrepreneurial decision-makers.  The typology 
includes five different types of entrepreneurial decision-making of Dare Devils, 
Lone Rangers, Doubtful Minds, Informers’ Friends and Busy Bees.  This 
typology was developed from the analysis of 646 entrepreneurs in SME’s.  The 
main differences between the typologies relate to: 
1 the type and frequency of decision-making which shows that, the more 
decisions entrepreneurs make, the more expertise they develop.  It also 
shows that different entrepreneurs have different levels of dependency on 
others in the process of decision-making; 
2 entrepreneurs vary in their level of confidence when making a     
decision;    
3 entrepreneurs have different levels of innovativeness; 
4 experienced entrepreneurs searched for less information than novice 
entrepreneurs but also entrepreneurs differ in the way they collect 
information; 
5 entrepreneurs use different times and alternatives when considering a 
decision; 
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6 entrepreneurs have a different perception of risk; 
7 entrepreneurs experience different challenges on their way to making a 
decision.     
Their taxonomy confirms previous research by Julien et al. (1997) and later by 
Wennekers and Thurik (1999), that different types of entrepreneurial decision-
making exists. Gibcus et al. (2006) acknowledged however that their taxonomy 
is more in line with a decision-making behavioral perspective.  
 
2.4 Frameworks for Entrepreneurial Decision-Making 
 
Brigham et al. (2007) identified three categories of responses that they believed 
lead to the failure of studies to reach a consensus on the individual 
entrepreneurial traits.  These three distinctive camps for studying entrepreneurial 
cognition are: 
 
1 Improper methodologies that led to a focus on personality;  
2 External/economic explanations of entrepreneurial behaviour; 
3 Cognitive determinants of entrepreneurial behaviour.   
 
Mitchell et al. (2007) extended this thinking and proposed that research into 
entrepreneurs would be enriched by drawing concepts from both 
entrepreneurship and cognitive research fields.  In addition, they argued that any 
entrepreneurial perception and thinking processes should take place within a 
context, because an entrepreneur is constantly communicating and interacting 
with the business.  In this way they support Brigham et al.’s (2007) argument 
that instead of categorising the study of entrepreneurs, researchers should focus 
on the interactive relationship between the entrepreneur and their work context. 
 
Entrepreneurial strategic decision-making (ESDM) (Vermeulen and Curseu, 
2008) extends the cognitive determinants criteria for entrepreneurial cognition 
research suggested by Mitchel et al. (2007), but the two frameworks overlap on 
the concepts of personality and environment. Although there are many theories 
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In this figure, the first component, ‘Different types of entrepreneur’, focuses 
primarily on personality types and characteristics reflecting earlier research on 
the centrality of the entrepreneur.  The figure underpins the taxonomy of five 
personality types (Gibcus et al., 2006) discussed earlier and emphasises the 
question ‘who are entrepreneurs?’  However, Vermeulen and Curseu (2008) 
deemed cognition to be an important aspect of ESDM.   
 
The second component, ‘the environment’, includes the uncertain and chaotic 
(Busenitz and Barney, 1997) environment in which entrepreneurs operate and the 
associated risks (Knight, 1921), which are similar to the construct in Brigham et 
al.’s (2007) framework of external/internal explanations of behaviour.   
 
The final component considers traditional and rational decision-making theories, 
which follow a particular pattern of rationality (Mintzberg, 1978; Simon, 1979).   
 
This generic cognitive model for ESDM argues that entrepreneurs handle 
information using a two-way process of automatic (intuitive) and controlled 
(rational) processing or ‘dual-processing’, also called heuristic and systematic 
thinking (Baron, 2004).  The interplay between these two cognitive systems 
underpin strategic entrepreneurial decision-making  (Dane and Pratt, 2007) and is 
consistent with earlier studies on entrepreneurial cognitive differences.   
 
In this generic entrepreneurial cognitive decision-making model, heuristics are 
acquired through experience and interact with the more analytical information 
processing used by entrepreneurs (Vermeulen and Curseu, 2008).   Heuristic 
information processing in this model includes:  schemas from long-term memory 
developed previously and the use of cognition.  The model also uses the 
cognitive aspects of working memory to explain the explicit and implicit nature 
of how knowledge is transformed in an interdependent process (Dane and Pratt, 
2007). 
 
Groves et al.’s (2011) empirical study of 219 professionals confirmed part of the 
argument for the differences between entrepreneurial cognition and non-
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entrepreneurial cognition.  Their study offered support for ESDM that 
entrepreneurs switched between linear and non-linear decision-making 
processes.  The researchers defined non-linear thinking as intuitive, creative and 
emotional, and linear thinking as analytical, rational and logical.  They found that 
the entrepreneurs switched more than actors, accountants and front line managers 
but the same as senior executives.  Another finding was the link between how 
long an organization was in business and their ability to switch between linear 
and non-linear thinking, emphasising the importance of experience and age in 
cognitive development.  Their finding that senior managers and entrepreneurs 
had similar profiles and balanced linear and non-linear decision-making is 
similar to Mintzberg’s (1978) argument that cognitive processing can be learned.    
 
Considering the extensive empirical and conceptual literature, Gregoire et al. 
(2010) claimed that entrepreneurial cognitive science is still considered to have 
weak theoretical and conceptual foundations, and is in need of improvement in 
its application to managerial sciences.  The complexity is compounded by 
several different disciplines which entrepreneurial process research has emerged 
from such as, economics, psychology, sociology and cognitive science.  In 
addition, each discipline emphasises different levels of analysis.  Although 
Gregoire et al. (2010) have not referenced Mitchel et al.’s (2007) earlier 
innovation and diffusion framework, their research argument also reflects that 
entrepreneurial cognition is an emerging field.  Gregoire et al. (2010) extends 
this perspective by adding that as a developing field, there is a need to articulate 
and coalesce around common organizing themes and to develop a conceptual 
agenda for entrepreneurship. 
 
In an attempt to fulfil the lack of common organizing themes, Gregoire et al. 
(2010) reviewed 154 articles using an entrepreneurial cognitive perspective from 
1976-2008, and argued specifically for clear articulation of cognition between 
the entrepreneur and the organization.  They found that only a small percentage 
of articles researched cognition as a process, and included terms, such as sense-
making, and interactions between individuals and their environment.  Another 
assertion they made was that articles which included individual cognitive 
differences, cognition as a process and different levels of analysis, were 
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considerably limited in terms of an empirical basis.  They used three areas to 
support their agenda in order to augment the contribution that the cognitive 
perspective makes to management research, and to address existing challenges 
that have resulted from a lack of a systematic agenda as shown in Table 2.2.  
 
TABLE 2.2 THREE CORE AREAS FOR A COGNITIVE RESEARCH 
AGENDA  
 
Developments of 
Entrepreneurial 
Cognition 
Process Orientation 
(Interaction Between 
Cognitive Elements) 
Across Levels of 
Analysis 
Founders of SME’s rely 
more on decision 
heuristics than non-
founders (Busenitz and 
Barney, 1997). 
 
Using heuristics is an 
advantage in highly 
uncertain tasks  (Gaglio, 
2004; Simon et al., 
2002).   
 
Is the development of 
heuristics due to traits, 
environment constraints 
or learned preferences 
(Baron, 1998; Forbes, 
2005; Simon and 
Houghton, 2002).   
 
Is the cause of cognition 
due to internal or 
external factors (Shaver 
and Scott, 1991).   
 
Effects of entrepreneurial 
action on cognitive 
elements (Weick, 1991) 
Knowledge is not 
distributed evenly in 
society (Hayek, 1945).   
 
Prior knowledge is a 
factor in identifying 
opportunities (Shane, 
2000; Shepherd and 
DeTienne, 2005).   
 
Questioned studies on 
how individuals 
leverage prior 
knowledge (Dimov 
(2007b).   
 
Developed a model on 
opportunity recognition 
(Gregoire et al., 2010).   
 
The study of 
interactions considering 
two cognitive 
phenomena is needed 
(Walsh, 1995).   
 
 
Constraints on 
uncertainty and cognitive 
implications using 
effectuation (Sarasvathy, 
2001).   
 
A different approach to 
cognition information 
processing is needed 
(Lant and Shapira, 2001; 
Hodgkinson and Healey, 
2008).   
 
Theoretical, 
methodological and 
empirical cognition 
research at multiple 
levels needs to be 
undertaken (Elsbach et 
al., 2005; Haynie et al., 
2010).   
Source:  Gregoire et al. (2010) 
 
Building on Mitchell et al.’s (2007) emergence of entrepreneurial cognition as a 
research area, Table 2.2 illustrates the research forms proposed by Gregoire et al. 
(2010) that can be explored systematically. 
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2.5 Temporal Theories in Decision-Making 
 
Temporal influences on cognition were not considered by the Gregoire et al. 
(2010) review of entrepreneurial cognition articles, and they are largely ignored 
by other researchers.  However, as an aspect affecting decision-making, 
temporality has previously been considered in terms of new venture creation and 
entrepreneur’s perception of timing with tasks (Bird, 1992; Bluedorn, 2002).  A 
study based on Type A-Type B personality models (Freidman and Rosenman, 
1974) found that the more polychronic the individual, the greater the striving 
towards achievement and the more extraverted they were (Digman, 1990).  A 
further study of 20 firms from the telecommunications and publishing industries 
found that the higher the level of polychronicity, or the ability to do a variety of 
things at the same time, the more an individual valued doing things faster 
(Onken, 1999).   
 
Das and Teng (1997) asserted that cognitive and entrepreneurship research failed 
to incorporate time as a variable, adding that a framework which includes traits, 
cognitive factors and time, needs to be developed.  Further researchers have 
argued that actions and interventions brought to the organization by 
entrepreneurs and top management display a temporal aspect (Balkin et al., 
2000).  Although temporal studies are limited, an earlier study of temporality in 
larger organizations looked at strategic decision-making and the time it took for 
management to implement a smoking ban (Willemsen et al., 1999).  Their study 
found that the decision-making process consisted of three phases of orientation, 
negotiation and implementation.  In terms of the interaction between managers 
and managing directors, they found that strong-minded managing directors 
convinced management that a complete ban was necessary.  An additional 
finding was that Managing Directors resorted to a confrontational and centralised 
decision-making process within a given time, which correlates with the typology 
developed later by Gibcus et al. (2006).  
 
More recently Bluedorn and Martin (2008) undertook a study into past and future 
temporal depths of entrepreneurs and noted a positive correlation between past 
and future temporal depths.  They suggested that understanding temporal issues 
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and the importance of time is another way of understanding entrepreneurs and 
the contexts within which they work.  The research discovered that the further 
entrepreneurs thought in the past, the further into the future they tended to think 
as well.  Bluedorn and Martin (2008) suggested that there was a gap in research 
findings with regards to temporal depth and entrepreneurial decision-making.   
The element of entrepreneurial timeliness is only briefly acknowledged in 
literature with regards to the interplay between cognitive aspects of the 
entrepreneur and the business (Vaghely and Julien, 2010).   
 
2.6 Opportunity Recognition, Alertness and Cognitive Learning 
 
Another aspect of entrepreneurial cognition was defined by Kirzner (1973) as 
alertness or the ability to notice without searching, to recognise overlooked 
opportunities that have not been seen by others, in order to generate economic 
values such as profit (Baron, 2004, 2006).  Kirzner suggested that more alert 
entrepreneurs have more accurate mental models, also called ‘schemas’, that 
drive opportunity recognition.   
 
Busenitz (1996) argued that studies of the differences in alertness between 
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs have produced mixed results and require 
significantly improved empirical and theoretical research.  In this way, Gaglio 
and Katz (2001) developed a conceptual model of entrepreneurial alertness, 
hypothesising that individuals who possess this alertness schema will notice 
change in the market place, and adjust their schemas accordingly (Foss and 
Klein, 2010).  And because of this alertness, Baron (2004) separately argued that 
entrepreneurs would be able to adapt their mental framework to ‘think outside of 
the box’.  Although, how this adaptation process takes place is unclear from their 
research. 
 
Alertness and the way in which entrepreneurs view patterns or configurations of 
opportunities have largely been neglected in research, even though it allows them 
to develop superior businesses (Markman and Baron, 2003; Baron, 2004).  
Complementing this positon, Shane (2003) argued that entrepreneurship could be 
explained through the nexus between the entrepreneur and opportunity.   
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Shane (2003: 21) argued that the existence of opportunities is either 
Schumpeterian (1934) or Kirznerian (1973).  He asserted that Schumpeterian 
opportunities are “innovative and break away from existing knowledge”, whilst 
Kirznerian opportunities are “not very innovative and replicate existing 
organizational forms”.   
 
The discovery of opportunity is based on experience and information that some 
people have and others may not have  (Baron, 2006), and complements the 
research processes of entrepreneurs (Vermeulen and Curseu, 2008).  In this way, 
the decision to exploit an opportunity is characterized by individual differences 
that include cognitive processing and were highlighted earlier (Busenitz and Lau, 
1996; Busenitz and Barney, 1997; Gaglio and Katz, 2001; Mitchell et al., 2007). 
 
Baron’s (2004) assertion that the cognitive lens is more useful than the economic 
lens aligns with Gregoire et al.’s (2010) later arguments, and is included in their 
analysis of using the cognitive perspective in entrepreneurship.  Baron (2004) 
focused specifically on opportunity recognition and organizational growth 
putting forward three cognitive elements:  
 
1 the importance of the perceptual process in the recognition of patterns or 
configurations; 
2 insights from signal detection and regulatory focus theory; 
3 the role of schemas, such as alertness.   
 
He argued that it is not the uniqueness of the opportunity, but the ability of the 
entrepreneur to see it that is important.  In this way, Baron’s (2004) perspective 
draws attention to the individual’s role in opportunity recognition which is 
distinctly different to the more complex dynamic perspective of entrepreneurial 
cognition identified by Gregoire et al. (2010).    
 
Baron’s (2004) signal detection theory suggests four situations relevant to 
opportunity recognition as represented in Figure 2.4 in which an individual will 
determine whether a stimulus exists or not.  In turn, signal detection theory is 
affected by the promotion aspects of regulatory theory in which an individual 
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will focus on accomplishment, and then recognize a stimulus when it is present.  
In contrast, the prevention aspect of regulatory theory means that the individual 
will avoid negative outcomes by concluding that the stimulus is not present and 
avoid opportunities that do not exist. 
 
FIGURE 2.4 SIGNAL DETECTION THEORY 
 
 
Baron (2004) claimed that successful entrepreneurs are focused on 
accomplishment and therefore adopt a promotion focus while non-entrepreneurs 
have a prevention focus and therefore are less likely to engage with 
opportunities.  This distinction offers further insight to the literature on cognitive 
differences between successful entrepreneurs and non-successful entrepreneurs at 
the individual level of analysis.  Baron (2006) later added to Kirzner’s (1979) 
theory that alertness rests on other cognitive capacities such as high intelligence 
and creativity, and stressed the necessity of cognitive processes in opportunity 
recognition. 
 
Mitchell and Shepherd (2010) further developed Baron’s (2004, 2006; Baron and 
Ensley, 2006) argument that the ability of the individual and not the opportunity 
has to be taken into consideration.  In a study with 121 technology entrepreneurs 
making 1,936 decisions about hypothetical opportunities, they discovered that 
the images an entrepreneur has of vulnerability and capability, impact the images 
Stimulus exists
Entrepreneneur 
knows
Stimulus does 
not exist
Entrepreneur 
fails to 
recognise
Stimulus does 
not exist
Entrepreneur 
does not know
Stimulus does 
exist
Entrepreneur 
does not see it
 34
of opportunity.  Earlier researchers had argued that an individual opportunity 
recognition process may also be influenced by the organization’s ability to 
integrate new knowledge, and conversely that the entrepreneur’s ability to see 
opportunities can influence the learning of the team (Lumpkin and Lichtenstein, 
2005).   
   
Deakins et al. (2000) argued that the literature on individual entrepreneurial 
learning in SME’s is limited with the focus traditionally concentrated on larger 
organizations.  However, since then researchers have developed entrepreneurial 
learning further by adding that entrepreneurs learn through doing and 
emphasising the importance of studying the interactive learning between the 
entrepreneur and the business as a process (Cope, 2005; Dutta and Thornhill, 
2008; Lumpkin and Lichtenstein, 2005; Politis, 2005).                                                                
 
2.7 Information Processing 
 
Information processing is defined as the ability to seek and integrate new 
knowledge that might influence an individual’s opportunity recognition 
processes (Lumpkin and Lichtenstein, 2005).  Although they focused on 
learning, they claimed that entrepreneurs transform information and data into 
knowledge for the organization in order to increase strategic assets.  Vaghely and 
Julien (2010) also used the insight of information process theories of algorithmic 
and heuristic information processing to demonstrate how entrepreneurs identify 
opportunities (Figure 2.5).  The two main aspects of their framework are firstly, 
the algorithmic thought processing, which is categorised by intuition, patterns 
and problem solving; and secondly, the heuristic thought processing which is 
categorised by sense-making (Weick, 1979), discussion, interpretation and 
intuition.   
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(Gardner, 1985; Mitchell et al., 2002).  Schemas are also defined as images that 
allow information to be organized and expectations to be formed and enacted 
(Gioia and Poole, 1984).  However, other definitions relevant to entrepreneurial 
cognition refer to schemas that are used to recognise and observe opportunities, 
and make decisions with regards to organizational growth (Busenitz and Barney, 
1997; Baron, 1998; Mitchell et al., 2002).  
 
Casson (2010) extended the use of schemas further by linking Kirzner’s (1973) 
alertness theory to schemas, and contended that entrepreneurs have more 
complex schemas than non-entrepreneurs.  In addition, they contributed to the 
argument on entrepreneurial cognitive difference by showing that the 
counterfactual bias (Roese, 1997; Baron, 1998) is more prominent in 
entrepreneurs than non-entrepreneurs.  Their research showed that the process of 
past successes, or previously formed schemas, can influence present and future 
decisions thus re-enforcing the way in which entrepreneurs perceive opportunity.  
This example of a process orientation articulated by Gregoire et al. (2010), 
differentiates the cognitive perspective of entrepreneurship from the behaviourist 
view by emphasising the interaction between cognition and the environment. 
 
2.9   Cognitive Biases and Heuristics 
 
Cognitive mechanism such as biases and heuristics influence entrepreneurial 
decision-making in rational and non-rational ways (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 
1992).  Heuristics are mental short cuts and a set of decision rules that help 
decision-makers cope with uncertainty (Busenitz and Barney, 1997; Simon and 
Houghton, 2002).  Heuristics may also lead to behavioral biases that could result 
in potentially severe decisional errors (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; Simon et 
al., 2002; Forbes, 2005). 
In addition to biases and heuristics affecting decision-making, researchers have 
noted that entrepreneurs have a tendency towards risk-aversion (Bellu et al., 
1990) which is consistent with prospect theory.  Palich and Bagby (1995) later 
asserted that entrepreneurs’ perceptions of risk reflected greater bias than those 
of non-entrepreneurs. 
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Entrepreneurial cognition on decision-making and opportunity recognition 
research indicates that the organizational context created by the entrepreneur is 
generally regarded as more complex and uncertain than those faced by 
individuals in larger organizations (Hambrick and Crozier, 1985; Busenitz and 
Barney, 1997; Covin and Slevin, 1997; Baron, 1998).  Paradoxically, this 
environment will also attract entrepreneurs with certain biases and heuristics 
(Brigham et al., 2007) because of the overload of information they receive, high 
levels of uncertainty in which they operate, and the time pressure they operate 
under (Baron, 1998) as represented by Figure 2.6. 
 
FIGURE 2.6 FACTORS INFLUENCING DIFFERENTIAL SUSCEPTIBILITY  
 
Source: Baron (1998) 
 
Fiske and Taylor (1991) stated that biases and heuristics help entrepreneurs to 
make decisions when they do not have existing schemas.  Gilbert et al. (1992) 
added that by limiting cognitive overload the entrepreneur is able to deal with 
more information.  These arguments support Baron’s (1998) assertion that 
certain conditions lead the entrepreneur to make decisions that are influenced by 
biases because of limited information processing capacity and the desire to 
minimise mental effort 
 
The over-confidence bias is described as the failure to know one’s knowledge 
limitations and not realising when they are incorrect (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1973).  Hambrick and Crozier (1985) found that entrepreneurs perceived their 
decision-making as infallible, while Busenitz (1999) noted that individuals with 
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over-confidence still endeavour to explore opportunities even if they have little 
knowledge because of their strong self-belief.  These differences, between 
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, were also highlighted by Levander and 
Raccuia (2001).  Similarly, Bernardo and Welsh (2001) found that over-
confidence causes entrepreneurs to ignore the facts and others’ opinions in order 
to follow their own judgements. 
In another study, Arabsheibani et al. (2000) conducted a longitudinal 
investigation over six years asking entrepreneurs and others about their future 
economic prospects.  They found that over-confidence in their answers meant 
that entrepreneurs were four times more likely than non-entrepreneurs to believe 
they would be better off in a year when they actually experienced deterioration.   
 
However, Simon et al. (2002) did not find significance with regard to over-
confidence and the economic situation when studying SME’s.  Their study in 
over-confidence contradicted Busenitz and Barney (1997) who regarded over-
confidence as significant for entrepreneurs in the start-up phase.   
 
However, in support of entrepreneurial cognitive biases, Van den Steen (2004) 
included optimism, over-confidence and illusion of control in his model on 
biases, arguing that when over-optimism leads to failure individuals will often 
blame exogenous factors, and when successful they will attribute it to their own 
action.  The contradictory findings could in part be explained by Casson (2010) 
who cautioned that trying to understand the influence of entrepreneurial 
cognitive biases, one has to consider the methodological implications when 
collecting data about the decision-making processes.  These processes could be 
situationally dependant, and are complex especially when the organizational 
response is not aligned to the entrepreneur’s expectations.  Casson’s (2010) 
argument is reinforced by Gregoire et al.’s (2010) assertions that there is a need 
for stronger conceptual and empirical foundations in entrepreneurial cognition 
research. 
 
The representativeness bias is the degree to which the use of a small sample can 
be generalised across a larger population (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, 2008).  
 39
However, this ability to make decisions under uncertain conditions with little 
information using heuristic decision-making is under-researched with few 
documented empirical studies.  Busenitz and Barney (1997) studied 124 business 
founders and 74 managers and noted that entrepreneurs scored higher on the 
representative scores than managers, and have a different decision making style 
to managers.  This study was supported by Shane (2003), who discovered that 
entrepreneurs sometimes make decisions based on a representative sample not 
substantially based on fact or historical data, which supports Schumpeter’s 
(1934) earlier suggestion that the intuition bias is a vital ingredient for any 
entrepreneur.  
 
Like representativeness bias and over-confidence bias, intuition bias is based less 
on fact and more on individual feelings, and will increase the possibility that an 
entrepreneur will undertake an opportunity spotted (Allinson et al., 2000).  In 
addition, Allinson et al. (2000) and Corbett (2002) found that entrepreneurs use 
intuition more than managers in their decision-making.  Groves et al. (2011) also 
emphasised that the ability to recall and synthesize relevant experiences and 
knowledge is consistent with the nature and utility of intuition in entrepreneurial 
thinking. 
 
Another bias that influences entrepreneurial decision-making is the illusion of 
control bias that refers to an entrepreneur’s overemphasis on the impact they can 
have on an outcome (Simon et al., 2000).  Langer (1983) noted that illusion of 
control may occur under the condition that people tend to seek out information 
that supports their hypothesis and ignore disconfirming evidence. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1973) added when entrepreneurs use the planning fallacy bias they 
underestimated the time tasks take, and believed that they had control over 
outcomes when they did not.   
Cognitive factors such as counterfactual thinking or the tendency to imagine 
different outcomes in a given situation than what actually occurred (Roese, 1997; 
Baron, 1998) are different between entrepreneurs and other groups (Baron, 
2004).  In a study by Baron (2004), entrepreneurs were found to engage in lower 
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levels of counterfactual thinking than non-entrepreneurs, and thought more about 
the future than past failings.   
 
2.10 Summary 
 
This chapter reviewed entrepreneurial cognition, differences and ambiguities 
between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs.  In doing so, the entrepreneur was 
given considerable focus reflecting entrepreneurship research over several 
decades.  However, the inconsistency in the literature in attributing success to 
entrepreneurial cognition in its entirety means that the context within which 
entrepreneurs operate has to be taken into account.  Based on this view, research 
that considers the interplay between the entrepreneur and the environment are 
reviewed in Chapter 3.   
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Chapter 3 Interplay Theories between the Entrepreneur and the 
Organization  
3.1 Introduction   
 
This chapter assesses the literature on the interplay between entrepreneurial 
cognition and the organizations that are accepted as conceptual models in social 
science (Mitchell et al., 2007).  A brief background to the historical use of 
interrelated constructs that have been restricted to individual level dynamics 
(Haynie et al., 2010), and larger organizations in management and organizational 
research in the form of systems thinking (von Bertalanffy, 1968; Senge, 1990) is 
considered.  At the entrepreneurial level, the combinations of configurations that 
are reviewed include; 1 entrepreneurial cognition, 2 organizational aspects of 
strategy, structure, culture and resources, and 3 the environment.  In this way, 
this chapter brings together entrepreneurial and organizational level interplay 
models in order to examine the interrelated and inter-relational concepts of 
cognition, the organization and growth. 
 
 3.2 General Systems Theory (GST) 
 
General systems thinking is a concept originally derived from the study of 
botanical organisms by von Bertalanffy (1968) and later used in organizational 
studies by Senge (1990).  Both offer an explanation of how complex 
relationships influence each another in mutually reinforcing ways. Systems 
thinking is an empirical field in which the interrelationships presented 
conceptually form a generic and historic platform to explore further dynamic 
interrelationship models in organizational and entrepreneurial studies.  von 
Bertalanffy argued that a collection of parts with inputs, processes, outputs and 
outcomes are interacting in a constant and reinforcing feedback loop.  He also 
emphasised the importance of communication between parts as being intrinsic, 
and not as an outside event ensuring the successful operation of a whole system.   
In turn, the social structure (the organization) has an influence on the 
entrepreneur, which will affect the way in which the organization grows.  These 
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two processes are not mutually exclusive, but do however reflect an on-going 
interplay as represented in Figure 3.1.  Specifically, von Bertalanffy (1968) 
argued that if one element in the system were to change, then it would affect 
other parts or processes within that system.  This illustrates the interdependency 
of parts that is the central tenet in open systems thinking. In this way, 
interrelationships can result in synergy which is when the whole is greater than 
the sum of its parts.  If the whole is less than the sum of its parts then the result is 
dysergy.  Both outcomes, synergy and dysergy, are determined by the 
interactions and feedback systems in the organization.   
Senge (1990) recognized that systems thinking could be viewed as a conceptual 
framework.  He proposed extending von Bertalanffy’s model by suggesting that 
four extra levels operate within a system.  Senge saw systems theory as 
interrelationships rather than linear cause-and-effect chains. These four levels or 
‘disciplines’ include patterns, mental models, systems and events.    
He applied systems thinking in explaining the operations of industries such as 
services, high-technology and human resources and proposed solutions to 
problems using a systems or holistic approach.  In this way he demonstrated the 
transferability of open systems thinking to a business and organizational context 
that demonstrated the generic potential for organizational analysis of von 
Bertalanffy’s (1968) original application.  Senge asserted that systems theory 
accommodates personal mastery, mental models, building a shared vision and 
team learning to provide more insight into how it can be used in a learning 
organization.  In support of this mutually reinforcing model, Scheider and 
Angelmar (1993) argued that individual and collective cognition served as 
stimuli to change each other which von Bertalanffy (1968) concluded was 
ultimately self-regulating. 
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TABLE 3.1 INTERPLAY MODELS 
Model Author and Date Interactive and Orientation Characteristics 
General Systems 
Theory 
von Bertalanffy (1968) Whole system  Process of change  
Interrelated parts 
Mutually reinforcing 
Configuration 
Theory 
Mintzberg (1978); Miller 
and Friesen (1984b) 
Holistic 
Reciprocal 
Non-linear 
Multiple 
Stable 
Presence of elements results in predictability  
Consistent 
EO 
Energy Conversion 
 
Covin and Slevin (1991) Two-way:  entrepreneurial 
and environment 
Process orientation 
Conceptual and empirical 
 
Converts capabilities into products and services for 
customers 
Entrepreneurial posture, culture and structure versus 
financial performance 
Organizational level perspective  
Organizational behaviour  
Entrepreneurial 
Orientation (EO) 
Lumpkin and Dess (1996) 
Wang (2008) 
Multiple dimensions 
Process orientation 
Cognitive components 
EO 
Contingency framework 
Performance is context specific 
EO and learning organization (LO) 
Stage Models 
Versus 
Dynamic States 
Greiner (1972); Adizes 
(1979); Churchill and 
Lewis (1983) 
One way/linear 
Conceptual and Empirical 
Speculative 
Personality emphasis at different growth stages 
 
Person and 
Entrepreneur-ship 
Fit 
 
Pervin (1968); Kirton 
(1976); Chan (1996) 
 
One way 
Conceptual 
Cognitive misfit-dominant style versus work context 
Style fit to circumstances 
Interplay between opportunity recognition and social 
skills 
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P-E Fit Markman and Baron 
(2003) 
Dynamic/reciprocal elements 
Conceptual 
Multiple 
Interplay between person and entrepreneurship 
Sensemaking 
 
Weick (2009) Reciprocal exchanges Entrepreneur and environment 
Understanding the context 
Sensemaking 
Cognitive interdependence between workflow and 
enactment 
Psychological 
Attributes and 
Processes 
Shane (2007) One way 
Conceptual 
Relationship between entrepreneur, opportunity and 
decision-making 
Organizational performance emphasis 
ETCC West (2007) Dual 
Conceptual 
Start-ups 
Team cognition 
Dynamic State Levie and Lichtenstein 
(2010) 
Dynamic/interactive 
Conceptual 
Multiple 
Between the organization and entrepreneur 
Continuous 
Dynamic Spiral 
Loops 
 
Shepherd et al. (2010) Process model 
Dynamic/reciprocal 
Conceptual 
Dual 
Positive and negative relationship 
Entrepreneurial mindset and organizational culture 
Multiple and reinforcing feedback loops 
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3.3 Configuration Theory  
 
It was Mintzberg (1979) who developed the notion of configurations as the 
interplay of strategy, environment and organizational structure.  In this way the 
constructs that he used overlapped with systems thinking (Miller and Friesen, 
1984b), but focused on five different internal structures of an organization.  The 
five configurations are the entrepreneurial, bureaucratic, professional, divisional 
and adhocracy organizations. 
 
Configuration theorists argue that coherence between elements and the presence 
of some elements can lead to reliable predictions in a configuration (Miller and 
Mintzberg, 1983: 57).  Levie (1986) added that this predictability and stability of 
a configuration would only change during periods of radical organizational 
change such as in the entrepreneurial organization when the founder retires.  
Mintzberg argued that when success and decision-making is centred on the 
entrepreneur, the increase in growth could increase their role and responsibilities, 
and insisted that the organizational configuration would change.  The general 
idea therefore of configurations in larger organizations is to understand and 
determine patterns between tightly-woven interrelated relationships which are 
reciprocal and non-linear (Meyer et al., 1993).  Specifically, Mintzberg’s 
bureaucratic, professional and divisional configurations demonstrate linear 
characteristics in their decision-making. 
 
At the small-medium size organizational level, Korunka et al. (2003) used 
configuration theory to understand nascent entrepreneurs at the start-up stage, but 
the identification and examination of configurations at that stage of growth is 
limited (Harms et al., 2007).  Although start-up researchers (Harms et al., 2009) 
recognize that transferring the configuration research approach from large to 
start-up and small businesses is a challenge, they emphasise the value of their 
findings that the configuration of entrepreneur and the environment are valuable 
in establishing patterns. 
 
The use of configuration theory in both large and small-medium size 
organizations focuses largely on the relationship with performance (Dess et al., 
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1997; Wiklund and Shepherd, 2005).  In this way, Witmeur and Fayolle (2011) 
developed a typology of entrepreneurial growth that showed organizations 
transitioning through stages in the same way that lifecycle stage model theories 
are configured.  Their typology was developed by building on and examining 
three streams of research which include lifecycle stage models, the fit between 
strategy and environment, management of information technology (IT) 
consulting and professional services.  From this examination, Witmeur and 
Fayolle (2011) supported configuration theory by developing seven 
configurations that they compared against Mintzberg’s (1979) organizational and 
strategic idea types.  Although their approach was consistent with configuration 
theory, they emphasised the importance of managing all the elements in a 
dynamic way. 
Lifecycle stage models is the idea of using configurations to link context, 
structure and performance as a trajectory (Hanks et al., 1994).  Although the 
linear configuration is in contradiction to the interrelated and continuous 
constructs of open systems thinking, the development model of growth in stages 
had significant impact in practice in organizational consultancy and research.  
The lack of empirical basis has been argued by Levie and Lichtenstein (2010), in 
light of dynamic growth models and configurations that focus on performance 
and characteristics not previously studied in entrepreneurship. 
The lack of consensus of linear and non-linear organizational growth in the 
literature is compounded by the differences of perception between entrepreneurs 
and academics regarding what constitutes business growth (Achtenhagen et al., 
2010).  Although Levie and Lichtenstein (2010) challenged the acceptance of 
linear models of growth, Achtenhagen et al. focused more specifically on the 
lack of focus on the entrepreneur’s perception of growth which they regarded as 
relevant.  As a result of the findings, they suggested a re-conceptualization of 
business growth that is more relevant and meaningful for both practitioners and 
academics. 
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3.4 Lifecycle Stage Models to Dynamic State Models  
 
Linear lifecycle stage models (Greiner, 1972; Adizes, 1979; Galbraith, 1982; 
Churchill and Lewis, 1983; Miller and Friesen, 1984) dominated up to 40 years 
of research into how organizations transition across stages of growth.  However, 
in a review of 104 models, Levie and Lichtenstein (2010) found no consensus for 
the number of growth stages or the factors that are required in order to progress.  
The argument that each stage is characterised by single loop cause and effect 
relationships (Horsnby et al., 1992; Hornsby et al., 2002) failed to recognize the 
dynamic on-going reinforcing feedback loop and the constant interdependencies 
of organizational factors (von Bertalanffy, 1968).  In an attempt to capture these 
issues, Levie and Lichtenstein (2010) developed the dynamic state model as 
represented in Figure 3.2  
 
FIGURE 3.2 DYNAMIC STATE MODEL 
 
Source: Levie and Lichtenstein (2010) 
 
Mintzberg’s (1979) study showed that entrepreneurial growth happens in bursts 
of growth and ‘pauses’ rather than a linear trajectory.  Steyaert and Hjorth (2003) 
added that entrepreneurial personality requirements at each stage of growth are 
based on ‘speculative theory’.  However, growth stage theories are still 
referenced as a teaching tool in major academic textbooks as noted by Levie and 
Lichtenstein (2010) and sales as a measure of growth still dominates the 
literature (Achtenhagen et al., 2010). 
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Levie and Lichtenstein (2010) conceptualised the potential of an untapped 
market as ‘opportunity tension’ by using constructs, relationships and drivers as 
a way of challenging traditional lifecycle models.  They reflect briefly on the 
cognitive aspect that the entrepreneur is driven by ‘perceived capability’ even 
when the market does not yet exist.  They hint at the temporal aspects of the 
dynamic model that can change over time in an adaptive system as management 
expectations differ and individual agendas develop.  In this way, the dynamic 
state model is similar to von Bertalanffy’s (1968) open complex system and the 
energy conversation characteristics in Slevin and Covin’s (1991) entrepreneurial 
orientation model.  All three of these models, incorporate the organization of 
resources for the benefit of the customer (Katz and Gartner, 1988). 
Furthermore, their report on empirical assessment of the conceptual models 
showed little support for the Greiner (1972) or Churchill and Lewis (1983) 
models for the sequences of growth.  On the basis of their research, Levie and 
Lichtenstein (2010) argued to replace stage theory with dynamic state theory, 
which focuses on the entrepreneur’s drive to grow the organization.  In this way, 
they concluded that opportunity tension is the contradiction between stability and 
change that exists in every dynamic state.   
 
Having examined dynamic state theory and stage theory models with regards to 
configurations there are two similarities.  The first is that the organizations will 
grow according to various different configurations, and secondly that these 
configurations may be predictable. However, a significant difference between 
stage and dynamic theories is that because of changes in the organization’s 
model, or environment, the number of configurations and the speed at which 
changes occur is accepted as unpredictable in the dynamic state theory.  
 
Since Levie and Lichtenstein (2010) challenged the stages and lifecycle models, 
little empirical and conceptual research has been undertaken to develop the 
model further.  However, over the years the configuration approach has been 
adopted by other researchers in order to understand the relationship between 
performance, organizational and environmental factors in entrepreneurship 
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research (Covin and Slevin, 1991; Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Li, Zhang and 
Chan, 2005). 
 
When applied to entrepreneurship, Dess et al. (1997) suggested that 
configuration theory captures the complex interrelationships of the 
entrepreneurial orientation of an organization.  In the same way that open 
systems theory captures the whole system, they argue that configuration refers to 
the notion that the whole is more than a sum of the isolated parts of the 
organization which von Bertalanffy (1968) regarded as synergy in a system.   
 
An example of a configuration is Covin and Slevin (1991) who coined the term 
‘entrepreneurial orientation’ (EO) and developed three dimensions – 
innovatiness, risk-taking and proactiveness to demonstrate how an organization 
went about being entrepreneurial.  They developed EO and Figure 3.3 shows the 
interrelationship between high performance and posture, and the subsequent 
influence on the interrelationships of external, strategic and internal variables in 
the energy conversion system. 
 
FIGURE 3.3 ENTRPERENEURIAL ORIENTATION 
 
Source:  Adapted from Covin and Slevin (1991) 
	
Weaker	Main Effect Strong Main Effect 
Entrepreneurial 
posture 
( i t ti )
Firm 
performance 
EXTERNAL 
VARIABLES 
 
Technological 
Sophistication 
Dynamism 
Hostility  
Industrially life-cycle 
stage 
STRATEGIC 
VARIABLES 
 
Mission strategy 
business practices and 
competitive tactics 
INTERNAL 
VARIABLES 
 
Top management 
values and 
philosophies 
 
Organizational 
resources and 
competencies
 50
It was mentioned earlier that the focus on organizational performance and growth 
are the common threads that link open systems theory, lifecycle stage models and 
configuration theory.  However, a major difference is that Covin and Slevin’s 
(1991) configuration approach used entrepreneurial behaviour rather than 
psychological personality profiles used in lifecycle stage models as an indicator 
of organizational performance.  A common argument between lifecycle stage 
theory and EO configuration is that firm size and age are relevant for 
performance.  While EO refers to processes, practices and decision-making, the 
empirical findings on the positive relationship between firm performance and EO 
are still inconclusive and context specific (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Su and Xie, 
2011). 
 
Although there is an argument that configuration theory suffers from a lack of 
meaningful constructs and relationships (Dess et al., 1993), Lumpkin and Dess 
(1996) modified EO by adding two extra dimensions, autonomy and competitive 
aggression to the model and linking it to the exploitation of opportunities.  They 
regard an organization as being entrepreneurial if it engaged in autonomy, 
innovativeness, risk-taking, proactiveness and competitive aggressiveness.  
Although their model is based on new start-ups, they hint that if organizations 
decline to take risks and become ‘overly passive’ they lose the entrepreneurial 
edge, but there is no clear suggestion why and how this might occur.  The 
external variable in Covin and Slevin’s (1991) original model was developed 
further by Wiklund and Shepherd (2005) using a resource based view (RBV).  
They found that environment dynamism has an influence on performance and 
that a configuration approach produced explanatory findings.   
 
While EO provides researchers with a framework to explore an organization’s 
ability to act entrepreneurially and increase performance, Covin et al. (2006) in a 
study of 110 manufacturing firms found that learning from strategy affected 
growth rate.   The idea of learning was developed further by Wang (2008) who 
extended EO by considering how medium-large organizations learn.   The 
findings that a learning organization (LO) mediates the performance of an 
organization support Covin et al.’s (2006) argument that the need for 
entrepreneurial organizations to learn from strategic mistakes is more important 
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than in conservative organizations.  Their argument is based on the behaviour of 
entrepreneurial organizations to continuously seek new opportunities rather than 
stop to seek opportunities when one does not work.  Based on these findings, 
Wang (2008) emphasised the importance of future research in EO and LO to 
consider the age and size of organizations.  
Although Harrison and Leitch (2005) suggested that organizational learning (OL) 
is still in its early stage of being adopted in entrepreneurship studies and with 
little available empirical research, Lumpkin and Lichtenstein (2005) developed a 
framework that linked OL to the cognitive aspect of opportunity recognition.  
These qualities are referred to as an organization's ability to create, acquire and 
transfer new knowledge and subsequently modify behaviour to reflect the 
acquired knowledge and insight.  This modification of behaviour is similar to 
von Bertalanffy’s (1968) self-regulatory open system thinking earlier, in which 
through learning, there is synergy in the organization after intended change has 
occurred.  
 
Through combining OL and opportunity recognition, Lumpkin and Lichtenstein 
(2005) proposed three approaches; cognitive, behaviour and action.  Unlike 
lifecycle stage theories, their framework includes the cognitive aspects of using 
new and existing knowledge to develop customer solutions, behaviour aspects of 
streamlining processes and action to engage with the organization.   
 
The cognitive aspect of Lumpkin and Lichtenstein’s (2005) model was further 
developed by Shepherd et al. (2010).  They presented an iterative process of 
multiple feedback loops between mindset and organization culture shown in 
Figure 3.4.   
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attention to the interplay between individual and team cognition across 
organizational hierarchies and dynamic state models.   In their study, Tripsas and 
Gavetti gave consideration to the role of shared cognition and capability with 
regards to inertia in an established entrepreneurial digital imaging organization.  
They focused on how the organization adapted from analog to digital imaging, 
and discovered that an important indicator of success was the relationship 
between managerial cognition and organizational adaptability.  In addition, the 
absence of shared cognition in Tripsas and Gavetti’s study led to management 
clashes which extended studies on the cognitive differences between 
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs (Busenitz and Lau, 1996; Busenitz and 
Barney, 1997; Mitchell et al., 2000; Sarasvanty, 2000; Gaglio and Katz, 2001) 
beyond the centrality of the entrepreneur.  
Although Tripsas and Gavetti's (2000) findings support studies on the benefits of 
shared cognition, the organization successfully made the transition from analog 
to digital without successfully managing a shared cognitive approach.  They 
argued that the success was due to the lasting influence of the co-founding 
entrepreneur, but warned of the potential danger to growth of not having shared 
cognition, given that not all entrepreneurs can have a lasting effect on 
organizational capabilities and cognition. 
West (2007) contributed to the debate at start-up level that shared cognition 
between the entrepreneur and management led to success. He developed the 
entrepreneurial team collective cognition (ETCC) model with two key structural 
properties of differentiation and integration in which the top management team 
(TMT) had different cognitive processes (Figure 3.5).  He suggested that a lack 
of integration of cognition and uncoordinated action across the levels of 
entrepreneur and management can lead to opportunities not being followed up, 
potential destruction of the organization and lack of team motivation. 
West also echoed the earlier ideas of Bougon (1992) by arguing that the 
differentiation in ETCC is not just a collection of individual cognitive processes 
decided by researchers to be important, but that the relevant level of integration 
of thinking, guides the direction of the organization.  He asserted that ETCC is 
not natural or effortless, but when absent could either impede or facilitate the 
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success or performance of an organization.   Thus, over fifteen years he drew 
together thinking on this topic.   
FIGURE 3.5 ENTREPRENEURIAL COLLECTIVE COGNITION 
Source: West, 2007 
Other researchers developed the advantages of a collective approach by linking 
conflict in relationships to the reduction of effective decision-making, 
satisfaction, resentment and cooperation (Ensley et al., 2002; Choi and Sy, 2010; 
Thatcher and Patel, 2012).  While Ensley et al. (2002) found that relationship 
conflict amongst top management teams led to reduced cohesiveness and growth, 
Lim et al. (2013) went further and supported West’s finding that too much 
conflict clouds shared judgement.  
Although West (2007) argued that too much or too little differentiation and 
integration affected performance, he failed to consider the extent to which 
individual or team members are cognizant of individual differences and cognitive 
sharing.  Furthermore, in an attempt to draw parallels between individual and 
team level cognition, it is unclear from the research how the information is 
shared and communicated between team members 
3.6 Communication Through Sensemaking and Sensegiving   
 
The notion of making and giving sense in entrepreneurship is largely linked to 
how the entrepreneurs interpret and translate decision-making (Daft and Weick, 
1984), and the way others interpret information that is communicated to them  
(Balogun, 2003; Balogun and Johnson, 2004).  Given the relevance of 
interpretation and communication of information in organizations, Gioia and 
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Chittipeddi (1991) argued that sensegiving is integral to research on 
entrepreneurial cognition as it refers to an attempt to influence others (Maitlis 
and Lawrence, 2007).   
 
It was mentioned earlier that sensemaking enables people to make sense of 
information (Nosek and McNeese, 1997) and that the flow of information 
enhances performance (Ensley et al., 2002).  In this way, sensemaking is seen as 
a search for meaning in the on-going collection of information, which can be 
different for managers and employees respectively (Weick, 2009).  Weick 
suggested that in organizing this process, individuals use conversation, text and 
mutual effort that is intrinsically linked to communication.  However, Busenitz et 
al. (2004) argued that if knowledge and information is diverging and hidden, 
then there is limited exchange of knowledge.  Yin et al. (2008) claimed that if 
there was an exchange of accurate information at top management level, it would 
be simpler to make sense and interpret information that could improve 
performance. 
 
The way in which the entrepreneur gives sense to the organization can be 
interpreted in a multiplicity of ways, referred to by Weick (1991) as 
‘equivocality’.  Although in the case of Weick’s study, he used it to describe a 
political opportunity that the individual had in order to influence the identity of 
the organization and other stakeholders.  In this example, sensemaking and 
sensegiving explores the psychological processes the entrepreneur goes through 
when interacting with their environment.  The concept of ‘testing the water’ was 
used earlier by Mintzberg (1978) to describe the way entrepreneurs sense the 
environment before they dived into an opportunity.  
 
The argument by Weick (2009), Warglien (2002) and Jennings and Greenwood 
(2003) is that sensemaking can be treated as reciprocal exchanges between the 
entrepreneur and the environment.  Although Gioia and Chittipeddi, (1991) argue 
that the focus of sensemaking has been in establishing organizational identity for 
leaders within a company.  They asserted that research has not focused on the 
iterative process of sensemaking with regards to performance aspects in the 
organization.  Gioia and Thomas (1996) went further to emphasise the link 
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between performance measures and the communication of sensemaking.  They 
argued that the organization aspires to whatever performance measures are 
communicated. 
 
Later studies by Dunford and Jones (2000), Corley and Gioia, (2004) and then 
Maitlis and Lawrence (2007), have typically used sensemaking as a vehicle with 
which to understand the vision and direction set by the CEO of an organization.   
 
The emphasis on communication was developed further by Taylor and Van 
Every (2000: 58), who suggested that “symbolically encoded representations” of 
circumstances, become actions through interactive talking and texting.  They 
claimed that the level, direction and type of communication an entrepreneur used 
would mediate the effect of sensegiving to the business.   
 
Supporting the importance of sensemaking in communication, Baron and 
Markman (2000) found that when entrepreneurs from both the cosmetics and 
high-tech industries had higher social skills they experienced greater financial 
success.  They noted that the ability to interact with individuals from a wider 
background and higher accuracy in perceiving others were predictors of financial 
success for entrepreneurs. It was unclear from the study what kind of interaction 
was referred to.  Locke (2002) contributed to the literature by adding that 
entrepreneurs see the whole picture of their business and make sense out of the 
chaos without getting overwhelmed.   
 
Weick (2009) later linked the organization and sensemaking arguing that in order 
to understand sensemaking, the context within which decisions are made has to 
be studied.  He argued further for cognitive interdependence between workflow 
and the way it is enacted, recognising that there was a limited amount of research 
on how entrepreneurs make sense of the environment and organizational 
sensemaking.  This ‘enactment’ process is seen to be part of entrepreneurial 
decision-making (Weick, 1979; Busenitz and Barney, 1997).  But as Holt and 
Macpherson (2010) have argued, little is known of how sensemaking occurs 
within entrepreneurial conditions.  In addition to Weick, research by Nicholls 
and Cho (2006) demonstrated that sensemaking is typically undertaken in social 
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entrepreneurship studies that investigate funding schemes through performance 
measurement.  
 
In more recent research by Mitchell et al. (2011) and Cornelissen and Clark 
(2012), communication as a mediating effect when influencing the cognition of 
others has been emphasized.  Mitchell et al. (2011) examined entrepreneurial 
communication with regard to feedback, and maintained that when an 
entrepreneur received feedback from managers, which they could validate or 
correct, cognitive differences could be reduced.  However, Cornelissen and 
Clarke (2012) found that the inner thoughts and imaginations of entrepreneurs 
are not spoken or even necessarily ‘speakable’.  
Whilst there isn’t much research on organizational sensegiving, Steier (2000) 
suggests that the level, direction and type of communication will mediate the 
effect of sensegiving to the business.  In addition, Gallen (2006) emphasised that 
the way in which entrepreneurs give sense regarding information, is due to their 
perception of the information, rather than any variation in the available 
information.    
3.7 Person-Organization Fit (P-O) 
P-O entrepreneurship research is concerned with the interplay or interaction 
between the entrepreneur and the opportunity (Markman and Baron, 2003; 
Brigham et al., 2007).  P-O fit builds on empirical and conceptual studies in 
larger organizations, with little attention being paid to P-O fit in SME’s 
(Markman and Baron, 2003).   Although P-O fit is defined in both organizational 
and entrepreneurship research as the match between an individual’s knowledge, 
skills, personality, performance and job satisfaction (Kristof, 1996), the 
traditional models do not include entrepreneurial cognition.  In furthering our 
understanding of P-O fit, an earlier study by Pervin (1968, 1996) also showed 
that organization performance tended to be higher when there was less of a misfit 
between the entrepreneurs’ individual characteristics and the organization.  
These earlier studies formed part of the P-O fit identified by Chan (1996) later as 
‘cognitive misfit’.  Brigham et al. (2007) claimed that cognitive misfit was the 
degree of mismatch between the individual's preferred and dominant style, and 
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that of the work context.  In their study of 253 engineers, they demonstrated the 
validity of cognitive misfit as a predictor of actual turnover.   
Studies have shown that in order to cope with organizational circumstances that 
do not reflect their preferred style, entrepreneurs will either adapt their style (but 
only temporarily), or change the circumstances to fit their style (Kirton, 1976).  
Kirton (1989) also extended cognitive style to the organizational setting by 
arguing that the organizational climate is set by a working group who share their 
style.  And although cognitive style is thought to be stable, factors such as 
education and experience can influence a change. 
Markman and Baron (2003) built on the P-O argument and showed that the 
closer the match between an entrepreneur’s characteristics and entrepreneurial 
activities, such as creating new organizations and transforming discoveries, then 
the more successful they would be.  As shown in Figure 3.6, they proposed that 
by observing the interplay between different aspects of the entrepreneur, such as 
opportunity recognition and superior social skills, the answer to individual 
differences between successful and non-successful entrepreneurs could be 
understood.  
Although P-O looked specifically at the fit between the entrepreneur and the 
organization, the model did not discuss ‘how’ the particular individual aspects of 
entrepreneurial cognition, for example the ability to recognize opportunities, 
interacted with the organization.  In addition, the relationship between the 
entrepreneur and the organization is ignored although it does build on individual 
differences such as knowledge, skills and ability.  The researchers also 
considered the external environment in the same way that Covin and Slevin 
(1991) did, highlighting the pharmaceutical industry as having an effect on 
knowledge, skills and ability because of high regulation. 
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The next chapter uses entrepreneurial cognition from Chapter 2 and interplay 
theories from Chapter 3 building on specific theories and models to develop the 
conceptual framework for this research.  
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Chapter 4 Conceptual Framework   
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter draws on entrepreneurial cognition and organizational literature in 
order to provide a map for the empirical work to be undertaken (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994).  The purpose of the conceptual framework in this chapter is to 
make explicit the decisions to examine particular relationships regarded as 
important that in turn affect the kind of data to be collected and analysed 
(Lesham and Trafford, 2007).  The decisions to select particular concepts are 
recognized by Andersen et al. (1999) to be subjective and are my representations 
of the relevant factors that affect the interrelationship between the entrepreneur 
and the internal stakeholders.  This chapter discusses the theories underpinning 
the conceptual framework, the components of the conceptual framework and 
limitations, models that were considered but not selected and concludes with the 
chapter summary.  
4.2 Underpinning of the Conceptual Framework 
 
The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 demonstrates strong empirical and 
conceptual support for the differences between entrepreneurial cognition and 
non-entrepreneurs.  However, the influence of these differences on shared 
cognition is limited.  Furthermore, in order to understand how differences in 
entrepreneurial cognition interact with internal stakeholder perception, 
organizational theories in Chapter 3 were examined.  The examination of the 
literature revealed that conceptualization of the interplay between the 
entrepreneurial level of cognition and the organization level of analysis was 
found to be limited (Gregoire et al., 2011).  In this way, a combination of 
elements from individual and organizational level theories, has been used to form 
the conceptual framework. 
 
An individual level theory by Vaghely and Julien (2010) concerned with the 
algorithmic-heuristic duality in entrepreneurial information processing highlights 
entrepreneurial cognitive differences and informs the conceptual framework.  
The reason for the selection of their theory is twofold.  Firstly, Vaghely and 
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Julien’s (2010) model builds on previous research that emphasises the 
differences in entrepreneurial cognition and non-entrepreneurs’ cognitive 
processes (Busenitz, 1996; Gaglio and Katz, 2001; Mitchell et al., 2002; Groves 
et al., 2011), giving it an empirical and validated foundation.  Secondly, the 
model is comprehensive in the dimensions that it represents from the influence of 
intuition biases (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Busenitz et al., 1997) and 
patterns in algorithmic thought processing (Vermeulen and Curseu, 2008) to 
sensemaking and intuition in heuristic thought processing (Mintzberg, 1978; 
Groves et al., 2011).  These concepts are all relevant to the research questions in 
this study. 
 
Although the relationship between entrepreneurial cognition and time is not often 
explored in the literature, time is considered important to opportunity recognition 
and in regards to an organization’s growth trajectory (Kirzner, 1979; Korunka et 
al., 2003).  This conceptual framework is developed on the foundation that 
interrelations between the concepts of entrepreneurial cognition, biases, 
temporality and communication affect growth and performance.   
 
The rationale and assumptions based on the individual level concepts deemed 
relevant to this investigation are presented in Table 4.1.  These concepts emerged 
from the conceptual perspectives which were presented in the previous two 
chapters.  Everything has been introduced before but are now been used in a 
different way. 
 
TABLE 4.1 RATIONALE FOR CONSTRUCTS CONTRIBUTING TO 
THEORETICAL UNDERPINNING 
Concepts  Rationale  
Entrepreneurial Cognition  Differences in cognition (Vaghely and 
Julien, 2010)  
Entrepreneurial Biases Affects entrepreneurial cognition 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Baron, 
1998) 
Temporality Interwoven relationships and 
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entrepreneurial characteristics modify 
the organization over time (Korunka et 
al., 2003) 
Communication The ability to give sense and make 
sense affects performance (Weick, 
1979) 
 
Lumpkin and Dess’s (1996) model informs the organizational level of this 
conceptual framework.  The EO dimensions of autonomy, innovativeness, risk 
taking, proactiveness and competitive advantage represent the entrepreneur as 
well as the organization.  The focus of the interactions in the EO model is 
primarily on performance and the positive influence of risk-taking that Cantillon 
(1734) in the 18th Century regarded as central to the entrepreneur.  Although in 
strategic decision-making participativeness was found to have a moderating 
effect on EO affecting performance (Covin et al., 2006).  This means that Covin 
et al. (2006) found that when senior decision makers use autocratic and non-
participative methods to make major operating and strategic decisions, it has a 
positive effect on growth.  This finding has important implications for this 
research.   
 
Following on from these assumptions about the relevance of interactions of 
decision-making and growth, the selection of this model to underpin my 
conceptual framework can be summarised in five points;  
 
1 the model has interrelated multi-dimensions of EO and organizational 
factors such as strategy-making processes, firm resources and top 
management team characteristics.  Therefore, as a mainly empirical body 
of research the effect of the concepts on each other can be explored; 
 
2 the EO dimensions can vary independently (Schollhammer, 1982); 
  
3 further research opportunities have been highlighted by Lumpkin and 
Dess (1996),  who suggest that EO dimensions or constructs should be 
 dev
(20
 
4 EO
stu
and
 
5 the
con
(Ed
 
The use o
foundation
research th
levels of a
with perfo
offers me 
cognitive 
framework
 
FIGURE 4
 
Source: Lu
eloped, su
10) call for
 has a com
dies, but ha
 Wiklund 
 use of ca
sidered an
mond and 
f Lumpkin
 for this re
at is centre
nalysis (Gr
rmance, en
an opportu
perspectiv
 that can b
.1 ENTRE
mpkin and
ch as how e
 moderatin
prehensive
s not been 
in Landstro
se studies t
 ‘ideal’ b
Wiklund in
 and Dess
search bui
d on intera
egoire et al
vironmenta
nity to cont
e in entre
e used for f
PRENEUR
 Dess (199
ntrepreneu
g effects on
 empirical 
widely exp
m and Lohr
o catalogu
asis to co
 Landstrom
’s (1996) m
lds on the 
ction betwe
., 2010).  F
l and organ
ribute emp
preneurshi
urther resea
IAL ORIEN
6)  
rs see risk, 
 EO to be u
and concep
lored at the
ke, 2010);
e and deve
ntribute to 
 and Lohrk
odel in F
entrepreneu
en cognitiv
igure 4.1 sh
izational fa
irically and
p and off
rch.   
TATION 
and Edmon
ndertaken;
tual basis 
 individual
lop the EO
cumulativ
e, 2010). 
igure 4.1 a
rial cogniti
e elements
ows the in
ctors.  As a
 theoretical
ers a secu
 
d and Wik
  
in organiza
 level (Edm
 mechanis
e EO rese
s a theore
on strategy
, processes
teraction of
 researcher
ly to a grow
re concep
  
64
lund 
tion 
ond 
m is 
arch 
tical 
 for 
 and 
 EO 
 this 
ing 
tual 
 65
Lumpkin and Dess’s (1996) model is a modification of Covin and Slevin’s 
(1991) earlier model in which they coined the term ‘entrepreneurial orientation’.  
Covin and Slevin accelerated EO empirical research and demonstrated that it was 
a useful configuration for further organizational and entrepreneurship research 
(Landstrom et al., 2010) and has since been widely researched (Lumpkin and 
Dess, 1996, 2001; Covin et al., 2006; Huang et al., 2010). 
 
Research areas that have extended the EO model include the effect of time on EO 
and methodological grounding (Wiklund, 1999); theoretical grounding of the 
constructs (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2005) and relating the EO model to growth 
(Covin et al., 2006).   
 
Covin and Slevin (1991) also undertook empirical work on CE (corporate 
entrepreneurship) and in this way EO formed the conceptual basis for studying 
entrepreneurial behaviour in larger corporations (Kraus et al., 2011).  They 
argued that external, internal and strategic variables have a strong effect on the 
entrepreneurial posture or position of an organization that in turn affects 
performance.  The dynamic interaction enabled the organization to change and 
adapt, and thereby increased its capacity to perform through the interaction of the 
three dimensions: innovativeness, risk-taking and proactiveness.   
 
The Lumpkin and Dess (1996) model was extended by Kropp and Zolin (2008) 
after a study with high-tech start-ups and technology development firms.  The 
performance measure dimension that included, sales growth, market share, 
profitability, overall performance and stakeholder satisfaction were extended to 
include commercialization, technology transfer and survival.  Other researchers 
emphasised the control of internal and external contingent factors when 
performance is examined (Wiklund, 1999; Wiklund and Shepherd, 2005; Rauch 
et al., 2004; Walter et  al., 2005; Covin et al., 2006).  
 
Lumpkin and Dess (2001) went further to test the dimensions of proactiveness 
and competitive aggressiveness on 95 organizations with entrepreneurs and top-
level decision-makers.  They found that a different approach to entrepreneurial 
decision-making by entrepreneurs and top-level executives had different effects 
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on a firm’s performance especially with regard to external factors.  In addition, 
their findings revealed that proactiveness was appropriate in rapidly changing 
environments with several opportunities for young organizations and that 
competitive aggressiveness benefits mature industries where competition is 
fierce.  However, they concluded that EO is not always positively related to 
performance and added that the organization’s conditions and external 
environment is a significant contributing factor. 
 
The concept of opportunity recognition modified the EO model even further.  
Wiklund and Shepherd (2003) argued that opportunity recognition is positively 
related to a firm’s performance and that EO enhances this relationship.  
Researchers that have focused mainly on the performance areas of the EO model 
also found that size was influenced by EO (Rauch et al., 2004), and that access to 
financial resources contributed to performance (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2005).   
 
Stam and Elfring (2008) claimed that EO is not enough for a new entrant to 
increase its wealth (Covin and Slevin, 1983; Ireland et al., 2003), and 
investigated the contribution that social capital and networks made (Walter et al., 
2005).  Their empirical study found support for EO in terms of how networks 
increase performance in new ventures. Renko et al. (2009) have also examined 
the relationship between EO factors in an empirical study on biotechnology start-
ups. They found a link between technology capability and product 
innovativeness., while other researchers have argued that EO is determined by 
the context in which organizations operate (Covin et al., 2006).   
 
Further EO studies relevant to this research is the ability of the model to explain 
the iterative learning experience between entrepreneurial cognition and internal 
stakeholders.  Wang (2008) looked at an organization’s ability to maximize EO 
through learning (Senge, 1990).  While Wang (2008) argued that the model of 
looking at the effect of EO on performance is deficient, the study contributed to 
the literature by demonstrating that a learning organization mediates EO and 
organizational strategy moderates the effect of EO. 
Wang (2008) claimed that for medium-to-large organizations, improvement to 
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performance is dependent on the distribution of the entrepreneurial spirit across 
organizational levels, a commitment to learn, and a shared vision.  In Wang’s 
study, a shared vision was found to be a crucial element in the mediating effect 
of LO in EO and performance.   
Although researchers have modified and tested various dimensions as shown in 
Table 4.2, the model still remains unaltered, and combined with entrepreneurial 
cognition theories forms the theoretical foundation for the components of this 
conceptual framework.  
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TABLE 4.2 ADDITIONAL DIMENSIONS TO ENTREPRENEURIAL ORIENTATION  
Relevant Research Dimensions  
Covin and Slevin (1983) EO + corporate entrepreneurship  
Lumpkin and Dess (1996) EO + proactiveness + competitive aggressiveness 
Kropp and Zolin (1996) EO + commercialisation, technology transfer and survival 
Wiklund (1999) EO + time 
Lumpkin and Dess (2001) EO + different types of decision-making 
Wiklund and Shepherd (2005) EO + opportunity recognition 
Rauch et al. (2004) EO + performance, size and access to finance 
Wiklunch (1999); Rauch et al. (2004); Covin  et al. (2006) EO + controlling internal and external factors 
Covin  et. al. (2006) EO + moderating effect on growth of entrepreneurial 
participative decision-making 
Stam and Elfring (2008); Walter et al. (2005) EO + social capital and networks 
Wang (2008) EO + organizational learning 
Covin and Lictenstein (2012) EO + measurement 
Boso and Cadogan (2013) 
EO + market orientation as success drivers in export 
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Table 4.2 represents research spanning 30 years of EO dimensions that have been 
tested, developed and principally limited to examining start-ups or medium-large 
organizations.  This research modifies and builds on the EO (Lumpkin and Dess, 
1996) model and introduces the interaction of the concepts of entrepreneurial 
cognition, biases, temporality, internal stakeholder perception, growth and 
performance.   
 
4.3 Components of the Conceptual Framework 
 
The basis of this conceptual framework is drawn from the empirical and 
conceptual work of the Lumpkin and Dess (1996) EO model and is underpinned 
by an open systems thinking approach to how each concept is interconnected and 
interdependent (von Bertalanffy, 1968).  
 
The EO model consists of the dimensions of entrepreneurial orientation, 
environmental factors, organizational factors and performance.  Lumpkin and 
Dess (1996) stated that the way in which elements of the model are configured 
will influence the performance, but did not discuss a theoretical configuration 
that explained the interrelationship between entrepreneurial cognitive aspects, 
internal stakeholder perception and performance.  
 
EO is hereby extended to include entrepreneurial cognition and the specific EO 
dimension is modified to include aspects of decision-making, opportunity 
recognition, alertness and schemas because entrepreneurial cognition research 
has found that it affects performance (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000).   
 
The EO dimension of performance as sales growth, market share, profitability, 
overall performance and stakeholder satisfaction is maintained but modified to 
include commercialization, technology and survival (Kropp and Zolin, 1996).     
 
The aspect of organizational factors in the EO model (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996) 
is top management team characteristics and is changed to ‘internal stakeholder 
perception’ to include other management levels with which the entrepreneur 
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interacts.  External environmental factors are not within the boundaries of this 
research and so are not included in the conceptual framework.   
 
There is no feedback loop from performance to the dimensions EO or 
organizational factors in the Lumpkin and Dess (1996) model.  In this conceptual 
framework the interplay between entrepreneurial cognition and internal 
stakeholders is linked to temporality, biases and performance and feeds into the 
interaction between entrepreneurial cognition and internal stakeholders.  The 
feedback loop in this conceptual framework suggests that these concepts have an 
iterative and reinforcing effect on each other. 
 
Figure 4.2 represents the dimensions and linkages between these concepts that 
have been informed by the literature and my experience of the phenomenon.  The 
interplay between these concepts demonstrates the continuous reinforcing 
dynamic nature of the entrepreneurial process.  
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In Lumpkin and Dess’ (1996) model, the entrepreneurial organization is regarded 
as an extension of the entrepreneur.  The dimension autonomy is the independent 
decision-maker and idea generator (Mintzberg, 1973) in Lumpkin and Dess’ 
(1996) model, and is regarded as an aspect of cognition in the conceptual 
framework.   
 
The mindset of an entrepreneur is inextricably linked to the organization through 
the dimension of internal stakeholder perception and is very interdependent 
(Ireland et al., 2003) and explained within the conceptual framework.  The 
critical aspect of this conceptual framework is the interrelationship between the 
way entrepreneurial cognition is communicated to the internal stakeholders and 
the way this communication is perceived and fed back to the entrepreneur as 
represented in open systems thinking.  Linking these concepts builds on the 
differences between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs cognition in literature.    
 
In this conceptual framework I have extended the EO model by conceptually 
presenting that there is interplay between the dimensions of entrepreneurial 
cognition and internal stakeholder perception that affects performance, which in 
turn affects the interrelationship.  More specifically, entrepreneurs are going 
through a cognitive process in which they scan, analyse, and interpret their 
environment in order to recognize an opportunity.   
 
The entrepreneurial process of opportunity recognition contributes to performing 
organizations (Markman and Baron, 2003).  However, research shows that these 
organizations perform and grow through a contribution from non-entrepreneurs 
through shared cognition (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000), and entrepreneurs 
communicating their strategic decision-making (Vermuelen and Cursue, 2008).  
Although contradicting this argument, it was mentioned earlier in EO research, 
that participative entrepreneurial strategic decision-making has a moderating 
effect on performance (Covin et al., 2006).   
 
The process of entrepreneurial cognition and biases is dependent on the 
organizational context (Casson, 2010).  This conceptual framework considers the 
organizational factors that the entrepreneur and internal stakeholders are 
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communicating about as influencing the interrelationship.  This builds on Covin 
et al.’s (2006) argument that the context of the organization will determine the 
EO of an organization.   
 
At an organizational level, EO (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996) refers to 
innovativeness in the entrepreneurial process (Schumpeter, 1934) that reflects an 
organization’s capacity for new ideas and willingness for new and creative 
practices (Miller, 1987).  In the conceptual framework, the process of 
innovativeness is extended to include an entrepreneur’s cognitive process of 
opportunity recognition and alertness.  
 
The entrepreneurial cognitive dimension of alertness influences the speed at 
which the entrepreneur interacts with the organization (Gaglio and Katz, 2001), 
and temporality is considered as a dimension that influences this interaction.  
Furthermore, the assumptions made in the conceptual framework are based on 
Vaghely and Julien’s (2010) argument that opportunity identification and 
recognition is sensitive and dependent on time, which has been ignored by other 
theories.  This cognitive process enables entrepreneurs to see opportunities others 
cannot see and is regarded as proactiveness in EO (Miller and Friesen, 1978; 
Lumpkin and Dess, 1996) and entrepreneurs acting on future needs by 
Venkatraman (1989).  
 
The literature on entrepreneurial cognitive dimension of decision-making states 
that the entrepreneur is either using heuristics or analysis to make decisions, and 
adeptly switches between two cognitive processing systems (Busenitz and 
Barney, 1997; Vaghely and Julien, 2010).   The conceptual framework extends 
this aspect of decision-making to explore how these differences make sense 
(Weick, 1979) to internal stakeholders in the decision-making process within the 
context (Casson, 2010) or issue domains (Maitlis, 2005) with which they 
interact.   
 
Individual cognitive differences such as decision-making and opportunity 
recognition between entrepreneurial cognition and non-entrepreneurs may affect 
the interaction between the entrepreneur and the internal stakeholders and has a 
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mediating effect in shared cognition (Busenitz and Barney, 1997; Cornelissen 
and Clarke, 2012).  In addition, entrepreneurial cognition is affected by biases 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) that non-entrepreneurs are less affected by 
(Baron, 1998).  Based on this literature, biases are considered an important 
conceptual component of the interaction between the entrepreneur and the 
internal stakeholders in this conceptual framework.  Casson (2010) reinforced 
this view that entrepreneurs use their experience to represent knowledge and 
patterns that is different to managers’ schemas.   
 
The biases dimension is an extension of the EO model and includes 
overconfidence, representativeness, intuition, optimism, planning fallacy and 
illusion of control.  These biases are aspects of cognition that  (1) influence the 
way in which the entrepreneur frames a problem, takes in information and makes 
decisions (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; Shane, 2007); (2) has a heavily 
weighted role to play in entrepreneur’s decision-making (Busenitz and Barney, 
1997; Baron, 1998; Simon et al., 2000); (3) show that entrepreneurs are more 
susceptible than others (Baron, 2004) and (4) have been linked to growth 
(Mintzberg, 1978, 1982). The influence of biases is therefore regarded as 
significant in the interplay between entrepreneurial cognition and internal 
stakeholder perception.  
 
The temporal concept reflects the time line associated with entrepreneurial 
cognition such as decision-making, opportunity recognition and alertness to 
opportunities and when they communicate these cognitive processes to internal 
stakeholders.   It was noted in research earlier that timing with regards to 
opportunity recognition and reacting to the market are important aspects of 
entrepreneurship.  In addition, actions and interventions in the organization by 
entrepreneurs and internal stakeholders have a temporal aspect to them (Balkin et 
al., 2000).  Timing is therefore considered as an important aspect of the interplay 
in this conceptual framework.   
 
The performance dimension forms part of the EO model.  In addition, 
entrepreneurial literature has linked growth and venture creation in 
entrepreneurial firms to entrepreneurial cognitive aspects such as decision-
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making and opportunity recognition (Mitchell et al., 2002, 2007; Wright and 
Stigliani, 2013).  Lumpkin and Dess (1996) provided an empirical and 
conceptual basis, claiming that organizational factors influence EO and 
subsequently lead to performance.  But their EO model does not include a 
reciprocal dimension for the cognitive interrelationship between the entrepreneur 
and internal stakeholder contribution to performance.  In this way, the conceptual 
framework extends the EO model by exploring the influence of performance on 
the interrelationship between the dimensions of entrepreneurial cognition and 
internal stakeholder perceptions and includes growth in the conceptual 
framework.   
 
4.4 Models Considered but Not Selected 
 
Conceptual models that represent the interplay between entrepreneurial cognition 
and internal stakeholder perceptions was  underrepresented in the literature The 
frameworks that were reviewed have been drawn from studies on entrepreneurial 
cognition and general organizational models on the interplay between the 
entrepreneur and the environment.  In considering their conceptual and empirical 
contributions, the models discussed in chronological order below formed part of 
the decision-making process to select the Lumpkin and Dess (1996) EO 
organizational level model.  Table 4.3 summaries the models that were rejected.
 76
TABLE 4.3 MODELS CONSIDERED BUT NOT SELECTED 
Model Author and Date Reason for Rejection 
EO 
Energy Conversion 
 
Covin and Slevin 
(1991) 
Focuses on the entrepreneur and environment 
Emphasises the interplay of entrepreneurial posture, culture and structure 
Organizational level perspective  
Focuses on organizational behaviour 
P-E fit Markman and Baron 
(2003) 
Lack of empirical research 
Focuses specifically on performance and opportunity recognition  
Entrepreneurial 
Psychological 
Attributes and 
Processes 
Shane (2007) No feedback loop or dimension that influences execution of the opportunity 
 
ETCC West (2007) Focused on start-ups 
Lack of empirical research  
 
Dynamic State Levie and Lichtenstein 
(2010) 
Limited empirical research 
Focused on the entrepreneur 
Dynamic Spiral 
Loops 
 
Shepherd et al. (2010) Focused on the interplay between entrepreneurial mind-set and organizational 
culture 
Lack empirical research and limited dimensions  
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4.5 Limitations of the Conceptual Framework 
 
This framework is the first conceptualisation of the interplay between 
entrepreneurial cognition and internal stakeholder perception, building on 
entrepreneurship cognition research and organizational dynamic studies on 
interrelationships.  At this point of the research, the conceptual framework 
represents assumptions that are based on theoretical perspectives that have been 
extracted from literature and my professional experience about the importance of 
these dimensions.     
 
The interlinking combination of concepts are not cause and effect relationships, 
but have an influence on each other which is modified after the findings have 
been analysed in Chapter 12 Analysis and Discussion.  
 
4.6 Summary 
 
In order to investigate the interplay between entrepreneurial cognition and 
internal stakeholder perception, this chapter has explained the theories that have 
collectively formed part of the conceptual framework.  In doing so, the 
interrelated concepts of entrepreneurial cognition, internal stakeholders, 
temporality, biases, communication and performance were combined to 
undertake the research. 
 
The following chapter uses this conceptual framework to inform the research 
design that in turn is linked to the research methodology and methods. 
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Chapter 5 Research Design    
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter presents the research strategy and provides the philosophical 
foundation for the study.  In this way, the research design provides a direct link 
between my research questions and the data collection process (Punch, 2000).  
This chapter is divided into the rationale for the philosophical perspective, 
reiterating the aims and objectives of this empirical research, followed by the 
research design and a philosophical discussion of the ontological and 
epistemological views, articulating the phenomenological position of this 
research, and the reasons for the selection of qualitative research for this 
research.    
 
5.2 Rationale for Research Approach 
 
In order to design the research questions I drew on theoretical perspectives from 
cognition, management and organizational literature.  In conjunction, my 
professional experience as an organizational psychologist, business founder and 
academic steered the design of the research questions.  In this way the primary 
research question explored how entrepreneurial cognitive processes, such as 
strategic decision-making and opportunity recognition, interplay with internal 
stakeholder perception.  The three supplementary questions that address the 
supporting issues are concerned with biases, temporality, growth and 
performance.  The four research questions were then answered by combining 
these disparate concepts that emerged from the literature review in a new way to 
investigate these interrelationships.  The research approach is inductive and the 
conceptual framework provided the format in which the research was designed, 
the fieldwork undertaken and the findings were analysed.  
 
5.3 Research Design 
 
Research design is a holistic approach to the research process (Hussey and 
Hussey, 1997) which showed the methodological steps taken during this research 
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process.  This approach helped me to select appropriate methods for data 
collection and analysis while cognizant of the research limitations and constraints 
(Saunders et al., 2000).  The research design in Box 5.1 consists of nine 
methodological steps that reflect the overall research process and were used 
iteratively with constant consideration given to threats to the research process 
(Maxwell, 2005). 
 
BOX 5.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 
Step One:  Getting Started 
Define the research question and search for gaps in entrepreneurial cognition and biases, 
and interplay frameworks, theories and models from entrepreneurship and organizational 
literature.  
Stage Two:  Case Selection for Data Collection 
Specify the population and criteria for case studies.  Negotiate access to firms for data 
collection. 
Stage Three:  Preparation for Data Collection 
Consider multiple data collection methods that are most suitable for a qualitative 
approach.  
Stage Four:  Data Collection 
Interviews in two phases based on selection criteria.  Interview nine cases in semi-
structured interviews.  Interview three cases quarterly in Phase II for twelve months. 
Overlap data collection and analysis. 
Stage Five:  Reduce Data  
Gain familiarity with data.  Sort, categorise and code interview transcripts using Nvivo 9.  
Use iterative and recursive processes to reduce data. 
Stage Six:  Analyse Data 
Theory generation. Within case and cross-case analysis. Evidence gathered through 
multiple lenses to identify case similarities and differences. 
Stage Seven:  Shaping Research Questions  
Iterative tabulation of each construct to confirm, extend and sharpen theory. 
Stage Eight:  Discussion of Findings and Claims 
Raises theoretical level through discussion of literature, conceptual framework and 
research questions.  
Stage Nine:  Reaching Closure 
Theoretical saturation when possible.  Draw conclusions from discussion. Contributions 
to knowledge and areas for future research. 
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Source:  Adapted from Eisenhardt (1989) 
 
Stages 1-9 describe the process from the first point at which the research 
philosophy and methodology is established, through to the analysis and 
theoretical saturation.  An iterative process of checking the data collection 
methods with the theoretical underpinnings was on-going throughout the 
research process.  Chapter 6 Methodology and Methods that follows, explains 
these stages in more detail and describes the alternative data collection methods 
that were considered and rejected. 
 
5.4 Ontological Position 
 
The aims and objectives of this research are best suited to an interpretivist 
constructionist ontology which states that there is no objective reality (Krauss, 
2005).  The stance that everyone experiences life through their own point of view 
and perceptions are consistent with this research.  This constructivist ontology 
posits that meaning lies in cognition, and is not external to the individual 
(Lythcott and Duschle, 1990).  The reason for this view is that reality is 
constructed and interpreted in society by individuals (Denscombe, 2007).  With 
this in mind, the most appropriate philosophical position for gaining insight into 
the interplay between entrepreneurial cognition and internal stakeholder 
perception is through a social constructiivist perspective.  A constructivist 
approach also allows for “multiple knowledges” to coexist when there is a lack 
of consensus (Guba and Lincoln, 1994: 113) which is relevant for this research 
that investigates the entrepreneur and internal stakeholder’s interaction. 
 
Kuhn (1996) defined a paradigm as a way of seeing the world and a commitment 
to the same set of rules as others of a similar disposition.  In this way he gave 
legitimacy to other researchers who have categorized paradigms.  In the context 
of undertaking research Guba and Lincoln (1994) and Creswell (2007) posit that 
a paradigm is an individual’s belief system that guides an investigation.  
Creswell categorises four main paradigms in Table 5.1 as post-positivism, 
participatory, pragmatism and constructivism. 
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TABLE 5.1 PARADIGMS  
Post-positivism Constructivism 
Determination 
Reductionism 
Empirical observation and 
measurement 
Theory verification 
Understanding 
Multiple participant meanings 
Social and historical construction 
Theory generation 
Advocacy/Participatory Pragmatism 
Political 
Empowerment issue-orientation 
Collaborative 
Change orientated 
Consequences of actions 
Problem-centred 
Pluralistic 
Real-world practice orientated 
Source:  Creswell (2007) 
 
The post-positivist paradigm challenges the positivists, an earlier philosophy of 
post-positivism, view that knowledge is an absolute truth.  But like positivism it 
is also deterministic in its outlook, determining effects or outcomes in a 
reductionist way by looking at what causes the phenomenon, event or process.  
In contrast to the constructivist assumption, the positivist separates the self from 
the world they study and rejects phenomena that are observable but cannot be 
measured (Healy and Perry, 2000; Denscombe, 2007). 
 
The positivist paradigm focuses more on the externally created social world 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2009).  It is reductionist because of the way it reduces 
ideas into something that is testable and measureable in order to prove 
predetermined theories from the collected data (Creswell, 2007).  Denscombe 
(2007) argued that one of the differences between interpretivism and positivism 
refers to where social reality is constructed in an entrepreneurial organizational 
context.  In this research the entrepreneur and internal stakeholders construct 
realities that do not exist objectively in the way positivists would argue (Denzin 
& Lincoln, 2000).  This research is concerned with how and why these realities 
are constructed. 
 
Creswell (2007) describes the participatory paradigm as a development from the 
constructivist paradigm with specific consideration to the political agenda.  This 
is in contrast to the positivists who imposed structure, laws and theories.  The 
emphasis of this paradigm is on improving individuals’ lives and therefore the 
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research questions are focused towards an action agenda.  As this research is not 
about socially improving participants’ lives by formulating policy, it is not a 
suitable paradigm to adopt for this research. 
 
The pragmatism paradigm has much more freedom in the methods it allows and 
is not confined to one system.  It is characterised by whatever the researcher feels 
is appropriate at the time with an open-minded approach to multiple different 
methods and different assumptions. 
 
The constructivist paradigm (Piaget, 1967) is adopted in this research in which 
the learner is actively involved in the construction (Papert, 1980).  More specific 
to this research is the view of Lindgren and Packendorff  (2009) who argued that 
constructionism is a suitable ontological perspective with which to study 
entrepreneurship and the interpretation of meanings in management (Saunders et 
al., 2000).  The socially constructed and re-structured view of individuals about 
what constitutes entrepreneurship is the basis for this argument.  This constructed 
view developed as a result of interactions such as the sharing of ideas in 
meetings, discussion and other social interactions (Jack and Anderson, 2002).  In 
the same way, entrepreneurs’ interactions and thinking form part of the 
entrepreneurial process.  These shared views are in contrast to a more 
deterministic scientific view of the entrepreneur.  The ontological position of 
entrepreneurship as a social construction between people (Table 5.2) supports the 
case study methodology in this research. 
 
TABLE 5.2 ENTREPRENEURSHIP AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION 
 
Position 
Entrepreneurship as a Social Construction 
Ontological position (view of 
reality) 
 
Entrepreneurship is inter-subjectively 
interpreted and constructed in social 
interaction between people 
Epistemological position (view 
of knowledge) 
Entrepreneurship research aims at creating 
understandings of how and why actors 
interpret and construct entrepreneurial 
processes. 
Ideological position (view 
legitimizes research) 
Awareness and responsibility required of 
researchers 
Source:  Lindgren and Packendorff (2009)  
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5.4.1 Epistemology  
 
This ontological view of ‘beings’ leads to the study of the construction of 
knowledge, which is termed epistemology.  The epistemological position of this 
research is interpretivism, which forms part of social constructionism.  The aim 
of interpretivism is to understand and explain individual experiences (Esterby-
Smith et al., 2009).  The sharing and construction of knowledge in this research 
is context specific, and should be understood in relation to the situation.  In this 
way, Easterby-Smith et al. (2009) argue that knowledge is constructed and ideas 
can be generated from a small sample compared with the more generalized view 
of the positivist epistemology in which large numbers are used and causality 
between interactions is established. 
 
This process approach to the research is part of an ongoing discussion amongst 
researchers in entrepreneurship who argue that it is the most suitable 
epistemological approach  (Bygrave, 1989; Zahra, 2007).  The inductive 
approach adopted in this research “will develop and construct theory” (Trafford 
and Leshem, 2008: 97) and is qualitative because it aims to seek meaning and 
interpretation rather than measurement of the social world (Creswell, 2007).  
 
5.4.2 Qualitative Research 
 
Qualitative research is used as a methodology in this research because of the rich 
detailed way in which phenomena can be investigated within the context in 
which they occur (Krauss, 2005).  Krauss argued that it facilitates the meaning-
making process which Bloomberg and Volpe (2008) suggested allows questions 
of how and why knowledge is socially constructed to be captured.  Denscombe 
(2007) regarded these rich descriptions that are socially constructed as multi-
layered, providing the researcher with greater insight, and defined by Creswell 
(2007: 27) as representing “a means for exploring and understanding the 
meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem”.   
 
Because this research will gain insight into the under-researched area of 
cognitive interactions between individuals, ‘building theory’ is more appropriate 
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than the quantitative approach of testing theory (Yin, 2007).  Building theory in 
this research contributes to the paucity of studies that combine entrepreneurial 
cognition (Kaish and Gilad, 1991; Busenitz and Lau, 1996; Busenitz and Barney, 
1997; Mitchell et al., 2000, 2002; Gaglio and Katz, 2001; Vaghely and Julien, 
2010) and biases (Tversky and Kahneman, 1979) with organizational factors 
(Mitchell et al., 2007).  Furthermore, quantitative research is characterised by 
‘theory verification’ and is a way of testing theories by examining relationships 
among variables using statistical analysis (Creswell, 2007).  Therefore, the 
reasons why and how entrepreneurial cognition interplays with internal 
stakeholder perceptions could not be captured through these cause and effect 
techniques used in quantitative research (Bloomberg and Volpe, 2008).   
 
In this study I required insight, and although the search for causality “is a useful 
human tool for picturing a process of events” (Gene and Chan, 1997: 60), it does 
not answer the question of why and how entrepreneurial cognition interacts with 
internal stakeholder perception.  Lichtman (2006) favoured a constructivist 
philosophy which enabled qualitative researchers to understand the context in 
which participants think and construct their views. Lichtman advocated that 
researchers should visit the environment in order to do this.   
 
Inductive research develops theory while deductive research tests theory and 
Table 5.3 summarises the key differences.  These characteristics of differences 
informed my methodological decisions and subsequent methods used in the data 
collection process.   
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TABLE 5.3 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INDUCTIVE AND DEDUCTIVE RESEARCH 
Source:  Adapted from Lichtman (2006) and Johnson and Christensen (2008)    
Criteria Inductive Research Deductive Research 
Purpose To understand and interpret social interactions To test hypotheses, look at cause and effect, 
and make predictions 
Group Studied Smaller and not randomly selected Larger and randomly selected 
Variables Study of the whole, not variables Specific variables studied 
Type of Data Collected Words, images or objects Numbers and statistics 
Form of Data Collected Qualitative data such as open-ended responses, interviews, 
participant observations, field notes and reflections 
Quantitative data based on precise 
measurements using structured and 
validated data-collection instruments 
Type of Data Analysis Identify patterns, features and themes Identify statistical relationships 
Objectivity and 
Subjectivity 
Subjectivity is expected Objectivity is critical 
Role of Researcher Research and their biases maybe known to participants in 
the study and participant characteristics may be known to 
the researcher 
Research and their biases are not known to 
participant in the study and participant 
characteristics are deliberately hidden from 
the researcher 
Results Conclusions cannot be  generalized Conclusions can be generalized 
View of Human 
Behaviour 
Dynamic, situation, social and personal Regular and predictable 
Common Research 
Objectives 
Explore, discover and construct Describe, explain and predict 
Nature of Observation Study in natural environment Study under controlled conditions 
Nature of Reality Multiple realities, subjective Single reality, objective 
Final Report Contextual description and direct quote  Statistical report with correlations and 
comparisons 
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I am aware of subjectivity and biases in the data collection and analysis processes 
(Denscombe, 2007).  However, as Denscombe argued, biases are entrenched in the 
research process and cannot be extracted.  Delbridge and Kirkpatrick in Saunders et 
al. (2009: 43) captured this argument and said, “we are part of the social world we are 
studying, we cannot detach ourselves from it”. Husserl (1970) described extracting 
oneself from the situation  as ‘bracketing’ the outside world and certain beliefs, or 
suspending judgement regarding particular phenomena in order to have a clear view.  
 
One way to reduce this bias is by using my skills as a psychologist to listen in a 
neutral state (Patton 2002; Denscombe, 2007), but at the same time being open to 
what I hear.  Another way I reduced my research bias was to discuss my research with 
colleagues in both the external and internal academic environment.  Discussions with 
academic peers internally included my supervisors who are both experts in their 
respective fields as well as methodologically experienced.  Creswelll (2007) calls this 
process ‘external audits’ in which the presentation of conference papers provided 
valuable feedback and opportunities to share my research with peers internationally, 
and increased external validity at the same time.   
 
Table 5.4 represents the symposiums and conferences at which I presented my 
research.  The external audits are a significant aspect of my personal and professional 
development.  I believe that the quality of my thesis has been improved through the 
feedback from academics and practitioners by presenting my research at regular 
stages where my thinking was challenged.  My personal learning has been enriched 
through discussions with peers from different perspectives and cultural orientations. 
In addition, Table 5.4 shows that from the beginning of this research the academic 
community has demonstrated an interest by accepting my earlier research for 
presentation at international conferences.  
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TABLE 5.4 CONFERENCES ATTENDED AND JOURNAL PUBLICATIONS  
Year Conference/Journal  Title 
2009/10 University of Plymouth, “Building Bridges in Social Science” 
EIASM (European Institute for Advanced Studies in 
Management) London, “Entrepreneurship and Innovation” 
Interplay between the entrepreneurial personality and the firm 
Entrepreneurial processes: The interplay of entrepreneurial 
thinking processes and the business 
ECSB (European Council for Small Business), Bulgaria, 
“European Entrepreneurship as an Engine for Post-Crisis” 
Interplay between the entrepreneurial personality and the firm 
2010/11 ICSB (International Council for Small Business) Sweden, 
“Changes in Perspectives of Global Entrepreneurship”  
Entrepreneurial processes: The interplay of entrepreneurial 
thinking processes and the business 
ISBE (Institute for Small Business and Entrepreneurship) 
Sheffield, “Sustainable Futures” 
The interplay of entrepreneurial thinking processes and the 
business 
EFMD (European Foundation for Management Development) 
Estonia, “Does Entrepreneurship Matter?” 
Entrepreneurial processes: The interplay of entrepreneurial 
thinking processes and the business 
RENT, Norway  The interplay of entrepreneurial thinking processes and the 
business 
 
ICSB, New Zealand (poster accepted-not presented) 
 
The interplay of entrepreneurial thinking processes and the 
business 
2011/12 RENT Lyon, France Understanding how entrepreneurial cognition interacts with 
internal stakeholders in the context of organizational growth 
 
 
EIASM, Finland 
 
Decision-making and opportunity recognition: The interplay 
between entrepreneurs and internal stakeholders 
EIASM, Venice 
 
Decision-making and opportunity recognition: The interplay 
between entrepreneurs and internal stakeholders 
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ICSB Dublin, Ireland 
The Interplay between Entrepreneurial Cognitive Mechanisms 
and Internal Stakeholders 
 
2012/13 ISBE (Institute for Small Business and Entrepreneurship) 
Cardiff, Wales 
Cognitive Alignment in Entrepreneurial Team building  
 
RENT, Lithuania  The Effect of Selective Entrepreneurial Learning on 
Interrelationships with Management and Performance 
2013 International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Business The interplay of entrepreneurial cognition and internal 
stakeholders 
2013/2014 Management Learning (working paper) Sensemaking and learning in established entrepreneurial 
organizations 
2014 Systemic Entrepreneurship, South Africa Effect of Selective Entrepreneurial Learning on 
Interrelationships with Management and Organizational 
Performance 
2014 Entrepreneurship, SMEs and Social Enterprise, Romania Cognitive Alignment in Entrepreneurial Team building 
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5.4.3 Phenomenology 
 
This research takes a phenomenological ontological position.  I am interested in the 
way people experience life as described by Bloomberg and Volpe (2008: 11), “to 
identify the core essence of human experience as described by research participants”.   
Ontology is defined as the concern for the nature of reality and phenomenological 
ontology raises questions about the way the world operates (Saunders et al., 2007). 
 
The history of the phenomenological tradition in the early 20th Century was led by 
Edmund Husserl and his followers and is considered to be both a movement and a 
discipline within philosophy. Phenomenology has become more popular as research 
methodology (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000).  Husserl was concerned with individuals’ 
perception of stimuli within a context and how they experienced the world.  
Denscombe (2007) explains that phenomenology is based on subjectivity, description 
and interpretation, and takes into account multiple realities.  These meanings form 
part of phenomenology, and are an appropriate perspective with which to view the 
way entrepreneurs and internal stakeholders interact.  This research is interested in the 
meanings participants assign to the interplay of cognitive processes as opposed to the 
positivist stance of objectivity and measurement (Denscombe, 2007). 
 
The conscious view of Husserl between the mind and the external environment is a 
suitable perspective for studying the perceptions of the entrepreneur and internal 
stakeholders in their environment.  Patton (2002) adds that collecting data from 
people directly, is the phenomenological view because they have direct involvement 
with the phenomenon. 
 
Laverty (2003) explored how several researchers have attempted to provide answers 
using Husserl’s methodological idea of ‘bracketing’.  However, Laverty’s (2003) 
suggestion that interpretations arise through a blend of the text and its context, as well 
as the participants, the researcher, and their contexts, is the approach taken in this 
research.  There were multiple individuals interviewed with regards to their views on 
the same interaction process.  Denscombe (2007) explained that the social 
construction by multiple people seeing things differently is an acceptable feature of 
this perspective.  From a phenomenological perspective, what people see and describe 
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emerges from their respective experiences and accounts (Patton, 2002).   In this way, 
my research takes a phenomenological perspective since it is based on the perception 
of the entrepreneurs and the internal stakeholders of their interactions and all the 
biases associated with retrieving the past as well as my own perception and analysis 
of the responses. 
 
The discussion in this chapter on my philosophical position helped me to design the 
research, use the conceptual framework to identify issues to investigate and also 
informed the methodological approach I used. 
 
5.5 Summary 
 
This chapter presents the research strategy and philosophy for this empirical research. 
The thinking behind the research design is explained so that this research can be 
replicated.  The next chapter explains the research methodology and methods used in 
this research process and the associated ethical considerations.   
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Chapter 6 Research Methodology and Methods   
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 6 discusses the methodology and the methods selected in this research 
guided by the philosophical stance presented in Chapter 5.  Its sections present 
the rationale for the use of a case study methodology, the advantages and 
disadvantages of using case study as a method, and multiple case studies which 
contextualise the interactions between the entrepreneur and internal stakeholders 
using issue domains.  The justification for a longitudinal approach, the selection 
criteria and a discussion on semi-structured interviews follows.  A section on the 
use of email data in the triangulation process, data collection processes, and 
issues regarding reliability and validity are addressed.  Finally, a consideration of 
the ethics of the study and summary closes the chapter.  
  
6.2 Rationale for a Case Study Methodology  
 
This research adopted was inductive which Bloomberg and Volpe (2008) 
stressed, captures the process of interaction and is most suited to case study 
design.  As a methodology, case study research allows for the analysis of a 
phenomenon or system that is bound by time or place (Miles and Huberman, 
1994; Creswell, 2007), using multiple data sources to understand individual and 
comparative cases (Yin, 2008).   
 
I adopted the social constructionism paradigm because I wanted to explore the 
interrelationships between the entrepreneur and internal stakeholders in their 
natural organizational context.  In addition, by using this paradigm I was able to 
investigate how participants socially constructed their interrelationship through 
their own point of view.  The view that I hold is aligned with Krauss (2005) that 
there is no objective reality and that cognition resides inside the individual.    
 
The process used to acquire, build and analyse the data in the research process is 
represented by Figure 6,1 in which Trafford and Lesham (2008) show the 
iterative stages of research suggested by Creswell (2007) that an illustration of 
the research approach is considered an effective way to increase social research 
validity. 
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Chapter 7 Phase I Case Selection and Phase II Data Coding 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a descriptive account of the nine cases in Phase I derived 
from the interviews of entrepreneurs and internal stakeholders, and the analytical 
data coding process.  Direct quotes are shown in italics to represent the thoughts 
and perceptions of the entrepreneur and internal stakeholders from these 
interviews. 
 
The analytical data process took place with entrepreneurs and internal 
stakeholders from three cases identified in Chapter 6 to categorize the empirical 
data into meaningful concepts.  The selection criteria for the entrepreneurs and 
internal stakeholder and the data coding process for Phase II are presented.  
 
7.2 Cases A-I Selection  
 
Table 7.1 below illustrates a synopsis of the nine organizations used in this 
research.  In Cases A, B, C, E, G, H and I, the founders were still strategically 
involved in the business, and interacted with the management team.  Individuals 
in the management team are referred to in this study as ‘internal stakeholders’.  
In order to meet the objectives of the study, entrepreneurs and internal 
stakeholders had to have regular interaction over strategic and operational 
decisions regarding the organization’s growth and performance.   
 
The tenure of the cases ranged from six years (Case H) to fifty years (Case E), 
although in Case E, the entrepreneur took over the family business from his 
father 40 years after start-up.  
 
TABLE 7.1 SYNOPSIS OF CASES A-I 
Case 
Study 
Company 
Tenure 
Sector-Specific Focus 
A 20+ years Contract Pharmaceutical, Biotech and Healthcare industries 
B 10+ years Specialists in Electrical Testing, Fixed Wire Testing, 
Portable Appliance Testing, Periodic Inspection 
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C 20+ years Creating new business based on advances in Technology 
(Digital Printing, Communications, Instrumentations, 
Medical Products Drug Discovery, Micro Devices, Optics 
Software) 
D 17+ years Publishing and Consultancy 
E 50+ years Manufactures and supplies standard bespoke temperature 
controlled laboratory equipment for incubating, shaking and 
mixing samples 
F 10+ years Technology, Software, Micro Systems 
G 10+ years A members organization for Health and Life Science 
companies  
H 6+ years Makes Micro Chip Gas Sensors, Nano technology 
I 10+ years Specialist Recruitment  
Note:  The shaded area represents the three cases selected for Phase II 
interviews. 
 
Using the four selection criteria identified in Chapter 6 the following section 
presents the findings and the decisions for further investigation. 
 
7.3 Case A Profile  
 
Case A is a privately owned organization employing 72 people, which services 
the Pharmaceutical, Biotech and Healthcare industries through attracting and 
fulfilling contracts for clients.  These services include chemical and physical 
analysis of pharmaceutical products, identifying the chemical composition of 
packaging used, and developing new chemical entities into pharmaceutical 
products.  More recently, the organization had invested in a manufacturing suite 
to enhance their subcontracting offer to clients and increase their market share.  
 
Three entrepreneurs originally founded the organization and were actively 
involved in decision-making.  The entrepreneur interviewed is the Chairman and 
had a partial role as the Managing Director (MD) whilst trying to hand over the 
MD role to the internal stakeholder, who had been with the organization for 
several years.   
 
The second co-founder, the entrepreneur’s wife, is the Finance Director (FD); the 
third co-founder is the Quality Director (QD).  Other members of the 
entrepreneur’s family worked in the business: his son, who is the Business 
 121
Developer had ten years working in the organization, and his brother-in-law is a 
Project Manager.   
 
The organization appears to have a socialist culture, in that everybody is treated 
equally, with no special benefits for executives such as company cars or private 
health insurance.  The organization did not own any intellectual property and 
operated a consultancy model, charging their time to clients rather than selling 
products.   
 
The incoming MD considered it to be a people and products based business, 
rather than a manufacturing business.  However, unlike some other service sector 
organizations, they operated in a heavily regulated environment.  Because of this 
regulation, several processes had been implemented which was subsequently 
monitored and controlled both internally and externally.  
 
The MD internal stakeholder highlighted that he and the entrepreneur had a 
similar cognitive process and approached decisions in a similar way even though 
he noted differences in their background.  He mentioned that the entrepreneur 
followed a technical and commercial route before starting the organization, 
whilst he gained experience by working in sales and marketing before joining the 
company.    
 
7.3.1 Entrepreneurial Interaction with the Internal Stakeholders (Q1 and 
Q3) 
 
The MD internal stakeholder mentioned that he interacted and managed the 
relationship with both the entrepreneur and the organization.  He sometimes 
found this to be a challenge, because of the 20 years experience that the 
entrepreneur had in building it.  
 
Internal Stakeholder 
That’s something that we’re going through this year, it’s something that 
(the entrepreneur) and I are just sitting down now and talking about, 
some of the different options. 
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The internal stakeholder felt that the entrepreneur did not manage the 
relationship with him, and that succession management was clearly a difficult 
aspect for the entrepreneur.  
 
Internal Stakeholder 
Obviously you wouldn’t hand over your baby after 20 years and say there 
you go, you look after it now and get on with it.  I think again it’s quite an 
interesting situation to manage, it requires management of both the 
founder and the company. 
 
However, the internal stakeholder did feel that he had actively made a steady 
impact on the company in the five to six years since the entrepreneur first handed 
him the role of MD.  
 
It was clear from the interviews with both the entrepreneur and the internal 
stakeholder that they communicated daily, and that further exploration of the 
issues they discussed, such as succession management, manufacturing, and 
recruiting would provide a rich environment for Phase II investigation. 
 
7.3.2 Entrepreneurial Participation in Decision-Making (Q1, Q2 And Q3) 
 
The second criterion, derived from the research questions, was to assess if the 
entrepreneur was still involved significantly in strategic and operational decision-
making process.  Both confirmed that they were interactively engaged with this 
process.  
 
Entrepreneur 
So it is really then around your pricing strategy, right from 
understanding how much work you can get done in a day.  So there’s a 
lot of work in the front end to get that planned efficiently. 
 
The internal stakeholder viewed himself, rather than the entrepreneur, as being 
responsible for the success of certain aspects of the organization’s growth.  There 
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was constant interaction between the entrepreneur and the internal stakeholder 
with regards to driving things forward in the organization.  This was regarded by 
both as a key interaction.   
 
7.3.3 Entrepreneurial Participation in Opportunity Recognition (Q1 And 
Q4) 
 
At the time of this interview the organization appeared to be experiencing 
significant change and growth.  Case A’s growth was defined as productivity, the 
number of employees and consultancy time sold to clients.  Because of this 
approach, the internal stakeholder felt that growth was restricted and increasing 
growth quickly would be a challenge.   
 
MD Internal Stakeholder 
I think there’s an interest in how you change pace of growth. Can you do 
it in a company that is mature?  You know you can step up the mark to 
growing at 50% a year or 100% a year, or does the size of the company 
become naturally limiting at some point?  In order to grow they have to 
be more efficient, and increase productivity. 
 
He defined growth as the achievement of client satisfaction, which he regarded 
as his contribution to the organization.  Both the entrepreneur and MD internal 
stakeholder constantly mentioned that the organization needed to change in order 
to grow.   
 
Entrepreneur 
So it’s a transition for them as well that they need to be moving on and 
moving upwards in terms of their thinking and what they are doing.  It’s 
been very positive so far, we’ve grown by getting on to nearly 20% this 
year…looking to do the same again next year. 
 
Case A showed that the entrepreneur and the internal stakeholder interacted daily 
with regards to decision-making and looking for growth opportunities.  
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7.3.4 Availability of the Entrepreneur and the Internal Stakeholders (Q2) 
 
In Case A, the entrepreneur and internal stakeholder were available to discuss 
major operational and decision-making issues.  This offered the level of 
interaction that was needed for the research in Phase II.  The organization was 
also changing as a result of the global recession that started in 2008 and was still 
in a state of change.  This environment provided several opportunities to explore 
the reciprocal dynamic between the entrepreneur and internal stakeholders as 
they worked through these changes and challenges.  
 
After the interview with the entrepreneur and the internal stakeholder, I decided 
that Case A was a suitable for Phase II exploration. 
 
7.4 Case B Profile 
 
Case B is a privately owned organization founded in 1993 by the entrepreneur to 
assist clients with their responsibilities under the Electricity Work Act 1989.  
They are specialists in Health and Safety Compliance Services, which include 
testing on portable appliances, electrical goods, emergency lighting, fire alarm 
and maintenance and detection services.  The organization had a network of over 
100 field-based engineers working in over 35,000 locations throughout the UK.  
The engineering team was supported by a further 40 staff in management, 
planning, administration, and sales.  Contracts with clients of all sizes, ranged 
from small one-off contracts to individual national contracts.  It was still 
managed by the entrepreneur, who was the predominant decision-maker, 
working alongside the internal stakeholders.   
 
7.4.1 Entrepreneurial Interaction with the Internal Stakeholders (Q1 and 
Q3) 
 
The entrepreneur in Case B interacted with the internal stakeholders in a 
selection of ways depending on the strategic or operational decision that was 
required.  Depending on how the business operated, sales conducted, standard of 
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operations set, and relationships with clients undertaken, he would be actively 
involved and claimed to be aware of what was going on.   
 
Entrepreneur 
 
They can see the line between how the business operates, how (I) operate, 
and the standards I expect to follow and everybody else to follow. 
 
The entrepreneur expected a reciprocal type of interaction in the way he wanted 
to be treated.   He believed that people needed to be managed and pulled “into 
line from time to time”, because they forgot to “do the basics” and didn’t work as 
fast as he did. 
 
Entrepreneur 
I expect people to treat me how I treat them and visa versa.  I think it’s…I 
don’t think I’m, I don’t think I’m as demanding as people think I am.  But 
people would say I’m quite demanding of them. But I think I also give a 
lot, I expect a lot, but I also give a lot in all aspects of life, without 
demanding something in return, but I’m probably in some ways I expect 
something in return.  If I’m putting a lot of effort into something I expect 
someone to also put the same effort into the other side so that it balances. 
 
The entrepreneur believed that the business was fundamentally about people and 
relationships, but argued that he still needed to “clamp down” from time to time 
even though he was more passionate about these relationships, than he was about 
the business.    
 
He felt that the external relationships with customers formed a key part of their 
business and he therefore interacted constantly internally and externally looking 
for new opportunities to grow the organization.  This made the organization 
suitable for Phase II investigation.   
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7.4.2 Entrepreneurial Participation in Strategic Decision-Making (Q1, Q2 
and Q3) 
 
The entrepreneur was the key decision-maker in this organization and was 
actively involved at all levels of the decision-making process.  Although he had a 
management team he could share the decision-making process with, the 
entrepreneur saw himself as the one who enforced decisions in order to instigate 
change and make progress.  
 
Entrepreneur 
I think business generally, especially if they have been set up by the 
principle, they go through a very rapid learning curve and that there is a 
constant change as the company grows. And it’s how you manage that 
change and manage the people within that dynamic and actually getting 
people to understand we need to make… we need to go forward, and that 
we constantly ask them to do new things which they maybe not used to.  
So they are constantly not comfortable, they are constantly at the edge of 
their comfort zone.   
 
He saw himself as a mentor or coach who needed to set high expectations for 
internal stakeholders to deliver, by pushing them to meet their potential.  Even 
though he didn’t enjoy the process of pushing people, he was very active in 
decision-making and challenged internal stakeholders when they had made a 
decision.  The interaction with internal stakeholders in decision-making made the 
organization suitable for Phase II study. 
 
7.4.3 Entrepreneurial Participation in Opportunity Recognition (Q1 and 
Q4) 
 
The entrepreneur was very focused and involved in ensuring an efficient sales 
process in order to increase sales and maintain good customer satisfaction.  He 
regarded the sales process as having a positive “knock-on” effect which affected 
all other departments in the organization. 
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Entrepreneur 
If you do actually get on the telephone and see if they receive it and 
overcome objections and follow up, funny enough, you get the sales.  And 
then that has another effect, because things are buoyant suddenly the 
engineering department is busy, the sales department is busy.   
 
He believed that the relationships with customers, as well as strong business 
principles would grow the organization, and the higher salaries enjoyed by 
internal stakeholders was evidence of this.  The growth activity confirmed the 
organization’s suitability for Phase II case study analysis. 
 
7.4.4 Availability of the Entrepreneur and the Internal Stakeholders (Q2) 
 
The entrepreneur was very aware of time, and its value and made reference to it 
throughout the interview.  He appeared to encourage staff to use their time 
effectively.   
 
Entrepreneur 
Once you get a process in place and you get systems, policies procedures 
that people can follow, it speeds up the effectiveness of the business, it 
means that we produce more within a limited time, within a shorter time 
frame. 
 
He agreed to take part in Phase II of the research, as he was interested in the 
outcome, and enjoyed using his time to do different things outside of the 
business.  
 
7.5 Case C Profile 
 
Case C is an independent employee-owned organization founded in 1987 by 22 
co-founders.  Two founders were still actively involved in various aspects of the 
business.  The entrepreneur in this research is the MD for one of the 
organization’s operating subsidiaries, of which he is also part-Chairman for the 
umbrella organization itself, of which the other founder is part-time Chairman.  
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The core competence of the business is in creating new businesses based on 
advances in technology such as digital printing, communications, 
instrumentations, electronics and sensors, micro-devices, medical products, drug 
discovery, micro devices, optics software and systems.   
 
The organization developed and commercialized these various technologies and 
products for a wide range of markets and worked closely with global clients.   
The culture of the organization was innovative and creative, with mostly 
informal communications between all levels of the management and employee 
teams.  At the time of this interview there were 350 employees divided into 
seven groups each with a Group Head, and separate portfolio of clients, products, 
and development work.  The organization regarded recruitment as an important 
strategic advantage and focused on recruiting commercially-minded, highly 
talented individuals.  
 
7.5.1 Interaction with the Internal Stakeholders (Q1 and Q3) 
 
The entrepreneur interacted with Group Heads across the seven groups.  He was 
also responsible for global relationships in Japan, Korea, China, America and 
Europe.  His daily interactions were with the internal stakeholder who was in the 
process of taking over the CEO role from the entrepreneur.  His weekly and 
monthly interactions also involved other Group Heads in both formal meetings 
and informal communication when issues needed to be discussed.  
 
Entrepreneur 
I’m also Managing Director of the --- partnership which was the original 
sort of incubator/contract arm of the business. So I’m still Managing 
Director of that. I do have a deputy who assists with that so, erm, so I 
split my time between the group, and that business. 
 
Iinteractions were usually driven by the internal stakeholder, who wanted 
feedback from the entrepreneur with regards to decision-making, or challenges 
they faced.   
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Entrepreneur 
The ideal form of leadership management is where you’re more or less 
invisible. Um, actually, it’s sort of light touch, doesn’t mean 
disconnected.  I tell my people that report to me, I expect them to know 
everything that’s happening within their business. 
 
He preferred to lead from the front, but found it increasingly harder now that he 
was MD, and more hands-on with regards to the operations of the organization.  
However, the majority of his interactions involved aspects of the culture, values 
and ethics, while he was trying to hand over the strategic decision-making to one 
of the internal stakeholders who was interviewed in Phase II.  These interactions 
made the organization suitable for Phase II investigation. 
 
7.5.2 Entrepreneurial Participation in Decision-Making (Q1, Q2 and Q3) 
 
The entrepreneur was involved in decision-making in both his role as MD and 
Chairman, interacting with Group Heads throughout the process. 
 
Entrepreneur 
..it’s not independent, you know, so it does rely on collaborating with 
other people, it’s not a strategy of collaboration, if you like, but each bit 
of the business can, well...it’s small enough that people can see and be 
seen, and hear and be heard, take responsibility, feel involvement, and 
decide we’re going to do this. 
 
The entrepreneur preferred not to make any decisions, which he believed should 
be made by the internal stakeholders, but instead encouraged them to take 
ownership and make decisions independently of each other.    
 
He would encourage this process by asking them questions rather than giving 
them the answers.  During this questioning process, the internal stakeholders 
produced decisions themselves which they communicated to him.  
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He believed that part of the delegation process was to exercise judgment in a 
situation when an internal stakeholder made a decision, rather than dictate what 
should be done.  Additionally, the element of trust between the internal 
stakeholders and himself, enabled a decision to be made quickly without waiting 
for a committee of internal stakeholders to get together first.  This interaction 
made the organization suitable for Phase II investigation. 
 
7.5.3 Entrepreneurial Participation in Opportunity Recognition (Q1 and 
Q4) 
 
The entrepreneur’s role in looking for new opportunities had changed from 
following up on sales opportunities, to more strategic networking, development 
and design opportunities through long-term relationships.  The front-line sales 
opportunities and responsibilities had been transferred to the internal 
stakeholders in his group and across to the other groups.  His interactions with 
internal stakeholders involved him asking the right questions regarding 
discussions about opportunities and strategic decisions.  He believed that by 
asking the right questions, the individual and organization could be successful. 
 
Although the entrepreneur was no longer directly involved with selling, he 
interacted with and managed the internal stakeholder, who was still growing that 
section of the business in China. 
 
Entrepreneur 
We were the first people in China, who were forming a bridge to China, 
so that people in the West could develop a product, and have it 
manufactured in China, satisfactorily. And um, and so we’ve been out in 
China whilst it’s all been growing and things like that. 
 
The entrepreneur was also actively involved in ensuring that various parts of the 
business continued to grow by not targeting the same markets. 
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Entrepreneur 
I sort of initiated, I guess, it’s situations like that where it sort of falls to 
me to resolve the situation. Um, so actually what we did we reviewed the 
strategy of this business, and it stopped doing that bespoke stuff and 
focused on its core business. 
 
The organization did not have a formal long-term strategy for growth because 
they were constantly searching for and finding new opportunities and innovating 
according to the changes in the environment.  The interaction between the 
entrepreneur and the internal stakeholders made the organization suitable for 
Phase II study.  
 
7.5.4 Availability of the Entrepreneur and the Internal Stakeholders (Q2) 
 
The entrepreneur was very aware of time, and regarded time as “running out”.  I 
received agreement and commitment from the entrepreneur to interview him and 
four internal stakeholders.  The internal stakeholders were selected by the 
entrepreneur on the basis of the most interaction he had with them.  He was fully 
involved in the recruitment process and met everyone who was interviewed, 
which was one of the regular interactions with the internal stakeholders that the 
entrepreneur wanted to explore in Phase II of this research.  
 
7.6 Case D Profile 
 
Case D is a publishing organization founded in 1989, and sold several years later 
by the entrepreneur because she felt that her personal goals and values were no 
longer being met.  They grew from a UK Cambridge-based publishing 
organization, to an international publishing organization when their clients began 
using the Internet to source information and conduct research.  
 
The core competence of the business was to sell consultancy and system 
installations to larger organizations and university departments.  They also 
provided international recruitment services and research anywhere in the world 
for fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) clients.  Because the entrepreneur had 
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sold the organization, she no longer interacted with any internal stakeholders, or 
participated in decision-making, and opportunity recognition.  The case was 
therefore not suitable for Phase II investigation.  
 
7.7 Case E Profile 
 
Case E is an independent, privately owned company, founded in 1952 to 
manufacture and design equipment for sample preparation, scientific analysis, 
data acquisition and data analysis, as well as providing solutions to the global 
scientific and industrial markets.  The entrepreneur took over the business from 
his father, after having had his own business for 15 years.  He is the MD and 
responsible for transformational change in the organization from manual systems 
to computerized systems and processes.  His strategic plan to modernize the 
organization had taken nine years, rather than the estimated five years he had 
anticipated.   
The organizational transition led to severe challenges for the entrepreneur, who 
wanted to grow quickly by increasing the company’s market share, product range 
and turnover.  However, because of the extent of the internal challenges, neither 
he, nor the organization was able to take part in Phase II of this research.  The 
time required was too demanding for the entrepreneur, and an exploration of the 
interactions with his internal stakeholders would have led to further tension in an 
already strained relationship.  Therefore, further investigation into Case E was 
not possible. 
 
7.8 Case F Profile 
 
Case F is a Data Communications organization, that became the leading 
developer of ATM (Asynchronous Transfer Mode) data network in Cambridge 
and Pittsburg, USA.  The entrepreneur was initially responsible for the finance 
and business strategy, including raising venture capital. He then ran the software 
engineering group, building it up to a team of 200 engineers eventually being 
responsible for technical strategy as the Chief Technology Officer (CTO).   In 
1999, when it employed over 2,000 employees and had annual revenues of over 
$600 million, the organization was sold for $4.5 billion.  The entrepreneur 
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continued as CTO until April 2000. 
 
The entrepreneur was no longer involved in the organization, and was now an 
active angel investor and mentor to start-up businesses in the UK and US.  In 
September 2001 he co-founded, and was currently Chairman of an investment 
group of seasoned technology and biotechnology entrepreneurs who invested in 
and mentored technology start-ups in Cambridge, UK.  Since 2002, the group 
had invested nearly £10 million in over 20 technology and biotechnology 
businesses, mostly based in Cambridge, UK.  Case F was not suitable for further 
investigation because the entrepreneur met none of the four criteria.   
 
7.9 Case G Profile 
 
Case G is a member’s organization for Health and Life science organizations, 
designed to facilitate collaborations between academic organizations and 
research institutes.  It is a not-for-profit company set up to facilitate better links 
between the organization and the industry.  They had a bio-incubator arm and an 
agenda to feed the government’s investment strategy.  The entrepreneur became 
the regional international trade advisor for bio-technology and the 
pharmaceutical industry, working for UK trade and investment in 2005 before 
running the organization.   
 
Case G now consisted mostly of service sector organizations in medical bio-
technology, medical devices, contract research organizations, technical service 
providers, design consultancies and commercial service providers.  Although the 
entrepreneur assisted and communicated with entrepreneurial organizations, she 
did not have internal stakeholders as employees, and was not involved in 
decision-making or opportunity recognition for growth within an organization.  
On this basis, as a member organization, I decided that this case was not suitable 
for Phase II exploration. 
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7.10 Case H Profile 
 
Case H is a university spin-out nano-technology organization founded in 2005 
and run by three young entrepreneurs who are still full time employees in the 
organization.  Their products were used around the world in numerous industry 
sectors for the detection and analysis of chemicals. By using leading-edge nano-
fabrication techniques, the organization had developed a complete chemical 
detection system on a very small chip called ‘Field Asymmetric Ion Mobility 
Spectrometer’ (FAIMS).  The chip had the ability to monitor a broad range of 
chemicals rapidly at very low quantities with high confidence.   
 
The organization had raised $50 million from start-up and operated with 40 
employees in both the UK and USA.  Their product range had extended to the 
development of gas sensors for the detection of toxic gases and industrial process 
control where instruments were used to detect contamination in food and 
beverage products.  The research and development part of the organization is 
based in Cambridge, UK, and the commercially focused part is based in the 
USA. 
 
Case H met three of the four criteria for Phase II of the research.  The 
entrepreneur interacted daily with internal stakeholders on decision-making and 
recognizing opportunities for growth, but was unable to commit to 12 months 
that was required for Phase II.  The entrepreneur travelled extensively to the 
USA and had limited time due to tight schedules which made this case unsuitable 
for inclusion in Phase II.  
 
 
7.11 Case I Profile 
 
Case I is a privately owned global specialist recruitment organization focused on 
the Service Sector, Museums and Heritage, Sports, Aviation and Airlines, and 
Hotels and Hospitality.  In eight years the entrepreneur and internal stakeholders 
had grown the organization into eight companies within the group with offices 
and employees in the UK, USA, Qatar and France.  Within the Sports sector, 
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their recruitment operations were being undertaken in China, South Africa, 
Mauritius and Brazil.   
 
They were the first company to win a contract with the Qatar Museums 
Authority, and their contracts in Qatar were a significant part of their growth.  
The entrepreneur resided in the South of France, and even though he was willing 
to take part in Phase II of the research, the timing and logistics of travelling were 
too expensive and challenging.  On this basis, Case I was not selected for further 
investigation. 
 
On the basis of the above selection criteria three cases were selected for Phase II 
as presented in Table 7.2.  
 
TABLE 7.2 THREE CASES IN PHASE II 
Case 
Study 
(i)Interaction 
with IS 
(ii)Decision-
Making 
 
(iii)Opportunity 
Recognition 
(iv)Financial 
Growth  
Meets 
criteria 
for Phase 
II 
A Daily YES Actively Founder involved in 
business growth 
YES  
B Daily YES 
Actively 
Founder fully 
involved in 
business growth 
YES  
C Daily YES Actively Founder involved in 
business 
development 
And leading growth 
in product and 
international 
development 
YES  
 
In these three cases the entrepreneurs interacted daily with the internal 
stakeholders on strategic decision-making and recognizing opportunities for 
business development.  Each entrepreneur committed to the length of time for 
Phase II interviews and recommended internal stakeholders who could 
participate.  
 
 136
The empirical data collected from these cases was collected through semi-
structured and then analysed.  The first part of the analysis process is described 
next.  
 
7.12 Data Coding in Phase II 
 
Nvivo9 was used to analyze the interview and email data, and is summarized in 
Table 7.3.  The interview transcripts were read several times to identify common 
themes.  The first step in the email coding process was to upload all email data 
into the Nvivo9 folder.  The second step was to read through the final list of 
codes developed from the axial coding processes of the interviews.  The third 
step was to read through the emails and select relevant words and phrases, which 
fitted into the labels and categories generated from the open and axial coding 
processes.   
A manual process of highlighting the relevant text from emails was used, taking 
into account the frequency of the same word in the conversation.  In this way, 
both the frequency and relevance of the words were taken into consideration in 
the analysis.  Email data was only available for Cases A and C. 
 
Key words and phrases were identified in order to understand the data and called 
open coding.  Denscombe (2007) referred to open coding as words and phrases 
that are mostly descriptive with similar meanings.  Sixty-two hours of recorded 
data were collected from undertaking the Set I, Set II, and Set III interviews.  I 
read and reread the transcripts to produce 127 identified codes that were reduced 
to 37 in Table 7.4.  The Code Book consists of the main codes that have 
subsumed codes with similar meanings and the explanations for each provided.  
These codes are regarded as vital to “any explanation of the complex social 
phenomenon" (Descombe, 2007: 98). 
 
Guba (1978) cited in Patton (2002) suggested a second opinion on what data falls 
into which category to ensure consistency.  For the purposes of consistency in 
understanding, a colleague read the code names and the description as it is 
presented in Table 7.3.  For each of the 37 codes, my description and the 
colleagues’ understanding of the code name were aligned and no alterations were 
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required following the feedback.  In this way, my original decisions in 
developing the codes and descriptions were confirmed.   
 
TABLE 7.3 CODE BOOK DERIVED FROM OPEN CODING 
Code Name Code Description 
1. Alert Exercising ability to spot issues and opportunities 
2. Atmosphere The internal climate of the business 
3. Background The knowledge and skills that have been acquired 
4. Business 
Development 
Going out and finding clients and opportunities 
5. Change An alteration from the current state 
6. Communication The way people interact and share 
7. Culture Customs and artefacts people identify with 
8. Decision-Making Coming to a conclusion about something 
9. Employees Internal stakeholders 
10. Entrepreneurship Idea creation and realisation 
11. Environment Internal and external conditions  
12. Experience Learning gained from what one has encountered 
13. Feedback Response to a particular process  
14. Finance Issues relating to turnover, sales, profit and loss 
Financial plans and targets 
15. Generation Relating to different age groups 
16. Growth Improvement, moving forward and a measure of output 
17. Influence The ability to persuade others into action 
18. Information 
Gathering 
Sources and methods of acquiring knowledge  
19. Innovative Development of products, services and markets 
20. Insight In-depth ways of seeing things 
21. Interaction Process of interrelationships  
22. Management Senior decision makers 
23. Negotiation Exchange of information for gain 
24. Opportunity Something that hasn’t been recognised before 
25. Optimistic Positive approach and attitude 
26. Outsourcing Procuring products and services external to the 
organization 
27. Pattern Recognition Joining the dots in opportunities and new information 
28. Perception A view based on experience and knowledge 
29. Personality A set of characteristics an individual displays 
30. Purpose A set of objectives to meet an outcome 
31. Recession A period of reduced output 
32. Recruitment Attracting and securing human resources 
33. Relationship The way in which two or more things are connected 
34. Responsibility Required to do as a set of obligations 
35. Sales  Contracts of commercial value 
36. Technology Commercial application of science and engineering 
37. Temporality The relationship and variations with and over time 
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Mason (1996) argued that during the analysis of qualitative data, the researcher 
moves between ‘literal’, ‘interpretative’ and ‘reflexive’ approaches.  This process 
was undertaken and the conceptual framework was used to give structure to the 
19 concepts in the form of axial coding that emerged from further reduction of 
the data (Table 7.4).  Axial coding looks for links, relationships and connections 
between themes and words (Descombe, 2007) and the main categories of the 
conceptual framework; entrepreneurial cognition, internal stakeholder perception 
biases, temporality and performance.   
 
TABLE 7.4 CATEGORISATION USING THE CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK 
(8) Entrepreneurial Cognition (4) Internal Stakeholders 
Alert, decision-making, information 
gathering, pattern recognition, 
insight, experience, opportunity 
Interaction, relationship, feedback, 
influence 
(1) Biases (4) Performance 
Optimism Growth, sales, technology, business 
development 
(3) Temporality  
Generation, change, background  
 
The open and axial coding completed the categorization of similar meanings into 
concepts.  The specific codes, their ascribed categories, links to the literature and 
meanings are discussed in Chapter 11 The Icarus Paradox.  In addition, the next 
stage of the analysis that the relationships between the concepts and how they 
influence each other is presented.  
 
7.13 Summary 
 
This chapter was presented in two main sections.  The first section was the 
descriptive account of the nine cases used in Phase I, and how three cases were 
selected for further investigation.  The second section included the data coding 
analysis process of the three cases using open and axial coding.  These codes are 
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used in the following three chapters to present the empirical findings for each 
case. 
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Chapter 8 Phase II Case A Findings 
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter presents the findings of the empirical data in Case A.  The 
entrepreneur and internal stakeholders were each interviewed three times in Sets 
I, II and III.  A synopsis of the entrepreneur and four internal stakeholders is 
presented, followed by the findings of the entrepreneur’s cognitive interaction 
with each of the internal stakeholders.  Direct quotes in italics from the 
entrepreneur and internal stakeholders present a glimpse of the interview.  The 
textual function of Boxes 8.2-8.7 was to enhance text that I regarded as 
significant in order to focus attention, and supplement the data presented.  The 
text boxes individually or collectively do not have a conceptual purpose.      The 
lexicon used in the direct quotes, text boxes and text are the precise words that 
the participants used the majority of the time.  It presents the data directly as it 
was captured.  
 
8.2 Synopsis of the Entrepreneur and the Internal Stakeholders  
 
The codes and job titles for the four internal stakeholders are presented in Table 
8.1.  
 
TABLE 8.1 INTERNAL STAKEHOLDER JOB TITLES 
Case 
Study 
Internal 
Stakeholder  
Job Titles 
A IS 1 
IS 2 
IS 3 
IS 4 
Managing Director 
Finance Director (and entrepreneur’s wife) 
Operations Director and Laboratory Manager 
Quality Control Administrator 
 
The codes (1-19) were grouped into categories to present the findings based on 
their similar meanings.   
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BOX 8.1 SUMMARY PROFILES OF CASE A PARTICIPANTS  
 
 
8.3 SET I:  JANUARY – APRIL 2011   
 
Set I presents the findings of the interviews, which took place between January 
and April 2011 with the entrepreneur and four internal stakeholders.   
 
(i) Profile of the Entrepreneur 
The entrepreneur in Case A is a biologist and has a chemistry degree.  He now 
acts as the Chairman for the organization, but is gradually handing over 
responsibility for running the organization to the Managing Director, Internal 
Stakeholder 1.  He worked for a large corporate pharmaceutical company and 
learned about the industry from several different jobs before deciding to start his 
own business.  He spotted an opportunity to offer services to the pharmaceutical 
industry in outsourcing the formulation side such as tables, capsules and aerosol 
markets which no one else was doing at the time. 
 
(ii) Job Profiles of Four Internal Stakeholders (IS 1- IS 4) 
IS 1 was acting as the MD, and taking over the role from the entrepreneur.  He 
first started in the organization 18 years ago in the lab whilst doing a Chemistry 
degree part-time, but left to work in Sales and Marketing for a large scientific 
equipment provider.  He spent six years gaining experience in other organizations 
and returned to work for the entrepreneur seven years ago in a business 
development role.  He recently took over the MD role, which he and the founder 
had spent several years planning for in their succession management discussion.  
  
IS 2 is the wife of the entrepreneur and is the Personnel and Finance Director.  
She had worked in the organization since it started, is a board member and 
interacted daily with the entrepreneur.    
 
IS 3 is the Operations Director and Laboratory Manager who has been with the 
organization for six years.  He was responsible for all the operations, formulation 
activity, analytical work, and reported directly to IS 1 and then to the 
entrepreneur.  Although his reporting line is directly to the MD, he had daily 
interaction with the entrepreneur on strategic guidance and decisions.   
 
IS 4 is the Quality Control Administrator and had been with the organization since 
1992 and worked with the entrepreneur in a previous organization.  Although she 
was not part of the Senior Management team like the other internal stakeholders, 
she was mentored by the entrepreneur who was a technical support for her.  She 
interacted with him regularly in a mentoring capacity.  She worked with the 
Quality Manager and reported to IS 1 directly for operational issues. 
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8.3.1 Decision-Making, Alertness, Information Gathering, Pattern 
Recognition, Insight, Experience and Opportunity Recognition (Q1)  
 
The entrepreneur gathered information that he regarded was necessary for a 
decision depending on the available time.  He did not believe in procrastinating 
over, or regretting a decision that was made.  This thought process was 
confirmed by IS 1 and IS 2.  IS 1 felt that the entrepreneur did not ever reflect on 
whether he had made a “wrong or right decision”, and that that kind of reflection 
was not part of the entrepreneur’s thinking process.  Although IS 2 admitted that, 
unlike the entrepreneur, she did go back over past decisions, and reflected on 
what she could have done differently.   
 
The entrepreneur’s process of decision-making was made before he consulted 
with others on their thoughts, and this was confirmed by IS 1, but contradicted 
by IS 2 in the first part of the interview who believed that she was part of his 
decision-making process.  However, later in the interview, IS 2 changed her 
opinion supporting what both the entrepreneur and IS 1 had said. 
 
IS2 
He will have the decision made, he may have the decision a lot earlier 
than he tells you, but he will be churning it over, if he’s sure its the right 
decision but he won’t say anything. 
I don’t think he actually talks about it until he knows about it himself so 
when he starts to talk about it he’s already thought about the pros and 
cons, so yes he will come across as quite confident, because if he’s 
dismissed it himself, he wouldn’t tell you about it. 
 
When the entrepreneur was faced with moving jobs before he started the 
business, he did not spend time considering the “what ifs”.  He took action “into 
the unknown” by gathering available information, rather than delay a decision in 
order to gather more information.  IS 4 said the entrepreneur did not make quick 
decisions.  
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IS 2 felt that he was very open and strong in his decision-making and persuaded 
people around him to his way of thinking.  IS 2 and IS 3 both said that the 
entrepreneur was an analyst by heart, very analytical in his decision-making, and 
confident in his decision-making process, although he also used his intuition 
when decision-making. 
 
IS 1 confirmed that the way the entrepreneur went about gathering information 
was limited, and saw it as problem that he made decisions without gathering 
enough facts.  This was contradicted by IS 2 and IS 3, who argued that the 
entrepreneur only “worked on facts” when making a decision, and IS 4 who said 
that the entrepreneur definitely gathered “lots” of information when making a 
decision.  However, IS 3 added that the entrepreneur made quick decisions 
without sometimes having the facts.  He used the example of the entrepreneur 
who advised an analysis after having heard only 10% of the story.  
 
IS 1 however also regarded the entrepreneur as partly analytical in his decision-
making, citing the use of key performance indicators to explain how important 
the measurement of performance was to the entrepreneur.  The reason IS 3 gave 
for the entrepreneur needing the facts to make a decision was based on the highly 
regulated and compliance nature of the pharmaceutical industry, which he and 
the entrepreneur understood more than the other internal stakeholders.  IS 1 also 
argued that when the entrepreneur made decisions on gut feeling, such as the 
example of building the manufacturing suite, he had not accumulated facts in 
order to weigh up the decision to build the manufacturing suite.  The 
entrepreneur’s use of intuition was supported by IS 2 who added that the 
entrepreneur could see things that others could not.   
 
According to IS 1, the entrepreneur did not use financial calculations to decide 
on whether or not an opportunity was a viable option, and in the case of the 
manufacturing suite, he had already made a decision to proceed before he spoke 
to IS 1, IS 2 and IS 3.  IS 4 argued that the entrepreneur took people’s view into 
account, but “will go for it” when he decided to. 
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IS 1 confirmed that the entrepreneur collected facts and figures when making 
decisions to purchase equipment, but not when it involved people and things in 
the organization.  But he added:   
 
IS 1 
He’ll quite often have a preconceived idea of how it should have worked 
or should work and will not always necessary gather all the information 
to see whether he was right or wrong,  
 
In making a quick decision about moving to bigger premises for expansion 
purposes, the entrepreneur evaluated the potential downside first, such as 
whether the organization could afford it.  But part of his decision-making process 
was to also evaluate the downside of “not making the decision”.  Although 
moving into bigger premises was a financial risk, the entrepreneur felt confident 
about the future, and the move ended up doubling their income.  He was already 
looking at new premises for their next move.  He appeared to be thinking ahead 
of the other internal stakeholders.   
 
BOX 8.2 DECISION-MAKING      
 
Although IS 2 perceived that the entrepreneur did not “push” people into 
agreeing with his decision, but rather persuaded them towards his decision.  She 
also felt that he was open to change and discussion if his decision was not agreed 
with.  This process of sharing his decision-making process with her before 
making a decision was not experienced by IS 1 and not mentioned by the 
entrepreneur.  In his decision-making process the entrepreneur evaluated 
employees’ capacity to cope with information, and did not take a risk on those 
that he believed could not handle the information.  
 
 
The entrepreneur recognized that he drives through decisions in a singular 
way, and sources information for a decision himself rather than asking internal 
stakeholders.  The entrepreneur evaluated the potential downside first. 
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The entrepreneur felt that there were very few people who were able to see and 
act on an opportunity in the way that he did.  He was able to see the potential in 
the development of a new product, which was not yet an obvious product for the 
organization to develop.   
 
BOX 8.3 OPPORTUNITY SPOTTING  
 
 
IS 1 said that the business had provided the same core services for 20 years.  IS 
1’s view was contradicted by IS 2 and IS 4, who mentioned that the entrepreneur 
was always alert and looking for opportunities, and that the majority of the time 
the entrepreneur’s ideas were taken forward.  IS 4 suggested that other internal 
stakeholders saw the entrepreneur sitting at his desk and were not aware of what 
he was involved in. 
 
Issue domain ‘Recruitment’ was an important aspect of growth for the 
organization and the entrepreneur believed that their new strategy to attract self-
motivated, driven and ambitious people was leaving a gap in their resources.   
 
Entrepreneur 
We’re looking now for the people who are willing to take those things on 
and who are willing to put themselves forward …unfortunately they are 
quite thin on the ground. 
 
IS 1 felt that new appointments should be made from the recruitment of people 
internally.  He added that this process could be used to develop existing 
employees.  
 
The entrepreneur’s experience and familiarity with the industry enabled him to 
take risks with issue domain ‘Manufacturing’ and believed that it was an 
However, IS 1 felt that the entrepreneur was no longer involved in spotting 
opportunities, although he was an alert individual.  He believed that in the past the 
entrepreneur was involved in spotting opportunities that involved growing and 
expanding the business, but was limited in terms of spotting new services and 
doing different things.   
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opportunity to increase their offer to clients.  He was optimistic about it as an 
area of expansion.  It was not normally part of the organization’s service offered 
to clients; however, he anticipated that the manufacturing suite would enable 
them to increase their size to potentially five to ten times bigger than it was.  
Even though the entrepreneur had taken a risk by building the new 
manufacturing suite, he took a calculated risk with regards to “hedging his bets” 
by continuing to provide the industry with their normal services as well.   
 
BOX 8.4 ENTREPRENEUR’S EXPERIENCE  
 
IS 1 considered this to be “pre-judging” without sufficient information, and 
instead believed that the entrepreneur based his decision-making on his 
experience.   He added that the entrepreneur used general experience to make a 
decision rather than specific manufacturing experience. 
 
Although the entrepreneur claimed to rely on his “gut feeling” when he decided 
to build the manufacturing suite, IS 1 said that the entrepreneur would still want 
to know the facts and data about how they would achieve growth in financial 
terms once it was built.  IS 4 confirmed that the entrepreneur’s decision-making 
was definitely informed by his experience.  
 
IS 1 said he could not visualize the size or shape of the organization, but he knew 
the type of clients and projects that would be needed to make it successful.  
Although he regarded himself as instrumental in making the manufacturing suite 
happen, he said it had been in the business plan for years and no one had done 
anything about it.   
 
IS 2 also said that she was sceptical about the manufacturing suite and the 
amount of investment needed to build it and finance the running costs.  She said 
that although many staff were against it, the feedback from clients had been very 
 
The entrepreneur made a judgment to go ahead.   He was still able to see how it 
fitted into the business model and use his confidence to make a decision that did 
not specifically relate to his experience.  
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good.  IS 4 also felt that the time and money required to provide the 
manufacturing suite had been underestimated, and that starting it was the 
entrepreneur’s hardest decision. 
 
IS 1 believed that the entrepreneur was risk-averse, and that his opportunity 
spotting ability was constrained by this, as well as by his experience.  He added 
that although the entrepreneur would have taken risks in order to build the 
business initially, due to his age he was now risk-averse. 
 
8.3.2 Change, Generation and Temporality (Q1, Q2 and CF) 
 
The entrepreneur had always had a drive for change even before he started the 
organization.  He had adopted a traditional business model, which was different 
from organizations that follow the market trend and then run out of money.   
 
BOX 8.5 TEMPORALITY 
 
 
IS 1 argued that the entrepreneur was not time bound in the way the entrepreneur 
believed he was.  However, with regard to decision-making IS 1 took longer than 
the entrepreneur to make a decision.  He believed that it was due to his lack of 
experience compared to the entrepreneur’s.  IS 1 suggested that the entrepreneur 
made quicker decisions than he did when they had the same information.  This 
included decisions concerning the technical, quality, regulatory and operational 
aspects of the organization.  He also suggested that he minimized the time when 
making decisions. 
 
IS 2 and IS 4 supported IS 1’s view that the entrepreneur was not good with time 
and did not work to time scales.  However, IS 4 felt that he was improving his 
time management ability.  IS 2 remarked that when something needed to be 
 
IS 1 suggested that the entrepreneur’s sense of time was different to his own, and 
that the entrepreneur felt everything should be done quicker than it actually was 
being done.   
 
 148
done, the entrepreneur would ensure that it was done in the given time, and that 
keeping appointments was always a challenge for him, whereas she was always 
five minutes early.   
 
IS 3 and IS 4 mentioned that the entrepreneur worked according to deadlines, 
and would hold people accountable to a promised time if they gave him one. IS 2 
preferred to “get it finished and off my desk”, whilst the entrepreneur didn’t get 
stressed about things in the same way, and used timing to get something done in 
a different way.  IS 3 felt that the entrepreneur used to be more concerned about 
punctuality in the past than he was today.  
 
IS 3 said that he tried to do things quickly even though it was made difficult due 
to a heavily regulatory environment.  The difficulty was eased by the 
entrepreneur, who IS 4 said always pushed the time boundaries imposed by 
industry standards. 
 
8.3.3 Optimism (Q3) 
 
IS 1 regarded the entrepreneur as a realist, not an optimist or pessimist and 
suggested that he was a balanced individual.  IS 4 felt that he was generally an 
optimist, although he was even-tempered and didn’t show much about how he 
felt. 
 
8.3.4 Sensemaking and Sensegiving (Q4)  
 
The entrepreneur made sense of his own decision-making abilities and was aware 
that he did not consult anyone when he was going through the process of 
thinking about something.  
 
Entrepreneur 
I’m very much a singular on that, I mean I would go and get that myself. I 
suppose at that stage that’s when I realize that I need to broaden my 
horizon even here because the company becomes a bit singular. 
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The entrepreneur did not communicate his thoughts about a new idea or 
opportunity immediately to the internal stakeholders.  He did, however, brief 
them about the issues related to the business in formal team meetings.  The 
interaction between the entrepreneur and the internal stakeholders who are 
employees, involved general communication about the organization’s 
performance and objectives for the future rather than issues regarding 
profitability.   
 
This sensegiving process was more formal than getting internal stakeholders to 
understand what profit was, and what it meant to the organization’s growth.  IS 2 
and IS 4 said that the entrepreneur was a good communicator, and that he used 
simple terms when he offered assistance to internal stakeholders in the 
laboratory. 
 
IS 1 thought that he listened to what internal stakeholders said much more than 
the entrepreneur did, but realized that it was too soon to tell whether his approach 
was the right one or not.  He went further to suggest that the entrepreneur’s 
decision-making was more “dictatorial” than consensus driven.  As the MD, IS 1 
preferred to have more of a consensus from other internal stakeholders before 
making a decision.  This view was contradicted by IS 2 who believed that the 
entrepreneur did consider internal stakeholders in his decision-making process. 
 
IS 2 
He would always sort of sit and muse with other members of staff.  He 
will sort of discuss things with them.  He’s not dogmatic in the way he 
comes to his decisions, he won’t say well I’ve thought of this and this is 
the way I want to go, he’s very much the sort of….well I’ve been thinking 
about this, what do you think and….er get feedback from them to see how 
comfortable they are with that decision. 
 
IS 2 felt that the entrepreneur was good at giving sense to internal stakeholders.  
She said that people did not have the same vision as the entrepreneur. 
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IS 2 
He’s very good at erm….he can speak to all levels, so if he is speaking to 
one of the analysts he will paint the picture in a way that they will, can 
understand, and appreciate at a different level. He will alter it so that the 
finance side will come on board. He will see it from a more financial 
perspective rather than from an analytical and create a progression. 
 
IS 3 regarded the communication between the entrepreneur and himself as open 
and regular, which was made easier by open plan desks, and sitting next to each 
other.  IS 4 gave the example of when the organization moved to larger premises, 
the entrepreneur was good at keeping people informed all the time about what 
was going on, and that the entrepreneur was making sure that IS 1 would do the 
same when he took over the MD role completely. 
 
8.3.5 Interaction and Relationships (Q1 and CF) 
 
The entrepreneur interacted with internal stakeholders with regards to several 
issues within the organization.  He would discuss strategic issues, such as short 
order books and lack of sales beyond three months, with IS 1, 2, and 3, who were 
on the management team, but not with IS 4.  He believed that people preferred 
not to know the risk to their jobs, and controlled the information that was 
disclosed to staff who were lower down the organization. 
 
In terms of the entrepreneur’s interaction with the internal stakeholders about the 
‘Manufacturing’ issue domain, he made the decision himself to take the risk.  
With regards to the internal stakeholders at management level, the entrepreneur 
discussed the business plan and his thoughts about the expansion into the USA. 
 
Entrepreneur 
 
I could make the judgment calls on those and …tip the odds in our 
favour.  I suppose it might just be a random decision on my part…or 
that’s where I feel I’m moving to, so getting outside of the comfort zone 
and moving into. 
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IS 1 interacted daily with the entrepreneur and believed they had a “brilliant” 
relationship, and IS 3 believed his interactions on technical issues with the 
entrepreneur led to mutual agreement.  Although, IS 3 said that on strategic 
issues the entrepreneur had the final decision.  
 
IS 1  
I think with him (the entrepreneur) has his decision and that will be the 
way it is done.  He has already made his decision or his mind before he 
gets all the information.  I will tend to listen to more opinions than 
perhaps he (the entrepreneur) does. 
 
The entrepreneur’s opinion was that there were people in life who didn’t make 
decisions and then regretted it later.  IS 1 felt the entrepreneur interacted 
differently and altered his information gathering and decision-making processes, 
depending on whom he was talking to in the management team, and the content 
of the communication.  This was confirmed by IS 3.  IS 2 said that he could 
influence the entrepreneur, but that the entrepreneur would still make the final 
decision.  However, when there was a problem to discuss, the entrepreneur and 
IS 1 would come to a consensus on what to do.  IS 3 also felt that the 
entrepreneur would ask him for his input into strategic decisions. 
 
BOX 8.6 THE FACTORS AFFECTING INTERACTIONS 
 
 
 
IS 1 thought that the company was improving and things were changing for the 
better, which was confirmed by IS 3 who felt that the organization was 
 
IS 2 said that the entrepreneur was not good at accepting peoples failings, and 
that in his interactions with internal stakeholders, some would get defensive 
and feel criticized by his frustrated response.  IS 1 felt that issues that could 
affect their relationship would be a lack of confidence and a disagreement on 
how the organization should grow.  
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experiencing increased levels of new employees, a larger market share and new 
product development opportunities. 
 
IS 2 noted that the laid-back attitude of the entrepreneur affected the interactions 
with internal stakeholders in a positive way.  IS 3 confirmed that the 
entrepreneur was very good at stepping back, and trying to find ways around the 
pharmaceutical industry regulation on new and existing product development 
without getting too concerned about it, whilst other internal stakeholders would 
be concerned by this relaxed approach.  On occasions when IS 2 had reflected on 
the “what ifs” of a decision she made, the entrepreneur was quick to dismiss it as 
something she had no control over and to move on. 
 
Interactions between the entrepreneur and IS 3 involved him sharing the 
entrepreneur’s experience and getting his input into operational issues.  IS 4 
received mentoring and technical support regularly from the entrepreneur.  In her 
experience he was a good communicator and challenged her thinking. 
 
Issue domain ‘Succession’ was discussed throughout the interview with both the 
entrepreneur and IS 1.  IS 1 felt that the entrepreneur was slowly allowing him to 
make decisions, by reducing his time in the office and gaining confidence in IS 
1’s ability to make decisions.  This indicated that the entrepreneur was gradually 
managing the succession process.  Although IS 2 added that the entrepreneur was 
still trying to run the organization as the one he had envisaged, but was aware 
that it will change as he took more of a backseat.  She felt that with the 
entrepreneur stepping out, it would become more like the bigger corporations in 
their industry with structure, systems and process, and less communication 
between internal stakeholders. 
 
IS 3 had also experienced succession issues with the entrepreneur who did not 
always agree with his approach, but he felt comfortable challenging him.  
 
IS 3 
I think sometimes he (the entrepreneur) maybe doesn’t like some of the 
ways that I achieve things erm …I suppose the proof is in the pudding 
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sometimes, but then …erm…I think that maybe he (the entrepreneur) 
would do things in a different way but he’s happy to let me do that. 
 
He perceived that the strategic direction, and also the senior management team, 
were heavily influenced by the entrepreneur.  Although this view was supported 
by IS 4, she said that she was more forward planning in her thinking than the 
entrepreneur. 
 
IS 3 
I think one of his (the entrepreneur) biggest concerns is succession 
management erm…and where the next experts, in particular techniques 
or specialists in particular areas are coming from.  
 
8.3.6 Growth (Q1 and CF) 
 
The entrepreneur defined growth as “getting a bigger part of their existing 
client’s outsourcing work”, which they had developed for the past 20 years.  The 
organization’s growth was approximately 20% cumulative per year.  However, 
this growth was limited by the nature of the pharmaceutical industry, the 
restriction of available cash for expansion and investors’ need for intellectual 
property in their portfolio.  The organization had been working on entering the 
US market for the past three years. 
 
Entrepreneur 
If somebody says have five million, just go do it, it could certainly double 
or treble the capacity of this company quite straightforwardly. 
 
The entrepreneur did not feel that the organization had grown much in the past 
20 years, and would have preferred to reach its present size ten years ago.  He 
always had the vision of growing a large company, but some internal 
stakeholders found it hard to grasp that it was always planned in his mind. 
However, IS 2 confirmed this was his vision. Although his ambitions were 
always to increase the size of the organization, he was realistic about the 
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opportunities to expand into the USA without sufficient funding which could 
cause cash flow problems for the organization. 
 
The growth prospect for the organization was to continue to provide outsourcing 
in their specialist area, which the entrepreneur had identified as the main 
opportunity when he started the business.  In terms of this growth area, their 
clients where also their competitors and offered analytical services for the 
pharmaceutical industry.  This was viewed as a threat to further expansion as 
well as the ongoing revenue stream.  Their growth strategy was to increase their 
European market, which stood at 30% of their total sales, and control their 
exposure to the market.  At the time of Set I interviews, the organization had a 
good relationship with the bank, and were aware of the inability to fund rapid 
growth into new geographical markets like the USA. 
 
The entrepreneur considered that expansion into the USA was possible, but it 
would require setting up laboratories and an infrastructure with systems and 
processes to maximize their success.  He believed he would be successful 
because of the integrity of the organization.  IS 2 believed that the entrepreneur 
was growing the company to employ people and provide them with a living, 
rather than to fund his own lifestyle. 
 
IS 1 regarded the manufacturing suite as a considerable growth opportunity for 
the organization while IS 2 regarded organizational growth as organic.  Growth 
for IS 2 was to increase their staff levels from 72 to 85 within a year.  The 
recession in 2008 however, meant that their clients had downsized and the 
organization did not need the extra capacity to do the work.  IS 3 measured 
growth through sales turnover and employee numbers, and believed there was a 
clear business plan to achieve growth. 
 
IS 3 felt that the organization was doing well with their clients and growing 
steadily, although IS 4 felt that there had been challenges in growing the business 
through two recessions. 
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IS 1 saw acquisition as a means towards growth, but believed that the 
entrepreneur’s lack of desire to consider it was caused by his lack of specific 
experience in this area.  He felt that as MD he was less risk-averse than the 
entrepreneur, and would consider acquisition if it meant that the organization 
would increase in size.  In terms of interaction with regards to any acquisition, IS 
1 did not feel that the entrepreneur would encourage communication about the 
issue because he had already made up his mind.  
 
In contradiction to IS 1’s view that the entrepreneur did not take risks, IS 2 felt 
that the entrepreneur was willing to take risks when he had collected the 
information, but that she was probably more of a risk-taker than he was. 
 
8.4 SET II:  JUNE – AUGUST 2011 
 
Set II presents the analysis of the interviews that took place between June and 
August 2011 with the entrepreneur and four internal stakeholders.  The purpose 
was to track any changes to the interactions over the issue domains and included 
any other new issues that may have arisen since Set I interviews.  The 
entrepreneur’s cognitive map was only used in Set II to assist me to explore the 
decision-making process and the opportunity recognition interactions with the 
entrepreneur. 
 
8.4.1 Decision-Making, Insight and Opportunity Recognition (Q1) 
 
The entrepreneur said that he was still very good at acquiring different types of 
information, and appeared frustrated that the internal stakeholders could not see 
the opportunities.  He gave an example of being able to connect the dots for a 
potential opportunity that no one else could see.  IS 4 believed that the 
entrepreneur was the visionary and IS 1 was a businessman. 
 
Entrepreneur 
Yeah but the dots are damn obvious.  That’s the issue.  But, there’s not 
much I can do about that if people don’t see them.   
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The entrepreneur had the insight to know that one of their long-standing clients 
would withdraw from the UK market and appeared frustrated that the internal 
stakeholders could not see the same threat.  In contrast, IS 1 argued that these 
predictions were difficult to achieve because the industry was so confidential.  
And IS 4 argued that the loss of this client did not affect the organization because 
they “were still busy”.  
 
IS 3 contradicted the entrepreneur’s thoughts and said that people do understand 
the importance to their ongoing revenue of the projects they were working on, 
and the financial implications of what they did. 
 
IS 3 
I think they understand their job role, definitely.  And yes I think they 
understand what they are doing and that we quote projects based on how 
much time the projects cost.  They understand that what they are doing 
makes money.   
 
IS 4 was aware that there were deadlines for projects, profits and payments by 
clients, and believed that some employees did have the same awareness, which 
supported what IS 3 said, but contradicted the entrepreneur thoughts. 
 
The entrepreneur confirmed his comments from the Set I interview, that he saw 
himself as an analytical thinker, and not an entrepreneur.  IS 1 confirmed his Set 
I thoughts that the entrepreneur was no longer involved in decisions which 
affected the operational side of the business. IS 4 said that the entrepreneur was 
involved in overseeing the whole of the operations and business plan.  IS 1, in 
support of the comments he made in Set I felt that the entrepreneur was 
inconsistent in the way he used the organization’s metric system for financial and 
operation purposes, and sometimes relied on his intuition. 
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BOX 8.7 THE RISK-AVERSE DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THE 
INTERACTION 
 
 
IS 2 confirmed what the entrepreneur had said, that he was still involved in 
finding opportunities to increase the size of the business and was always looking 
at the broader picture.  She said that the entrepreneur was connecting the dots 
ahead of everybody else, and was focused on the detail of what he was doing.  
She recognized that some internal stakeholders had difficulty combining detail 
thinking with strategic thinking in the way the entrepreneur did.  For example, 
providing financial detail for a client’s proposal and being able to see the 
strategic benefits of the detail to the future of the organization. 
 
IS 4 built on her Set I interview comments about the entrepreneur’s vision when 
he started the organization, and said that he made a decision irrespective of 
whether others followed him or not.  She added that sometimes he made a 
decision and went ahead, but that he also did listen to others’ ideas. 
 
The entrepreneur suggested that the recession brought opportunities such as 
restructuring the organization, but added that it needed to be done quickly in 
order for the organization to grow.  The entrepreneur wanted to use the 
opportunity for the organization to move into sharing intellectual property and 
development work, rather than only working as a service provider.  He 
confirmed his Set I interview comments that he was looking ahead three years at 
the new premises they would need. 
 
The entrepreneur and IS 1 mentioned that regarding issue domain 
‘Manufacturing’, they now had a license, which they didn’t have in Set I 
interviews.  He said that after starting it, the entrepreneur was less involved in it 
 
IS 1 felt that the entrepreneur’s risk-averse attitude to acquisitions was based 
on his perceptions, which IS 1 felt were not substantiated.  He reinforced that 
this could negatively impact organizational growth, and that the entrepreneur 
was not open to new opportunities.  . 
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now, but that he was still considering the strategic options.  The entrepreneur’s 
reduced level of involvement was ratified by IS 2 and IS 3.   
 
IS 2 went further and confirmed her Set I interview that the internal stakeholders 
did not share the entrepreneur’s vision for the manufacturing suite at the 
beginning, but that they were now operationally involved.  IS 4, supporting her 
Set I comments felt that “they” were naïve about the profit the manufacturing 
suite would generate, and the time it would take to operationalize.  However, she 
did see it as a part of the organization’s growth that would bring in further 
analytical work.  
 
IS 1 was hopeful that they would receive their first client within a few months, 
but that people in the organization did not see it as a core part of the business.  IS 
1 saw it as generating 15% of their future growth, even though the manufacturing 
revenue might only be a small part of the overall client contract. He stated that 
some internal stakeholders did not see that picture. 
 
The entrepreneur was concerned that he was not given the correct information by 
the internal stakeholders in terms of how profitable the manufacturing suite was 
going to be.  At the stage of Set II interviews, he was still in the process of 
gathering the facts about it.  IS 1 referred to the entrepreneur as making “blanket 
decisions”.  He said that the entrepreneur didn’t realize that things had changed, 
and that the organization did things in a different way to the one he remembered.  
He went further and declared that the entrepreneur used his intuition about the 
length of time and turnover the manufacturing suite would generate, rather than 
using factual information.  IS 1 commented that he had also used his intuition in 
making decisions about the manufacturing suite without providing enough 
financial detail. 
 
IS 2 acknowledged that the manufacturing suite was not making any money, and 
IS 3 confirmed that they were not manufacturing anything yet.  IS 3 said that the 
process of developing a product with a client was presently happening and he 
believed it would improve. 
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8.4.2 Temporality (Q2 And CF) 
 
The entrepreneur confirmed his thoughts from Set I interviews that the 
organization took too long to develop, and it should have happened sooner than 
20 years.  He felt that this slow development of 15-20% a year was not fast 
enough for investors and therefore the organization could not attract investment. 
 
IS 2 said that the entrepreneur was relaxed and didn’t stress or rush, but was 
always quick with regard to invoicing clients, IS 3 mentioned that the timing of 
the issue domain ‘Manufacturing’ did not go according to the predicted plan and 
was a month behind schedule.  IS 4 confirmed that the manufacturing suite had 
taken longer than people had anticipated, but that she, because of her previous 
manufacturing experience, had predicted this outcome. 
 
8.4.3 Sensegiving (Q4) 
 
IS 2 said that the entrepreneur was good at giving sense to people at all levels of 
the organization from board level to the people on the floor in the laboratory, but 
confirmed what the entrepreneur said, that people at lower levels of the 
organization did not want to know the financial details of what was going on.  IS 
3 felt that the entrepreneur trusted him to run the laboratory, and he reinforced 
what IS 2 said, that the entrepreneur wanted to do the best for people in the 
organization.  IS 3 believed that the entrepreneur challenged convention, and did 
not accept things being done the same way all the time.  
 
IS 4 confirmed her Set I comments that the entrepreneur was good at explaining 
things and asking for her opinion. 
 
8.4.4 Interactions (Q1 and CF) 
 
The entrepreneur’s interactions had changed since Set I interviews: he felt that he 
did not understand how to make people see the obvious. 
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Entrepreneur 
I’ve given up on that and I’m now more interested in the differences in 
people as opposed to the similarities if you know what I mean.  Accepting 
the differences as well, and different talents that people have.  I’m not 
sure you can make people see something that they can’t see.   
 
He said that if people could see the things he did, they would not be working for 
his organization but they would be doing it themselves.    
 
BOX 8.8 THE FLOW OF INFORMATION 
 
 
He admitted that he did not know what people thought, but believed that the link 
between the client and their salaries was too remote.  He felt that because of the 
large size of the company, people did not understand that the client paid their 
salaries.  Even though he felt this, according to IS 1 he still looked after 
everybody in the organization.   
 
The entrepreneur reinforced his Set I views, that he could not communicate his 
vision to people, and that he always saw the company as this size and bigger.  He 
commented that the success of the organization was no surprise to him.   He went 
further and reinforced his Set I interview, that some internal stakeholders did not 
understand profit even though he communicated to them what it meant at every 
meeting. 
 
IS 2 confirmed her Set I thoughts that the entrepreneur did not push people into 
making decisions, but would use his influence until they got to the decision he 
intended them to.   
 
 
 
He confirmed his Set I comments, that people do not want to know about 
figures, or to take risks in the business, that they wanted an “easy life” and 
thus that he limited the flow of information to internal stakeholders.   
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IS 2 
I’ll argue with him in that way whereas perhaps people are a bit more 
reticent but he’s usually quite open to people’s ideas, but if he thinks he 
has the best idea he will try and persuade them to come round to that way 
of thinking. 
 
IS 2 confirmed her Set I interviews that the entrepreneur always tried to get 
people on board with what was going on, and that his interactions with people for 
the manufacturing suite involved several presentations.  
 
IS 3 interactions with the entrepreneur were less frequent as the entrepreneur was 
trying to reduce his day-to-day activities.  IS 3 contacted him via email if he 
needed to speak to him about a technical challenge, and found that the 
entrepreneur’s solution would be the same one he had arrived at.  He admitted 
that he thought the entrepreneur worked differently with him than he did with 
others. 
 
Although IS 1 was the new MD, IS 3 revealed that the entrepreneur’s level of 
technical experience was more suited to answer his questions in more detail than 
IS 1, who would analyze the problem from a Business Development perspective.  
IS 1’s role and responsibilities therefore involved him engaging with IS 3 on 
performance and operational issues.  In terms of issue domain ‘Succession’, IS 1 
and IS 4 felt that the entrepreneur’s mentoring role was being reduced because he 
was out of the office for longer periods.  
 
Both IS 3 and IS 4 believed that they could understand the entrepreneur’s 
thought process.  IS 4 confirmed her Set I comments, that the entrepreneur 
bounced ideas off her because she was able to understand what he was saying, 
and could generally develop his idea. 
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8.4.5 Growth and Succession (Q1 and CF) 
 
Although the entrepreneur had found an opportunity to develop a new a product 
with a client, he felt that his organization did not have the funds necessary to 
invest in its development.  He was still working on new opportunities, but was 
more focused on his grandchildren.  Even though his son works in the 
organization, he felt that his children did not have the same ambition that he did.  
The entrepreneur was confused about why his children were not interested in the 
business, and put it down to the hard work and sacrifices they had witnessed their 
parents going through when they were growing up. 
 
IS 4 confirmed the entrepreneur’s comment in Set I, that he always had a long-
term vision for the company.  The entrepreneur was surprised that when the 
business lost a large client project that threatened organizational growth the 
internal stakeholders appeared unconcerned about the safety of the jobs.  The 
entrepreneur believed that internal stakeholders did not understand the 
significance of what happened, and he had expected that at least the management 
team would have been able to see it coming.  IS 1 argued that it was impossible 
to have predicted that this client was going to withdraw from the UK. 
 
The entrepreneur compared growth to a “wave with ups and downs”, and argued 
that the company could only progress through a steady stream of innovation and 
new ideas.  IS 4 also described organizational growth as “peaks and troughs”.  
The entrepreneur confirmed that he still saw expansion into the USA as a 
possible growth opportunity.  He added that the management should have a 
market penetration plan but did not think that they did.   IS 3’s view on growth 
was that the organization had “underlying growth” but that “top line” growth was 
not happening.  However, he was confident that the organization would increase 
in size and output in year 2013 after the initial impact of the recession had 
passed.  
 
IS 2 believed that the entrepreneur was still a risk taker which conflicted with 
what IS 1 stated about him in Set I interviews.  However, IS 2 mentioned that she 
was less of a risk taker, and might have an influence over the entrepreneur not 
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taking risks now which contradicted what she said in Set I interviews that she 
was a bigger risk taker than the entrepreneur. 
 
The entrepreneur believed that the organization would continue to grow and 
perform with the current management team, but was concerned with the level of 
detail that he was still required to get into in order to follow up on management 
decisions.  He was also concerned that the management team was not able to 
look ahead at what was needed for the future, but recognized that he needed to 
play less of a management role if he was to sell the business in the future.  
However, he was not confident that he could achieve that. 
 
IS 3 said that the organization was growing in other areas, except issue domain 
‘Recruitment’.  However, they had recruited across the company recently, and 
were targeting senior people.  He said that, because of the uncertainty and 
changes in their industry due to the recession, they had not recruited for a long 
time.  The organization had lost three people and had not replaced them.  IS 2, 3 
and 4 confirmed their Set I comments that the growth of the company was 
dependent on the number of people they could recruit. 
 
8.5 SET III:  SEPTEMBER – DECEMBER 2011 
 
Set III presents the analysis of the interviews that took place between September 
and December 2011 with the entrepreneur and four internal stakeholders.  Its 
purpose was to track any changes and included any other new issues that may 
have arisen since Sets I and II interviews.  
 
8.5.1 Decision-Making and Interaction (Q1 and CF) 
 
The entrepreneur said that his interactions with IS 1 and the organization had 
changed significantly since the Set II interview.  He was now much more 
confident in the way the business was going and although there were still 
differences of opinion between himself and IS 1, he could accept them.  IS 2 
confirmed her Set II comments, that the entrepreneur’s involvement was much 
more strategic now, although employees would also go to IS 1 now for strategic 
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decisions.  However, IS 2 mentioned that the entrepreneur was still “floating 
ideas to the board” and was involved in new opportunities, which contradicted 
what IS 1 had said. 
 
IS 4 felt that she could see what the entrepreneur could see in terms of the quality 
of the product, but she recognized that he had a wider vision than she did.  She 
admitted that she could not see, and did not have, a five-year vision like the 
entrepreneur, which confirmed what the entrepreneur said in his Set II interview. 
 
With regards to issue domain ‘Manufacturing’ IS 1 and IS 4 revealed that they 
had not manufactured anything successfully yet in the new suite, but they 
believed that the manufacturing suite would be profitable in the future.  IS 1 
added that the sales predictions had been inaccurate, and it was frustrating that 
they had no success attracting manufacturing opportunities.  IS 3 said that he 
expected manufacturing to take place in January 2012, whilst IS 4 felt it would 
take a year to be functional.  She argued that it was lack of experience in 
manufacturing that caused the inaccurate predictions by internal stakeholders.  
 
IS 1 confirmed his comments in Sets I and II, and said that the entrepreneur was 
not involved in opportunity recognition, and that he was the one successfully 
bringing in new projects and equipment.  He added that the business would not 
have taken risks if he had not encouraged it, and claimed that he was responsible 
for the formulation activities that the organization now undertook.  He iterated 
that although formulation was something that the entrepreneur wanted to do and 
it was in the Business Plan, nothing had previously been done with it. 
 
8.5.2 Growth, Change, Temporality and Sensemaking (Q1, Q2, Q4 And CF) 
 
The entrepreneur said that the business needed to change if it was to grow, and 
that IS 1 was equipped to deliver organizational growth.  He stated that IS 1 
trusted people to do the job much more than he had, and also delegated much 
more than he did, which was confirmed by IS 2.  He went further to add that 
while he preferred to control all aspects of the organization, it was no longer a 
suitable way to develop the company.  IS 2 said that the entrepreneur would try 
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and find the solution, but realized now that there were other ways of getting to a 
decision besides his own process. 
 
Entrepreneur 
But as the company gets to a certain size you start thinking, well the 
company itself has a future, and it may be that I could limit where the 
company could go and that.  
 
He admitted that he would still take a risk, but that he was enjoying doing other 
things now. This was confirmed by IS 2 who perceived, that the change was due 
to the entrepreneur’s age.  In addition, IS 2 believed that clients preferred to see 
younger people in management in the organization.  
 
IS 1 said that the entrepreneur was only comfortable making a decision with 
things that he knew very well, and cited this as a reason why the organization 
had not grown through formulation activities, with which the entrepreneur was 
unfamiliar.   
 
IS 1 said that the entrepreneur had spent a lot of time away from the organization 
since the Set II interviews, which he felt helped IS 1 build his confidence in 
decision-making and running the organization.  He declared that the entrepreneur 
trusted his decision-making.  IS 2 and 3 confirmed that the entrepreneur seemed 
more relaxed and spent less time in the organization, and that IS 2 spent more 
time with IS 1 rather than the entrepreneur in decision-making.  IS 4 noted that 
her relationship with the entrepreneur had become more personal and friendly 
rather than formal.  
 
IS 1 confirmed his Set II comments that there were aspects of the business, such 
as the management of projects and the commercial side, which were very 
different to the way the entrepreneur remembered them to be; that the 
entrepreneur was now mainly familiar with the quality systems and not how the 
organization was run.  IS 4 said that some internal stakeholders did not 
understand the quality side of the business in a similar way to the entrepreneur.   
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IS 1 
He doesn’t say it explicitly but implicitly he’d say “ I cant understand 
why we don’t do this.”  Well, we haven’t’ done it that way for years.  
That is how he remembers it happening. Not because that is the way it 
works now.  
 
IS 2 felt that the organization had not suffered from the recession, and that 
because their client contracts were long-term their workload was consistent, 
which is what IS 2 and 4 had stated in previous interviews. 
 
IS 4 noticed that her interactions with the entrepreneur were less frequent than 
when she was interviewed in Set II, and that the mentoring support she was 
receiving from the entrepreneur was replaced by that from other internal 
stakeholders.  She also noticed that the day-to-day running had changed since the 
entrepreneur had handed over to IS 1, which she believed was due to IS 1’s lack 
of experience.  IS 4 said that one of the differences between the entrepreneur and 
IS 1 was that the entrepreneur would say “yes we can do that” and know what it 
took to get it done, whereas IS 1 would say “yes we can do that” and had no idea 
how to proceed.  She felt that the entrepreneur mentored IS 1 constantly, which 
resulted in similar management styles with subtle differences. 
 
Issue domain, ‘Recruitment’ for senior positions did not happen because the 
organization was busy with analytical work.  IS 3 said that he didn’t want to 
“mess it up for clients” and was not convinced by the quality of the recruits they 
interviewed for the senior positions.  However, IS 2 said they had recruited six 
employees, which in Set II interviews she had mentioned she wanted to do, and 
IS 3 said they had recruited 4 people for laboratory work, and would be 
recruiting again in 2013.  Both IS 2 and 3 revealed that customer sales had 
increased. 
 
IS 2 said that there was very little evidence for the issue domain ‘Succession’ 
and added:  
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IS 2 
I think the lab managers, they are all quite comfortable, but I think 
(IS1’s) knowledge of perhaps chemistry is not as good as (the 
entrepreneur), and so on certain procedures they will go straight to him. 
 
The entrepreneur realized that he could not do everything himself, and that by 
developing the right structure, the organization could develop without him.  The 
entrepreneur went into the office once or twice a week rather than daily like he 
used to do. 
 
8.6 Summary  
 
This chapter presented the findings of Set I, II and III using the 19 categories 
derived from the empirical data.   The cognitive differences between the 
entrepreneur and the internal stakeholders were highlighted with regards to these 
categories.  These included biases and temporal issues regarding decision-
making for issue domains ‘Recruitment’, ‘Manufacturing’ and ‘Succession’.  The 
chapter also highlighted the changes in entrepreneurial attitude and the level of 
interaction between the entrepreneur and the internal stakeholders.  The 
following chapter presents the findings for Case B.  
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 Chapter 9 Phase II Case B Findings 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the findings of the empirical data in Case B.  The 
entrepreneur and internal stakeholders were interviewed three times.  A synopsis 
of the entrepreneur and two internal stakeholders is presented.  This is followed 
by the findings in Sets I, II and III.  Direct quotes in italics from the entrepreneur 
and internal stakeholders present a glimpse of the interview.  The textual 
function of Boxes 9.2-9.9 was to enhance text that I regarded as significant in 
order to focus attention, and supplement the data presented.  The text boxes 
individually and collectively do not have a conceptual purpose.  The lexicon used 
in the direct quotes, text boxes and text are the precise words that the participants 
used the majority of the time in order to present the data directly as it was 
captured.  
 
9.2 Synopsis of The Entrepreneur and The Internal Stakeholders  
 
The codes and job titles for the two internal stakeholders are presented in Table 
9.1.  
 
TABLE 9.1 INTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS JOB TITLES 
Case Study Internal Stakeholder 
(IS) 
Job Titles 
B IS 5 
IS 6 
Marketing Coordinator 
Financial Controller 
 
The codes (1-19) were grouped into categories to present the findings based on 
their similar meanings.  The roles and responsibilities for the entrepreneur and 
internal stakeholders are summarized in Box 9.1. 
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BOX 9.1 SUMMARY PROFILES OF CASE B PARTICIPANTS 
 
9.3 SET I:  JANUARY – APRIL 2011   
	
Set I presents the analysis of the interviews, which took part between January 
and April 2011 with the entrepreneur and internal stakeholder. 
 
9.3.1 Decision-Making, Alertness, Information Gathering, Pattern 
Recognition, Insight, Experience and Opportunity Recognition (Q1) 
 
The entrepreneur was very practical in the way he saw things.  He said that he 
didn’t understand the conceptual elements of a process in the same way as the 
practical ones.  This was confirmed by IS 6 who said that the entrepreneur 
preferred visuals in his presentations and reporting.  
 
 
 
 
Profile of the Entrepreneur 
 
The entrepreneur in Case B undertook building studies at university, but left 
after a year and started a six month placement as a trainee manager in a 
construction organization.  He gained practical experience by working on sites 
as a manager, and two years later left to work for another subcontracting 
organization.  He was promoted to run a £30 million budget as an Estimating 
Manager until the recession in the 1980’s, and then decided to start his own 
business after completing his Chartership in building.  
 
(ii) Job Profiles of Two Internal Stakeholders (IS 5 and IS 6) 
 
IS 5 reported directly to the entrepreneur in his role as Marketing Coordinator.   
He joined the organization after completing a Degree in Engineering 
Management, and was moved to the Marketing Department after starting in 
Administration.  He worked with the entrepreneur in developing the marketing 
plan and ran the Marketing Department.   
IS 6 worked for a Chartered Accountancy firm, and was now the Financial 
Controller reporting directly to the entrepreneur.  He worked with the 
entrepreneur for approximately 13 years in his present role and his previous 
accountancy organization combined. 
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IS 5 
He (the entrepreneur) is very analytical in his decision-making process.  
He does not make snap decisions, and is very cautious in his decision-
making process.  He gathers as much information as he can.  
 
The entrepreneur thought that he should made quicker decisions.  He added that 
people probably thought that he made quick decisions because they were not 
aware of the length of time he spent thinking about it before he decided.  
Although, this was not the case with IS 5 who recognized that the entrepreneur 
gathered information and took his time to make decisions.   
 
IS 5 added that the entrepreneur made decisions based on experience rather than 
intuition, and that the entrepreneur would “rule out ideas” which had not worked 
in the past, even if IS 5 suggested doing it a different way to the one the 
entrepreneur had experienced.  IS 6 felt that the entrepreneur was good at reading 
people, and that he understood the psychology of behavior.  He was impressed 
with his attention to detail in his interactions and observations. 
 
The entrepreneur believed that most decisions involved a financial aspect and 
therefore would ask IS 5 and IS 6 to find the information he wanted, which they 
confirmed.  He trusted IS 5’s judgment, and said that IS 5 and IS 6 would not 
bring him information without considering all the options. 
 
Entrepreneur   
They know never to just bring me one set of answers, or what they think.  
I always look at the ‘what if factor’, what if something goes wrong.  How 
are we exposed, what are the upsides, what are the downsides, to try and 
think about all that before I can make a decision … 
 
IS 6 felt that the entrepreneur didn’t realize that all decisions were controlled by 
him. He said people were fearful to make decisions independent of the 
entrepreneur even though he and the entrepreneur believed that they should. 
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IS 6 
I know what information I need to give him for him to make a decision. If 
I’m kinda quite vague or don’t work out figures or things… he’s quite 
analytical in the way that he looks at things, so rather than me saying this 
is what I want to do and this is what I’m hoping to achieve, I’ll give him 
an idea or I’ll give him two ideas, compare them.  Do all the thought 
processing, so he can make a quick decision. 
 
IS 5 mentioned issue domain ‘Technology’ and said that he wanted to update the 
web presence for the organization.  In order for the entrepreneur to make a 
decision, IS 5 had to provide the entrepreneur with financial and research details 
on the viability of the idea.  The entrepreneur paid special attention to the 
financial requirements of any marketing project IS 5 brought to him.   
 
The entrepreneur collected and assessed the information he received, irrespective 
of whether it was a decision about a photocopier purchase or a strategic decision.  
He admitted that he knew what he wanted, and would not be able to sit down and 
collect the detail himself, but that asking IS 5 and IS 6 to collect the information 
was the best approach for him because of his lack of patience.   
 
Entrepreneur 
When I set off at the start of it, I think I know the answer and therefore 
what I suppose I’m trying to do is justify the decision, and the answer 
that’s going to come out at the end process, but I do feel I have to go 
through all those steps to do the research. 
 
IS 6 
He has probably made a decision, not based on that, based on either a 
general feeling or conversations with people, and then he would look for 
something to support that.   
 
The entrepreneur made a decision after weighing up all the eventualities rather 
than acting on a ‘hunch’.  He did not explain the reason for his request to the 
internal stakeholders and believed that they would eventually see what he could 
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see later on in the process.  He wasn’t sure that they would arrive at the same 
decision that he would if they were given the same information, but tried not to 
influence their thinking. 
 
The entrepreneur said that he would allow the internal stakeholders to decide for 
themselves, and even if they came out with a different decision than his, he still 
considered it.  This was contradicted by IS 6 who said the entrepreneur was the 
person who made all the decisions. 
 
Entrepreneur 
That decision-making process once I’ve decided something and once 
we've gone through, then I do expect it to be carried out… if somebody 
goes against it…then the best for them to do is to take a long vacation 
from the office or from out of my vicinity.  
 
The entrepreneur always looked for opportunities for the organization to run 
more efficiently, in contrast to the other managers who did not attempt to 
improve the systems and processes in their sales role.  IS 5 confirmed that the 
entrepreneur’s view was that some people in the organization worked because 
they had to, not because of a desire for job satisfaction. 
 
IS 5 felt that the entrepreneur was constantly bringing new ideas to the 
organization, but the execution and implementation of the ideas did not always 
happen, because he would change his mind.  IS 6 confirmed that the entrepreneur 
was actively involved in spotting new opportunities, such as marketing the 
business and the brand name. 
 
IS 5 used the idea of issue domain ‘Technology’ to describe how he had been 
“pushing” a technological change for the Marketing department for several years.  
However, after the entrepreneur had heard from another organization that a 
technological change they had implemented had failed, he changed his mind 
about implementing it in the organization.  IS 5 went further and said he had 
been trying to get the entrepreneur to engage with issue domain ‘Technology’ 
since he started working in the organization, and that although the entrepreneur 
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had bought into the idea after two years, IS 5 believed that the entrepreneur did 
not like change.  IS 6 confirmed that the existing technology to support the issue 
domain ‘Sales and Technology’ was poor and inadequate. 
 
Although the entrepreneur regarded his decision-making as analytical, IS 6 
argued that, unlike him, the entrepreneur made decisions based on people rather 
than financial numbers.  Like IS 5, IS 6 was always trying to work out what was 
behind the entrepreneur’s questions and understood his thinking because of the 
length of time they had worked together. 
 
9.3.2 Change, Generation and Temporality (Q1, Q2 and CF) 
 
IS 6 explained that he worked quickly and added that other people considered the 
entrepreneur demanding of their time.  The entrepreneur believed that most 
people came to work for a standard of living only, and not for a promotion or the 
challenge of the job, but believed that IS 5 and 6 were motivated by job 
satisfaction.  IS 5 added that other managers did not feel part of the organization, 
and felt excluded by the entrepreneur’s lack of communication.   
 
The entrepreneur felt that when he changed a system because it was not working 
efficiently, the employees, management, IS 5 and 6 would regard it as him 
constantly changing things, rather than something they should have been doing 
independently.  This was confirmed by IS 5’s earlier comments. 
 
IS 5 
He doesn’t want the processes changed, he just wants the answer so 
which is why when I changed that process, I didn’t go to him, because he 
would have said no that’s the way we always do it. 
 
Although the entrepreneur recognized that the organization needed to change in 
order to grow, IS 5 felt that it was more theoretical than a practical intention to 
change.  He added that the entrepreneur was not interested in a drastic change, 
and was happy with the organization the way it was.  However, IS 5 said that the 
entrepreneur was happy with changes more recently than he used to be.  He 
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added that it might have had something to do with the quality of the ideas, rather 
than the entrepreneur not wanting change. 
 
The entrepreneur was determined that projects should finish on time, and used 
the example of a contract manager who did not have the same time effectiveness 
and urgency to deliver a quality project for the client.  After several 
disagreements with the entrepreneur, the contract manager resigned and the 
entrepreneur replaced him.  He added that the organization was wasting time and 
money because of inefficient work ethics.  He felt that he never had enough time 
to do the things he wanted to do and that balancing work and home was a 
constant challenge. 
 
IS 5 stated that the entrepreneur believed that things should happen faster than 
they did, and that with regards to issue domain ‘Technology’, the entrepreneur 
did not understand that there were no established processes to monitor issue 
domain ‘Sales and Marketing’ on the website.  However, he added that the 
entrepreneur was beginning to see that the answer to his questions on sales and 
marketing opportunities were being answered a lot quicker with the new 
technology system implemented by IS 5.  He thought that if the entrepreneur 
were to do certain tasks in the organization now, he would take a lot longer than 
other employees because he had forgotten how long they took.   
 
IS 6 revealed that the entrepreneur was always pushing people to achieve better 
results and didn’t like employees engaging in activities which wasted time. The 
entrepreneur’s perception was that time is money.  He added that the 
entrepreneur focused on the small things, and did not like anybody to stand 
around the coffee or water machine chatting when they had work to do.  He went 
further and said that the entrepreneur reacted quickly if he felt that the sales 
department was under performing. 
 
9.3.3 Optimism (Q3) 
 
IS 5 cited that although the entrepreneur tried to be positive, he sometimes came 
across as being negative.  Issue domain ‘Sales and Marketing’ affected how 
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positive the entrepreneur was.  He supported his view that if sales were down 
that month, the entrepreneur could not hide his negativity.  IS 6 said that the 
entrepreneur always insisted that the management team had a positive outlook 
and impression, irrespective of the sales figures dropping below expectation. 
 
BOX 9.2 THE FACTORS AFFECTING INTERACTION   
 
 
9.3.4 Sensemaking and Sensegiving (Q4)  
 
The entrepreneur stated that managers worked ‘in’ the department rather than 
‘on’ the department.  He believed that in order for them to make sense of the 
improvements needed in the organization they should become more strategic in 
their thinking.  In the issue domain ‘Sales and Marketing’, the entrepreneur 
declared that the Sales Managers should have picked up that they had not 
received work for six months from their good clients.   
 
BOX 9.3 SENSEMAKING 
 
IS 6 could not understand why the 
entrepreneur waited to communicate recruitment changes to the employees. 
 
 
 
 
The atmosphere created by the entrepreneur affected all the employees, 
including IS 5 and 6.  IS 6 felt that the entrepreneur was an optimistic person 
who didn’t like negativity.  He emphasized the fact that if the entrepreneur was 
negative, everybody in the office would pick it up. 
The entrepreneur tried to make sense of what people said, and then he 
considered whether it required a change in the business.  IS 6 had learnt that 
the entrepreneur would analyze any comment he made to him and then tried to 
make sense of it. However, he thought that the entrepreneur was unaware of 
the effect of not communicating with people about the reasons behind the new 
recruits and what their role was within the organization.	
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9.3.5 Interaction and Relationships (Q1 and CF) 
 
IS 5 felt that the entrepreneur did not change his opinion if someone disagreed 
with him, and that he was confident in his ability to do any job within the 
organization.  He said that even though the entrepreneur might say he agreed 
with someone else’s decision, they always ended doing what he wanted to do 
anyway, and they might not even realize it.  IS 5 had witnessed people starting 
with a lot of ambition and then being deflated after six months because the 
entrepreneur did not want to implement their ideas. 
 
IS 6 stated that the entrepreneur took his opinion into consideration much more 
since the senior sales director, who had been with the organization for ten years, 
had left.  The entrepreneur interacted with IS 6 and felt confident that they knew 
each other well, because of their history together.  He felt that IS 6 was 
committed to the organization, responded quickly and prioritized him when 
something needed to be done and delivered on time. 
 
The entrepreneur dealt with employees very directly and firmly, and pointed out 
to the Sales Managers how they could improve their service to clients.  Their 
interaction was confirmed by IS 6.   The sales team was unable to see how they 
could make the improvement until the entrepreneur had shown them.     
 
BOX 9.4 ENTREPRENEUR’S COMMENT ON THE INTERACTION  
 
 
IS 6 remarked “he gets a heckava lot out of his staff”, but included that 99% of 
his interactions were with the management team and not employees.  IS 6 felt 
that he drove the organization to make a profit for himself, and not to put it back 
into the organization, but he didn’t think other people in the organization realized 
it. 
	
I’m not very tolerant (pause)…I’m not very tolerant of people who don’t put 
the effort in erm….I’m not very tolerant of people who only go through a 
process half-heartedly… if you are gonna do a job, I think it should be done 
l
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Entrepreneur 
They don’t really have to come into contact with me other than in a 
smiling way if they are doing their job properly, if they are not doing 
their job properly and we are letting down the clients or we are not 
delivering internal service to other departments or anything…then I’m 
probably not the person they want to see… 
 
The interactions with the entrepreneur were affected by how hard employees and 
internal stakeholders worked, and how committed they were.  IS 5 stated that the 
entrepreneur had “pulled him around” to his way of thinking, and that the 
entrepreneur rewarded loyalty. 
 
He said that, as IS 6 confirmed, his clients and employees felt that he was a very 
hard person to deal with, because his standards were so high and he had high 
expectations of people.  The entrepreneur commented that his role was not to be 
liked, but to ensure that employees had a salary each month.  He wanted 
employees to take responsibility for their work. 
 
The entrepreneur believed that everybody should be able to see the obvious 
things, such as following up on a client and supervising people on expensive 
contracts rather than leaving them on the site alone.   
 
IS 5 always used the entrepreneur’s thought process when he was selling an idea 
to him, and that being on the “same wavelength” enabled a quicker agreement 
from the entrepreneur.  He felt that working with the entrepreneur had influenced 
and focused his thinking.  IS 6 confirmed that the entrepreneur would run any 
new ideas through IS 5.  However, IS 5 felt that it was difficult to change the 
entrepreneur’s mind even if he presented a strong case to him on a particular 
issue. 
 
IS 5 revealed that the entrepreneur kept people “on their toes” and put people 
under pressure to deliver in a quicker time frame.  IS 6 added that “there was a 
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lot of fear” of the entrepreneur in the organization, but believed that the 
organization was successful because of his actions. 
 
The biggest impact on interrelationships was the sales and invoice white boards 
which showed whether the monthly sales were low at £300 000 or high at £500 
000.  The entrepreneur monitored these figures and was generally positive when 
they were high. 
 
IS 5 felt that the entrepreneur told him what he wanted to hear with regards to 
changing his present role, rather than making changes that made a difference to 
him in a substantial and sustainable way.  This resulted in IS 5 “switching off”.  
He said that although the entrepreneur said he trusted the management, including 
himself, he didn’t think the entrepreneur trusted that anybody could do the job as 
well as he could. 
 
IS 6 believed that if he mentioned something to the entrepreneur he would 
consider it and listen to his opinion.  Although he admitted that his interactions 
with the entrepreneur were too intense at times, and that the constant pushing did 
not motivate him.  
 
9.3.6 Growth (Q1 and CF) 
 
The entrepreneur spotted an opportunity for growth with existing clients, in issue 
domain ‘Sales and Marketing’, that could have been lost because of a problem in 
the archived filing system, costing the organization £800 000.  IS 5 and IS 6, 
who volunteered to work over a weekend to sort it out, managed to correct the 
problem.  The sales managers however, could not see the problem the 
entrepreneur had identified and kept telling him there was nothing to worry about 
because their sales figures were good.  He was very keen that the organization 
became more efficient.  IS 6 saw the situation as a retraining exercise for the 
sales department, rather than a cultural shift in the way people did things in the 
organization. 
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The entrepreneur believed that he could double the turnover of the organization, 
but that it would take time away from the other things he wanted to do.  He used 
to measure the growth of the business in terms of their turnover, which was 
approximately £5 million, and the number of employees.  More recently he 
considered the efficiency of the organization as an important aspect.  IS 5 
defined growth as profit, repeat business by clients and the development of 
certain markets.  IS 6 added that growth meant turnover, and did not regard 
employee numbers as growth and confirmed that their sales figures had dropped. 
 
BOX 9.5 INTERNAL STAKEHOLDER CONFIDENCE 
 
 
The entrepreneur’s interactions with the organization had increased because of 
the drop in sales.  IS 6 mentioned the issue domain ‘Recruitment’, and said that 
in 2007, the organization had a high turnover of staff because of the demands the 
entrepreneur placed on people.  He said that 12 out of 35 people had left within 
two weeks of him joining the organization 2 years ago. 
 
9.4 SET II:  JUNE – AUGUST 2011 
 
Set II presents the analysis of the interviews that took place between June and 
August 2011 with the entrepreneur and two internal stakeholders.   The purpose 
was to track any changes with the issue domains, and any other new issues that 
may have arisen.  The entrepreneur’s cognitive map was used to help me explore 
the decision-making process and the opportunity recognition interactions with 
the entrepreneur.  
 
 
 
 
 
IS 6 mentioned that because of the historical success, the management team 
and employees agreed with the entrepreneur’s decisions. 
	 180
9.4.1 Decision-Making, Insight, Alertness, Information Gathering, Pattern 
Recognition, Insight, Experience and Opportunity Recognition (Q1) 
 
The entrepreneur said that he knew where he wanted to get to in his strategic 
decision-making, but not necessarily where he wanted to get to in reality.  He 
would then engage with people to validate or confirm this thought process.  He 
believed that attention to detail and thinking about one’s actions would result in 
fewer mistakes.  He used the example of archiving the files in Set I, and said that 
“getting the order right” would have prevented the mistake of missing potential 
work from clients.  He was confused and angry that employees allowed that to 
happen.   
 
Entrepreneur 
People just come to work and look at it as a process, they are not 
equating the success or not equating those orders to jobs, they looking at 
it as money, and really doesn’t make a difference if it was done today or 
tomorrow. 
 
IS 5 and IS 6 believed that having a different opinion to the entrepreneur would 
not alter his decision-making and that he would end up doing what he wanted to 
do.  IS 6 believed that the entrepreneur’s decision-making was all related to how 
well the organization was doing financially and that emotion was not a 
consideration in his decision-making process.  However, he added that since the 
turmoil the organization had been going through since Set I, the entrepreneur was 
trying to have more of a positive attitude rather than “battering people” to 
improve productivity. 
 
9.4.2 Change, Generation and Temporality (Q1, Q2 and CF) 
 
IS 5’s role had changed since Set I from Marketing Coordinator to Commercial 
Manager  which involved more client interaction.  He mentioned issue domain 
‘Sales and Marketing’, and said that in his previous role, the contacts that he had 
developed would not be converted to a sale by him, whereas in his new role he 
had end to end client control.  With regards to these changes, the entrepreneur 
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was able to make quick decisions if he felt confident that he was making the right 
decision, because there was no board to delay the decision.  
 
The entrepreneur believed that people took too long to do a job and that they did 
not make the connection between getting the job done quickly, and the number 
of orders they received.  IS 6 confirmed the entrepreneur’s view on time, and 
said that the entrepreneur believed that saying goodbye to an ex-employee was 
wasting valuable time.  The entrepreneur also felt that responding quickly to a 
client was very important in the client relationship. 
 
9.4.3 Optimism (Q3) 
 
The entrepreneur’s attitude had been negative since Set I interviews because of 
the financial and operational difficulties.  IS 6 mentioned that recently the 
entrepreneur had become more positive and added: 
 
IS 6 
He’s been realistic about ‘yes this is a big change for us, and ok I’m 
going to keep positive and keep motivating people and keep it going as 
we are heading in the right direction,’ but I think it will last a number of 
months. The only time it wouldn’t last is if, by probably the next 4 or 5 
months, there hasn’t been any positive change in the figures, if we’re still 
floundering around you know, then he would. 
 
9.4.4 Sensemaking and Sensegiving (Q4)  
 
The entrepreneur acknowledged that, what seemed like commonsense for him, 
was not commonsense for those around him.  He used the example of two 
employees putting a quote into a window envelope the wrong way around 
without anybody checking whether they could see the address and not “switching 
their brain on” when they got to work. 
 
The entrepreneur noticed that people did not relate the clients’ orders to “that’s 
what keeps them in their jobs”.  He was always trying to make sense of the 
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impact of the financial figures on the business, and could not understand why 
others did not do the same thing. 
 
Entrepreneur 
I would look at that order and say well, ok that’s £100 000 but if we get 
everything right we can make x amount out of it.   So really, in that 
process there’s a lot of money going to be spent in employing people in, 
getting in engineers’ time and other elements so…you know, if you look 
at it as if we lost an order for £100 000 that’s basically a few peoples’ 
jobs. 
 
The entrepreneur said that he had spent a large part of the year trying to get the 
management team to see the potential of the organization.  He believed that the 
reason for employees and management not wanting to see the changes that were 
necessary for growth, was due to job insecurity and lack of skills and knowledge. 
 
IS 5 felt that the entrepreneur didn’t realize the negative impact issue domain 
‘Recruitment’ of the new Sales Consultant was having on him or the rest of the 
organization.  When the entrepreneur sensed the negative mood of the 
organization, he sent out questionnaires to gather data about what and how 
people were feeling.  Based on the large amount of negative feedback, the 
entrepreneur decided to change his attitude to a more positive one. 
 
9.4.5 Interaction and Relationships (Q1 and CF) 
 
The entrepreneur mentioned the issue domain ‘Sales and Marketing’, and the 
difficulty he had getting the sales team to see that they should treat a sales order 
like cash and say thank you immediately for the work.   
 
The entrepreneur had difficulty getting employees to take responsibility and be 
accountable in their jobs.  This did not apply to IS 5 who felt that in his new role 
he enjoyed more responsibility, he felt that he was not motivated by “having a 
job”.  He also felt that the entrepreneur did not understand what motivated him. 
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IS 5 
He does not think other people would care as long as they have a job. 
 
The entrepreneur stated that when the company was smaller it was easier to 
monitor and measure employee’s performance with regards to client 
relationships and the jobs.  He added that increasing new clients resulted in a 
large number of errors and in demoralized employees.  In contrast, IS 5 declared 
that the employees were demoralized because of the lack of information about 
the changes the entrepreneur was making with regards to issue domain 
‘Recruitment’. 
 
The entrepreneur had tried several times to explain to the engineers the 
importance of timeliness with clients and the importance of following up on 
client contacts, but that they still did not understand.  He believed that he had to 
always put pressure on them to pay attention, which resulted in them thinking he 
was being hard on them.  He added that even management could not see the 
importance of having clean vans, even though their clients could.  IS 5 noted that 
the entrepreneur had hired the new Sales Consultant to help him manage these 
aspects of the business.  However, he was not certain whether this was the case. 
 
The entrepreneur revealed that he was always fire fighting and made several 
changes in the Sales and Marketing departments.  He mentioned issue domain 
‘Technology’, and said that Sales Managers were using manual systems, and that 
when they left he hired new people and gave them laptops to work with.  He said 
that the sales staff who had been with the organization a long time were reluctant 
to look for new and improved ways of working.   
 
IS 5 mentioned his frustrations with all the organizational change which included 
issue domain ‘Recruitment’.  He did not know what the organization structure 
was and he didn’t believe that the entrepreneur knew either.  He felt that his 
interactions with the entrepreneur involved several hours of communication, but 
often left without an answer to his question. 
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IS 5 had noticed that although the entrepreneur always presented the 
organization’s performance, he did not communicate the real reasons behind 
what he was doing.  IS 5 and IS 6 believed that the entrepreneur was aware of the 
impact of what he was doing, but not the impact it was having on the 
organization. 
 
9.4.6 Growth (Q1 and CF) 
 
The entrepreneur witnessed that the organization’s growth had resulted in the 
employees feeling detached from their jobs.  There was also less informal 
communication between employees about clients’ needs when the size of the 
organization increased.  
 
However, the entrepreneur believed the organization was not big enough and had 
not yet fulfilled its potential, and felt frustrated that other people did not have the 
same vision as he did.  He referred to the “comfort zone” that people preferred to 
exist in, although he mentioned that the past 18 months were the most turbulent 
of the last ten years.  He added that when he was off sick for a few months, the 
organization did not grow and several clients were unhappy with the quality of 
the work they delivered.  IS 5 shared the entrepreneur’s concerns and said that 
growing past £5 million pounds in turnover was a challenge. 
 
The entrepreneur mentioned the issue domain ‘Recruitment’, and said that even 
though the company needed to recruit people from the outside, it was politically 
difficult because of demotivating employees who had been with the organization 
for a long time.  IS 5 believed that he could do the job just as well as one of the 
new recruits and confirmed the political challenges the entrepreneur faced.  IS 5 
confirmed that the entrepreneur was recruiting people from the outside in order 
to get experienced management input and that it created an uncertain 
environment.  IS 5 also confirmed that the Sales Consultant was recruited in 
order to increase the sales team and to relieve the entrepreneur of some of his 
management responsibilities. 
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The organization was still recruiting, and employed more people than they did in 
Set I interviews.  The entrepreneur believed that one way of building the 
organization was to recruit people that believed in its potential.  
 
The entrepreneur confirmed IS 6’s thoughts in Set I that several people had left 
the organization because of his desire to “push the organization towards growth 
and drive through changes”.  The entrepreneur reinforced the point that when he 
was not there, their turnover dropped by 40% within 2 months.  He added that 
the organization was on the right track and growing again since his return.  IS 6 
contradicted this and argued that the entrepreneur’s absence was not enough to 
justify the change in their sales, he believed that a slow time of year combined 
with a poor sales processes was the cause. 
 
IS 5 confirmed that employees had left because of the amount of pressure the 
entrepreneur exerted on them.  He thought that the entrepreneur could have 
handled the relationship better.  He also mentioned that since Set I, the 
entrepreneur’s secretary left after ten years with the organization as well as the 
Sales Director.  IS 5 and IS 6 believed that the entrepreneur was very secretive 
about the employees who had left.  IS 6 felt that the entrepreneur was not aware 
of the consequences of hiding information from employees and thought that the 
entrepreneur believed that the organization had an open culture. 
 
IS 6 noted that it would be useful for the entrepreneur to see how employees’ 
negative feelings were linked to performance, but he commented that it was 
difficult to measure this impact.  
. 
9.5 SET III:  SEPTEMBER – DECEMBER 2011 
 
Set III presents the analysis of the interviews that took place between September 
and December 2011 with the entrepreneur and two internal stakeholders.  I 
tracked any changes to the interactions between the way the entrepreneur thinks 
and the internal stakeholder perception over the issue domains and any new 
issues that had arisen since Set I and Set II interviews.  
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9.5.1 Decision-Making and Interaction (Q1 and CF) 
 
There were several changes since Set II interviews.  IS 6 confirmed the issue 
domain ‘Recruitment’ changes had taken place at management level.  IS 6 felt 
that the transformational changes had “flushed out” several inefficiencies in the 
organization.  His role had changed slightly and now included Human Resource 
elements since the entrepreneur’s secretary had left.  The entrepreneur had 
restructured the Sales Department and changed the role of an employee who had 
been with the organization for ten years to a more responsible role.   
 
The entrepreneur had decided to change the type of work they attracted because 
of the increased level of competition in their sector.  He was looking at 
developing more long-term relationships with clients, rather than chasing the 
larger contracts that delivered short-term order books.  This approach was 
different from his Set I and Set II strategy.  The decision to change was a result 
of several failed attempts to maintain the status quo.  He felt that the organization 
should always be undergoing Business Development, and that the previous Sales 
Director did not have the capacity to use issue domain ‘Technology’ to increase 
their sales and market share. 
 
BOX 9.6 ACCEPTANCE OF DIFFERENCES  
 
 
Entrepreneur 
Trying to encourage people to increase their input and their returns 
rather than standing with a cattle prod behind them saying blooming do 
it. 
 
IS 5 reiterated that the entrepreneur’s lack of experience in issue domain 
‘Technology’ had a negative impact on the way he viewed the implementation of 
 
The entrepreneur still felt that employees and management did not have the 
same thought process as he did and they were not alert enough.  	
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certain technologies.  IS 5 felt that the way the entrepreneur thought about things 
had not changed, but that he was more prepared to let others make decisions.  He 
added that the entrepreneur got people to agree with his decision by implying or 
insinuating things.  IS 6 added that the entrepreneur expected “the world to flex 
to him, not him flex to the world”.  
 
9.5.2 Change, Generation and Temporality (Q1, Q2 and CF) 
 
The entrepreneur mentioned that he had “mellowed” with age and that others 
regarded him as an “unreasonable man”.  The entrepreneur described an 
employee whose role he had changed, to improve their health and safety 
standards, within three months rather than a year, something the employee had 
thought was impossible. 
 
The organization had experienced several changes since Set II interviews.  The 
entrepreneur mentioned the issue domain ‘Recruitment’, and the changes to the 
sales team, which resulted in significant improvements in systems and processes.  
The entrepreneur believed that if IS 5 had joined the organization five years 
earlier, issue domain ‘Sales and Marketing’ would have been technologically 
more efficient.  IS 5 mentioned issue domain ‘Technology’, and said that the 
website was now up and running, which it wasn’t in Set II, and confirmed the 
entrepreneur’s comments that the system was more efficient. 
 
IS 5 noticed that the biggest change in the organization since Set II interviews 
was the entrepreneur’s attitude, which had become more “laid back”.  He added 
that the entrepreneur was more emotional in his decision-making than he used to 
be, and that his perception of employees’ motivation had changed for the better.  
IS 5 was no longer looking for a new job, but added: 
 
IS 5 
If we don’t make money now for the next 3 months then, for good reason, 
he (the entrepreneur) will change the way he thinks about things and 
drastic changes will happen. So I’m sort of prepared for that really. 
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IS 5 and IS 6 agreed that the entrepreneur’s change in attitude had gone too far 
and that he should still be concerned with cost and performance, but that 
everyone was happier around him now than in Set I and Set II. 
 
9.5.3 Optimism (Q3) 
 
IS 6 said that because of the turmoil the organization had been through, the 
entrepreneur was trying to be more positive in his outlook and that it was made 
easier by the new Sales Consultant who had a more hands-on approach, leaving 
the entrepreneur to focus on strategy.  He added that everybody in the 
organization was feeling the impact of the entrepreneur’s positive attitude and 
that the entrepreneur did not have emotional highs and lows like he used to. 
 
9.5.4 Sensemaking and Sensegiving (Q4)  
 
However, the entrepreneur believed that the employees were unaware of the 
reason behind his change in attitude and strategy, but that he did keep 
communicating to them that the market was changing.  The entrepreneur was 
aware that giving employees too little information resulted in them thinking he 
had secrets, but felt that if he did tell them everything they would feel insecure 
and threatened. 
 
9.5.5 Interaction and Relationships (Q1 and CF) 
 
The entrepreneur still thought that he needed to drive people to achieve, which 
confirmed his Set I and Set II thoughts.  He noticed that he had mellowed with 
age, that he did not drive people as much, but tried to influence them in his 
direction.  Since the changes in the organization, he felt more comfortable with 
the team. 
 
The entrepreneur recognized that IS 5 was an ambitious and capable manager 
with attention to detail, and was more prepared to let him make technological 
changes independently than he was in Set I and II.  IS 5 felt more confident to 
challenge the entrepreneur than he used to in Set II interviews, and 
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acknowledged that the entrepreneur pushing him to achieve more had partly 
helped him. 
 
The entrepreneur realised that the frequency of his interactions with employees 
and management had reduced, and as a result there seemed to be more open 
communication between employees and management than with him.  He wanted 
the systems to drive improved behavior rather than him driving people to deliver.  
IS 5 confirmed that since the new Sales Consultant had been recruited a few 
months earlier, the entrepreneur spent less time on operational issues which he 
believed was good for the organization and gave IS 5 more freedom to do his 
job. 
 
IS 6 thought that the entrepreneur listened more to people rather than enforcing 
his opinions on others.  He added that the entrepreneur’s interactions changed 
because he realized that employees were leaving and not responding to his 
“pushing” anymore. 
 
IS 6 
I do remember him saying to me probably round about that time. That he 
was going to change and stop the bollockings.  I think those were his 
words.  He said he would deal with things in a more positive way.   I’ve 
really noticed that since then,  it’s a real change in him. 
IS 6 said that the entrepreneur was trying to understand the reason why people 
did or didn’t do things.  He was more measured than he was in Set II.   
 
9.5.6 Growth (Q1 and CF) 
 
The entrepreneur said that issue domain ‘Technology’ had started to produce 
good results in Sales.  He felt the new technology was more comfortable for IS 5 
than it was for the older, more experienced sales employees.  However, he failed 
to mention his own reticence due to experience and age with regards to the 
technological improvements.  Both IS 5 and IS 6 felt that the entrepreneur was 
more confident with the changes in issue domain ‘Sales and Marketing’ now that 
he was seeing increased sales.  IS 5 noticed that the entrepreneur was more 
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confident in the team he had around him now than he was at the time of the Set I 
and II interviews.   
 
The organization had recruited 20 new staff in three months since Set II 
interviews, and would be recruiting in the following year to replace ex-
employees and to cope with the expansion of the organization.  The entrepreneur 
confirmed that his strategy had changed, and he was now looking at longer-term 
contracts, confirming his Set II thoughts.  
 
Entrepreneur 
I’d rather have 5 years work at 40% rather than a year’s work at 50%.  
 
The entrepreneur had made fewer harsh decisions recently than he would have 
made before, such as recruiting certain types of employees, or committing to the 
additional expenditure during a poor economic climate.  He felt that if he had 
made even more ruthless decisions with employees and clients when he first 
started the company, the organization would have been a lot bigger than it was 
now.  However, the entrepreneur mentioned that issue domain ‘Sales and 
Marketing’ was producing new clients. 
 
The entrepreneur accepted that the turnover and profit would be down, due to his 
new longer-term strategy, but felt that the change was necessary.  He used to 
measure the organization’s growth through profit, but the success of his new 
strategy, which focused on organizational stability, was still unclear.  IS 5 and IS 
6 confirmed that previously the entrepreneur would not have accepted the drop in 
sales. 
 
IS 5 stated that he could take more risks now that the entrepreneur was not 
involved in the detail of the issue domain ‘Sales and Marketing’, because the 
entrepreneur would make it difficult to implement changes quickly, because he 
didn’t understand the benefits of issue domain ‘Technology’. 
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9.6 Summary   
 
This chapter presented findings of the interaction between the entrepreneur and 
internal stakeholders with regards to the 19 categories.  The text highlighted the 
conflicting thoughts between the entrepreneur and the internal stakeholders with 
regards to issue domains.  The entrepreneur’s cognitive changes were also visible 
across the respective sets of interviews.  The next chapter presents the findings 
for Case C.   
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Chapter 10 Phase II Case C Findings 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the findings of the empirical data in Case C.  A synopsis of 
the entrepreneur and internal stakeholders is presented, followed by the findings 
of the entrepreneur’s cognitive interaction with each of the four internal 
stakeholders with regards to their decision-making process and recognizing 
opportunities, presented in Sets I, II and III.  Direct quotes in italics from the 
entrepreneur and internal stakeholders present a glimpse of the interview.  The 
textual function of Boxes 10.2-10.9 was to enhance the text that I regarded as 
significant in order to focus attention, and supplement the data presented.  The 
text boxes individually and collectively do not have a conceptual purpose.  The 
lexicon used in the direct quotes, text boxes and text are the precise words that 
the participants used the majority of the time in order to present the data directly 
as it was captured. 
 
10.2 Synopsis of Entrepreneur and Four Internal Stakeholders  
 
The codes used for the four internal stakeholders are presented in Table 10.1.  
 
TABLE 10.1 INTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS JOB TITLES 
Case Study Internal Stakeholder 
(IS) 
Job Titles 
C IS 7 
IS 8 
IS 9 
IS 10 
Managing Director 
Group Head  
Group Head 
Senior Project Leader 
 
The profile of the entrepreneur and internal stakeholders is displayed in Box 
10.1. 
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BOX 10.1 SUMMARY PROFILES OF CASE C PARTICIPANTS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(i) Profile of the Entrepreneur 
 
The Entrepreneur in Case C is a physicist who gained experience working for a 
£2 billion pound turnover organization that developed software and technology 
for aerospace suppliers and other clients. Following that, and during the 
recession of 1979, he worked as a consultant in Research and Science.  After he 
had gained experience in areas such as display technology and imaging, he 
decided with 22 other founders, who worked in the same consultancy, to start 
their own business.  He was the only founder remaining in the organization and 
was handing over the managing of one of the groups to IS 7. 
 
 
(ii) Job Profiles of Two Internal Stakeholders (IS 5 and IS 6) 
 
Internal Stakeholder 7 (IS 7) was in the process of taking over as MD for one of 
the groups within Case C.  He was a physicist and had joined the organization 
13 years earlier.  Previously, he worked briefly in the telecommunications 
industry gaining commercial experience, and was now responsible for running 
the day-to-day activities of the group and taking over responsibilities from the 
entrepreneur.    
 
Internal Stakeholder 8 (IS 8) was a physicist who had been in the business since 
2003 and now ran one of the technology groups. He reported directly to the 
entrepreneur and indirectly to IS 7.  He managed 27 consultants and three 
support staff.  
 
Internal Stakeholder 9 (IS 9) had been with the organization for 13 years and 
was now responsible for Business Development and Technology Development 
for one of the groups in Case C.  His Japanese work however spanned the other 
6 groups.  He interacted with the entrepreneur with regards to this market and 
reported to IS 8.   
 
Internal Stakeholder 10 (IS 10) was a physicist who had joined the organization 
in 2002.  He worked as a Senior Project Leader and reported to IS 8 in one of 
the groups within Case C, but he also interacted with IS 7 and the entrepreneur 
on strategic decision-making.   His role also involved Business Development.   
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10.3 SET I:  JANUARY – APRIL 2011  
	
Set I presents the analysis of the interviews, which took part between January 
and April 2011 with the entrepreneur and four internal stakeholders IS 7, 8, 9 and 
10.  The interview schedule included the categories presented in Chapter 6 and 
contextualised with issue domains, ‘‘Recruitment’, ‘Business Development’ and 
‘Strategy and Vision’. 
 
10.3.1 Decision-Making, Alert, Information Gathering, Pattern Recognition, 
Insight, Experience, Opportunity (Q1) 
 
The entrepreneur said that he no longer thought about his decision-making in the 
same way he had done 30 years ago.  He now “just did it instinctively”.  He felt 
his experience enabled him to make decisions, although he added that he 
constantly read new information and integrated it into his existing knowledge 
and experience.  The entrepreneur noted that at his age he had a lot of 
experience, and that the way he internalized new information was not going to 
change now.   
 
Attending negotiating and sales courses in the past was part of his accumulation 
of knowledge, but he added that he was naturally good at these aspects.  
However, the courses had given him extra confidence and a new perspective to 
what he was doing.  IS 10 confirmed that the entrepreneur was always reading 
internal material to provide insight to the organization and to “stay on top” of 
what was going on. 
 
The entrepreneur cited that successful people made relevant decisions for their 
environment and that the more correct decisions he made, the more confident he 
became in his decision-making.  He mentioned issue domain ‘Recruitment’, and 
said that he was still involved in the interviewing process, but only if IS 8 and 
other internal stakeholder were going to offer the recruit the job.   
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Entrepreneur 
I would say, you know I’m concerned about this, how do you feel about 
it? I try to get him to make the decision. 
The entrepreneur stated that he and IS 7 would make a decision after reviewing 
the interview and the candidate’s experience, whilst other managers and internal 
stakeholders involved others in the decision-making process.   He believed that 
internal stakeholders did not want to take responsibility for the decision whether 
to recruit because they lacked experience.  He added that by asking the recruit 
the right questions in a short space of time, he could work out a candidate’s 
suitability for the job.  IS 7 felt that the issue domain ‘Recruitment’ would not 
react well to external people being recruited into senior roles within the 
organization.   
 
The entrepreneur noticed that employees, internal stakeholders and Group Heads 
wanted to do things according to processes, but that approach limited their ability 
to look for new opportunities.  The entrepreneur had seen an opportunity to 
restructure the organization a few years ago and IS 10 declared that the 
entrepreneur changed his role without his input.   
 
The entrepreneur regarded his decisions about risk as “managing the downside 
and the upside” and believed that the organization took risks but managed the 
downside.  He felt that a lot of the organization’s risk was contractual, and in 
negotiation with a big USA client he refused to take on all the risk and insisted 
that it was shared with the client.    
 
Entrepreneur 
This is a multi-billion dollar, multi national company and I just dig my 
heels in and eventually they gave up you know…and they, they accepted 
so we agreed. 
 
IS 7 and IS 10 felt that the entrepreneur’s decision-making was informed by his 
experience. 
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IS 7 
He has a huge amount of experience, and he often calls up examples for 
me. I don’t have the same level of experience so I tend to be more 
analytical and wanting to get to the facts. 
 
IS 7 felt that the entrepreneur used to be less risk-averse in his decision-making, 
but that he was now the “arbiter of risk”, and could not work out if it was due to 
his age or that he wanted a good argument to justify the risk.  He added that he 
was more analytical in his decision-making and that the entrepreneur looked at 
the cultural aspects of the decision.  IS 7 used the entrepreneur’s thinking process 
when it came to helping other internal stakeholders present an opportunity to the 
entrepreneur by “packaging” the idea for him.  IS 8 noted that the entrepreneur 
was emotional in his decision-making and preferred to “talk things through” 
which IS 10 confirmed. 
 
IS 7 said that the entrepreneur did not make decisions when asked.  This was 
confirmed by IS 8, who added that the entrepreneur had an instinct about what 
the decision should be, but hesitated to give the answers.  However, IS 8 added 
that the entrepreneur could also be directive if he didn’t agree with something.   
 
10.3.2 Change, Generation and Temporality (Q1, Q2 and CF) 
 
The entrepreneur had a longer view of time than IS 7, which was confirmed by 
IS 10.   IS 7 stated that the entrepreneur looked at longer-term value, but didn’t 
think that his view had filtered down to the organization.  Employees and Group 
Heads were still working to shorter timescales.  He said that internal stakeholders 
did not realize the entrepreneur’s view of time, although IS 10 added that the 
entrepreneur’s long-term view had influenced him and IS 8. 
 
IS 7 
He had a far longer horizon than anyone else, so he tends to think ten 
years and I tend to think a few years and the other guys tend to think 
short-term. 
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IS 10 confirmed that the entrepreneur’s approach to time had not filtered down to 
him, and said that he had deadlines that IS 7 and IS 8 did not understand. 
 
BOX 10.2 DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF OPPORTUNITY RECOGNITION  
 
IS 8 declared that he did not have time to get into the detail that he needed and 
that he was forced to “let people get on with it”.  The entrepreneur in contrast, 
naturally felt that people should have the freedom to decide without being 
directive.  Although he insisted that time was money. 
 
Entrepreneur 
Opportunities, you gotta grasp them quickly…cause they’ll go away.  If 
it’s a problem it will run away from you and if it’s an opportunity it will 
slip through your fingers.  In order to achieve the unreasonable demands 
from clients, we have to be ruthless and prioritize. 
 
IS 7 stated that he was part of the new generation that was running the 
organization and that the entrepreneur was scared of losing the culture that he 
and the other founders had developed.  He believed that the organization had to 
change and that he and the entrepreneur had the same view on the change 
needed. 
 
IS 7 
I think there is a different generation so erm…not talking about me and 
(the entrepreneur), there is a different generation there, and also there’s 
a different generation of young people who are now joining the company. 
So actually what we want, what excites someone to want to join this 
company, and what excited people twenty five years ago, will be different. 
 
	
The entrepreneur said he achieved results to meet client requirements in a 
quick and effective way.  IS 7 said the entrepreneur was no longer bringing 
new opportunities to the organization. 
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IS 7 used the example of the new generation who wanted to use Linkedin, an on-
line social website to talk about themselves, and the entrepreneur who wanted to 
ban the use of it in the organization.  He believed that the entrepreneur had made 
a decision about it without considering all of the information, and that he had to 
persuade him to re-consider it.  He added that the entrepreneur would just say 
“no” if he thought something was a bad idea.  IS 7 revealed that it was hard for 
him and the entrepreneur to stay in touch with the new generation’s work ethic 
and communication with regards to information sharing.   
 
10.3.3 Optimism (Q3) 
 
IS 8 didn’t think the entrepreneur was optimistic, but instead thought that the 
entrepreneur was confident, and didn’t wear “rose tinted glasses” about the 
future.  He added that his confidence was justified by his experience.  IS 10 said 
the entrepreneur was optimistic but not “reckless”. 
 
10.3.4 Sensemaking and Sensegiving (Q4)  
 
The entrepreneur said that flexibility and the use of intuition was important when 
dealing with people.  He added that the Project Leadership Training course run 
by the organization for new recruits gave them a sense of the culture.  IS 8 
expected that the entrepreneur’s role was to maintain the culture and the 
environment in which internal stakeholders and Group Heads could operate.  
This confirmed IS 7’s thoughts about the entrepreneur’s role. 
 
IS 7 had no clear mandate from the entrepreneur in terms of his role and 
responsibilities.  He made sense of what the organization needed and did it 
without questioning the entrepreneur, by filling in the “gaps”.  Both the 
entrepreneur and IS 7 sensed what things “needed to be picked up” and each 
filled in the gap without defined or allocated tasks.   
 
IS 7 
The challenge for (the entrepreneur) and similarly for me is to be that 
enthusiastic person that catalyzes these things, but at the same time also 
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having a view of risk and working out how to apply that, so that when 
things do occur we have a balanced judgment.  
 
10.3.5 Interaction and Relationships (Q1 and CF) 
 
The entrepreneur revealed that he gave the Group Heads the freedom to take 
risks, but because all employees, internal stakeholders and Group Heads were 
shareholders, they were reluctant to take a risk with a big downside.  For 
example, the entrepreneur made Group Heads go back to clients and renegotiate 
a better deal, in order to spread the risk between the organization and the client.  
 
Entrepreneur 
When you put some steel in their spine and they go back and say sorry we 
can’t do that and they still get the contract. 
 
The entrepreneur expected people to “use their brains” when thinking about 
Health and Safety issues because the organization developed potentially 
dangerous products.  He added that his approach was hands-off and that he had 
minimal interaction in operational issues, although he did get actively involved 
when IS 10 was dealing with a difficult client.  IS 7 supported the entrepreneur’s 
view that the internal stakeholders should be making their own decisions, and IS 
8 felt that he had freedom to make his own strategic decisions. 
 
BOX 10.3 ALIGNING DECISION-MAKING  
  
 
The entrepreneur’s interactions with the organization involved ethics, charities, 
facilities, Health and Safety, values and challenges anybody faced.  However, IS 
8 preferred that the entrepreneur gave him clarity about underlying principles of 
what he was expected to do, instead of “rambling on”. 
	
The entrepreneur preferred to influence the business without directing it and 
wanted his interactions with employees to be based on what they thought was 
the right decision, and not what he thought was the right decision.  	
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BOX 10.4 INTERRELATIONSHIPS 
 
IS 7 and 10 confirmed that the entrepreneur would speak to people in the office 
corridors, but that he interacted mostly with internal stakeholders and Group 
Heads, although he added that the entrepreneur kept a strategic eye over the 
printing group.  The entrepreneur spoke to IS 10 about big projects when he saw 
him in the corridor. 
 
IS 10 
His ambition, his drive, I think that that is a mystery if you like.    
 
He added that the entrepreneur’s interactions with the internal stakeholders and 
Group Heads were unstructured and explorative in nature, and was more of an 
opportunity to exchange ideas and communicate, than providing them with 
strategic direction.   
 
IS 7 said that the entrepreneur liked to think that his role was more strategic, 
however he thought that he provided a source of insight because of his 
experience. IS 8’s interactions with the entrepreneur was a two-way discussion, 
although he did have strong opinions.   
 
IS 7 said that the entrepreneur was being “very cautious” in handing over total 
responsibility of running the group to him.  Although he and the entrepreneur 
constantly discussed how to get the internal stakeholders and Group Heads to 
think and take responsibility in a way that fitted in with the organization’s 
culture.  However, IS 7 thought that that was the entrepreneur’s responsibility 
and not his. 
 
IS 7 noted that there was a generation gap between the entrepreneur, employees, 
internal stakeholders and Group Heads which meant that they did not feel 
 
IS 8 felt that the entrepreneur was not a “relationship person”, and that many 
people in the organization did not understand him.   
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comfortable communicating with him as they would younger colleagues.  He 
added that the entrepreneur controlled the salaries, and had mentioned to him that 
he should start taking over that responsibility.  He added that he didn’t mind that 
the entrepreneur did not want to hand over total responsibilities, like dealing with 
shareholders, to him yet, but had spoken to him about needing to have clearer 
responsibilities.  And because IS 8 was younger, he found it hard to interact with 
his direct reports in a directional way. 
 
IS 7 
If he left I would have some clear mandate. 
 
IS 7 suspected that because he and the entrepreneur had not communicated on 
what needed to be done in the organization, nothing had happened with the 
succession plan.  He believed that if he knew what his total responsibility was, he 
would have attended to the new type of recruits, and encouraged their 
development in alignment with the organizations. 
 
IS 7 noticed that he interacted more with the internal stakeholders and other 
Group Heads than the entrepreneur, and that they communicated with him about 
how and what the entrepreneur thought.  He acted as the “go between” for them 
for difficult situations with which the entrepreneur might disagree.   
 
BOX 10.5 RESPECT IN INTERACTIONS  
 
 
IS 7 said that the entrepreneur would “push through a decision” when it was 
about efficiency and ideas that were not plausible, but also to get things done 
quickly.   
 
 
IS 7 said that people respect and tried to impress the entrepreneur, whereas he 
had more of an honest discussion with employees about their thoughts.  This 
was confirmed by IS 10. 
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IS 7 
If (entrepreneur) looks at it and says it is not very good, you haven’t 
done well, then people think, actually I shouldn’t have done that, I 
shouldn’t have had that conversation and …so he’s probably aware of it. 
 
IS 7 stated that the entrepreneur would have to change his interactions with 
Group Heads if he wanted to get more insight into what they were doing or 
thinking.   
 
10.3.6 Growth (Q1 and CF) 
 
IS 7 confirmed that they did not define growth because it was organic.  He felt 
that that was because the organization operated as spin-outs and were always 
looking for opportunities that could take them into different directions.  He added 
that issue domain ‘Recruitment’ limited their growth because of the challenges of 
attracting suitable candidates.  He went further and said they did have a target of 
20% growth, and that profit and new technologies were key aspects of it. 
 
IS 8 said that there was no agreement amongst the entrepreneur, internal 
stakeholders and Group Heads about the purpose of the organization, except that 
the entrepreneur said it was to create and environment where opportunities could 
happen. 
 
The entrepreneur mentioned that issue domain ‘Business Development’ was not 
the way the whole organization was structured.  In the past, one half of the 
organization would develop technology as a packaged service, and then “roll it 
out” in the market.  He felt that “growing” the organization using this approach 
to Business Development was no longer suitable and had to be replaced by a 
more questioning approach to what the market required.  IS 10 confirmed what 
the entrepreneur has said, that each Group Head was responsible for their own 
Business Development.  
 
The entrepreneur mentioned issue domain ‘Strategy and Vision’, and said that his 
approach to the business was successful but that if a part of the organization 
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“were struggling”, he would focus more on a future strategy than he was 
presently undertaking.   He added that he looked at time in terms of progress that 
they could make if the organization was in the same place in twelve months time, 
then they should act immediately.  IS 8 acknowledged that the entrepreneur did 
not have a plan for the future. 
 
The entrepreneur used numbers as a means to diagnose not measure growth, but 
also looked at profit per head when measuring growth and added value.  He 
added that for the printing side of the business the value was intangible, which 
made valuing the organization a difficult task.  As a result, he made judgments 
on whether the organization was growing by looking at headline numbers of how 
intellectual property was being commercialized. 
 
IS 7 mentioned issue domain ‘Business Development’, and said that he 
developed his part of the organization and was constantly looking for new 
opportunities.  He felt that the organization was in a transition state.  They were 
looking at diversifying by adding manufacturing to their client offer.  IS 8 had 
developed the technology for manufacture but IS 7 felt that he was resisting the 
opportunity to develop it further.  He believed that IS 8’s resistance was because 
he thought the entrepreneur believed that spins-outs were too risky.  He went 
further and added that, in the past, the entrepreneur would “push you back” if he 
believed something was unusual.   
 
IS 8 stated that when interacting with the entrepreneur, he left with a clearer 
picture about what the entrepreneur wanted, and tried to match his decision.  IS 
10 noted that the entrepreneur always encouraged him to develop new ideas, but 
knew he could exercise his “veto” rights. 
 
BOX 10.6 ALIGNED COGNITION   
 
I will go in to talk about something and I will leave with some further thinking 
to do, or an idea of how he sees the world. 
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There was a difference between the way the entrepreneur and IS 7 viewed how 
they should approach new clients and the development of products.   
 
IS 7 
(the entrepreneur) will say, ‘well we don’t go into the lab to try things, we 
just you know go and get projects  clients’, which is exactly what we 
don’t want. The reasons we get projects with clients is because we do try 
things in the lab on our own and we come to them with crazy new things. 
 
BOX 10.7 FEAR IN INTERACTION   
 
 
IS 7 
The other thing I will do is I will package it up…so that it will work as a 
low risk opportunity for him (the entrepreneur). 
 
IS 7 added that the high risk strategy the entrepreneur had with the printing part 
of the business, has resulted in a “skewed” view of risk in the rest of the business 
because of the length of time it has taken and the big investment they had made. 
 
IS 8 defined growth as client relationships and increased organizational value, 
while IS 9 defined growth as head count and the number and type of spin-outs.  
When speaking about growth, IS 8 added that he did not see the organization as 
risk-taking.  
 
10.4 SET II:  JUNE – AUGUST 2011 
 
Set II presents the findings of the interviews that took place between June and 
August 2011.  They involved the entrepreneur and four internal stakeholders, in 
order to track any changes to the interactions between the way the entrepreneur 
thinks and the internal stakeholders over the issue domain and other new issues 
that may have arisen since Set I interviews were noted.   The entrepreneur’s 
  
So if they want to keep in with him they just keep following the straight 
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cognitive map was used to help me explore the entrepreneur’s cognitive 
interactions. 
 
10.4.1 Decision-Making, Insight, Alert, Information Gathering, Pattern 
Recognition, Insight, Experience, Opportunity  (Q1) 
 
The entrepreneur admitted that he saw less of IS 7 than he did in Set I and that 
they focused on “specifics rather than a review of things” when they met.  IS 8 
said that the handover of the organization to IS 7 was taking longer than expected 
because the entrepreneur wanted to “imbue him with the organization’s way of 
doing things”. 
 
The issue domain ‘Recruitment’ was taking place without the entrepreneur’s 
intervention, although when IS 7 was away he advised a Group Head against 
recruiting someone.  The Group Head followed the advice of IS 7.  The 
entrepreneur had handed over the recruitment responsibility and day-to-day 
decision-making to IS 7 since Set I.  This was confirmed by IS 8.  IS 7 confirmed 
that the entrepreneur first met recruits after they had joined the company and not 
during the recruitment process as he had done in Set I.  He had also taken over 
the salary list he mentioned in Set I, without waiting for the entrepreneur’s 
approval. 
 
IS 7 confirmed the entrepreneur’s comments in Set I that he used his instincts to 
make a recruitment decision.  In contrast, the internal stakeholders and Group 
Heads discussed their recruitment decisions with each other.  He added that his 
decision-making was different to the entrepreneur’s with regards to a few 
recruitment choices, and they both accepted that.  IS 8 said that IS 7 found it hard 
to structure and focus the entrepreneur’s contribution in meetings, and due to this 
behavior IS 8 found the entrepreneur to be indecisive.  The entrepreneur 
confirmed his Set I thoughts that he preferred not to make decisions and tried to 
influence people to make decisions of which he would approve.  The 
entrepreneur said that when he heard a decision was made, he kept an open mind 
and was open to persuasion.   
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IS 8 confirmed his Set I thoughts that the entrepreneur was emotional in his 
decision-making, and added that he hated to be “pinned down” to a decision.  He 
went further and said that the entrepreneur would consider the options of a 
decision from all angles.   
 
IS 8 
It’s very rare for him to actually say this is what we should do or 
anything like that. So you end up just kind of following this emerging 
train of thought, which eventually leads you somewhere.  You sort of end 
up saying ‘well you know how about we do this’.  It’s clearly what he’d 
like you to say, but he just doesn’t want to say it himself. And this process 
can take quite a long period of time. 
 
Since Set I, the entrepreneur was still involved in decisions with regards to the 
allocation of space and facilities and thought that overseeing these tasks was his 
strategic responsibility. 
 
IS 7 perceived that the entrepreneur wanted to teach the Group Heads how to 
make decisions and run the organization, rather than discuss things.   
IS 7 
Now if I was being charitable I’d say they wanted people to have 
independent thought and therefore talking lots to them and telling them 
what you think doesn’t give them an opportunity for independent thought.  
 
IS 7 confirmed his thoughts and IS 10 comment that the internal stakeholders and 
the Group Heads adjusted their thinking to that of the entrepreneurs’.  He added 
that the entrepreneur was not looking for opportunities because he was focused 
on maintaining a profitable organization.  However, IS 8 said that the 
entrepreneur was “loosely” overseeing a new opportunity that he and IS 7 were 
presently investigating.   
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10.4.2 Change, Generation and Temporality (Q1, Q2 and CF) 
 
The entrepreneur used the marketing brochure as an example of how decisions 
were made by Group Heads, without them taking the time to consider the 
implications, which confirmed his thoughts in Set I.  In this example he 
disagreed with a decision because it lacked consideration of the customer and 
market.  He believed it was not sufficiently thought through. 
 
The entrepreneur commented that by IS 7 taking over the day-to-day running of 
the organization, he would create change, but that the culture, values and ethics 
were embedded, and would be unaffected.  He believed that the lack of 
understanding about the way he thought was not due to a generation gap, but 
rather a lack of confidence and a belief by the internal stakeholders and Group 
Heads, in what the organization was about.   
 
BOX 10.8 DIFFERENT RISK DEFINITIONS  
 
The entrepreneur was still in the process of handing over the responsibility of the 
organization to IS 7 who had no idea when it was going to happen.  IS 7 
suggested that the entrepreneur felt nervous about leaving, and whether he would 
have the capability to do the job. 
 
10.4.3 Sensemaking and Sensegiving (Q4)  
 
The entrepreneur felt that if people didn’t agree with him it was because they 
could not make sense of what he was thinking and why.  He added that Group 
Heads would think he was being cautious or difficult, but that he would try and 
explain to them what he thought and what his values were. 
 
 A lot of people that come out of the education system and maybe the first few 
years in a corporate environment have got this ‘we must do things properly, 
we must have procedures, standard operating procedures’. And pick up all the 
risk aversion and structures and procedures that clog up quite a lot of 
corporate activity. 
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IS 8 said that he questioned the entrepreneur’s ability to make sense of the 
investment he made in the printing group and wondered whether it would be a 
profitable part of the organization. 
 
10.4.4 Interaction and Relationships (Q1 and CF) 
 
The entrepreneur discussed issue domains ‘Business Development’ and 
‘Recruitment’ with internal stakeholders and Group Heads, and the broader 
organizational issues with IS 7.  IS 7 noted that the entrepreneur told him things 
that he wouldn’t previously have done.  He suggested that internal stakeholders 
and Group Heads shared their individual strategies and learned from each other.  
IS 8 felt that IS 7 would have more interaction with the internal stakeholders and 
Group Heads than the entrepreneur had in the same role, which confirmed all his 
Set I thoughts. 
 
The entrepreneur declared that for some internal stakeholders and Group Heads, 
they wanted to spend the organization’s money without thinking it through, and 
wanted to take the easy way out rather than actively engaging with issue domain 
‘Business Development’. 
 
Entrepreneur 
And saying no to put some steel in their spine, to get them to figure out 
how to get the right thing…so yes there are things that are like that. 
 
The entrepreneur acknowledged that IS 7 had similar thinking processes to his 
own, and that he would help him put any differences of opinion into perspective.  
He added that they both wished that the other internal stakeholders and Group 
Heads thought in the same way.  
 
He mentioned that his disagreement with employees, which IS 7 mentioned in 
Set I about Linkedin, was caused by them not thinking of the consequences to the 
organization and clients of uploading information.  He felt that one of the other 
Group Heads had sent out a document before he had a chance to see it, which 
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confirmed what IS 7 said in Set I, about the entrepreneur’s late involvement in 
decision-making.  The entrepreneur felt that the document sent out was too 
policy-based, rather than a suggestion to employees about how they should 
behave, which is how he would have preferred it to be presented to staff.  
However, he preferred not to be directional and did not advise the employee on 
the course of action. 
 
The entrepreneur and IS 7 had had a discussion about his responsibilities since 
Set I, but IS 7 still thought that his role was unclear.  However, they had agreed 
that IS 7 would take over the monthly meetings with the internal stakeholders 
and other Group Heads.  IS 8 noticed that the entrepreneur’s interactions in team 
meetings were not helpful because he took a long time to discuss issues and then 
did not reach a decision.  He would have preferred a more structured thought 
through contribution from the entrepreneur. 
 
IS 7 confirmed that in his discussions with the entrepreneur they had decided that 
IS 7 would be responsible for the day-to-day running of the organization, and the 
entrepreneur would focus on the cultural issues.  IS 8 stated that IS 7 understood 
what he was trying to do and provided him with more clarity in their discussions 
than did the entrepreneur.  He confirmed IS 7’s comments in Set I that the 
entrepreneur would “talk around the subject” and hated to be pinned down.  
Although, IS 8 declared that he reported to the entrepreneur and not to IS 7.  IS 9 
said that the entrepreneur had a more influencing style in his interactions, while 
IS 7 was more direct and “harsh”. 
 
IS 7 decided that when he took over managing the relationship with the other 
Group Heads, he would have a more open relationship with them than the 
entrepreneur did which confirmed his Set I thoughts.   
 
IS 7 
You just don’t talk about those things, you just avoid those areas except 
under very managed and carefully controlled circumstances when you 
know that you’ve thought about it a lot and there’s a very well considered 
angle to take. 
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IS 7 confirmed the entrepreneur’s view that internal stakeholders and Group 
Heads would think about things before approaching him, which stopped 
employees from communicating with him.  The entrepreneur’s decisions had 
never been challenged by the internal stakeholders. 
 
IS 7 
So there is a tendency, and people wouldn’t go to those places when he 
(the entrepreneur) is in the room, because they’d know he would just 
dismiss it. But in terms of a cultural change thing, there is more of a 
dialogue. 
 
IS 7 thought that in the last ten years the communication with management had 
not been very good and it left people feeling that they could not be open and 
honest.  Although, he added that the entrepreneur did not communicate on the 
future of the company, but recognized that the entrepreneur might not have a 
strategy and managed instinctively.  IS 8 didn’t know how important 
relationships were to the entrepreneur.  He confirmed his Set I thoughts that he 
was not a “people person”. 
 
IS 9 confirmed the entrepreneur’s comment in Set I that his approach was hands-
off and used the Japanese handover to describe how the entrepreneur introduced 
to him to this contacts, but let him to handle the relationship. 
 
IS 10 said that he had no interactions with the entrepreneur since Set I 
interviews. 
 
10.4.5 Growth (Q1 and CF) 
 
The entrepreneur discussed underperforming groups with IS 7, and was still 
involved in discussing employees leaving, and the affect of that on the 
organization.  IS 8 confirmed that the entrepreneur did not have a strategy for 
growth.  The entrepreneur felt that the employees and organization had survived 
the recession and thus had proved they could be successful.  IS 7 believed that 
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the entrepreneur was opportunistic and did not have a worked-through 
considered plan for the future.  He believed that the company had grown through 
the entrepreneur’s efforts and thinking, and not through the ex-founders, and 
confirmed his Set I opinion that there have been less spin-outs and fewer 
opportunities operationalised.   
 
IS 8 questioned whether the last 5 years growth was due to the entrepreneur, or 
IS 7’s ability in issue domain ‘Business Development’.  He perceived that the 
entrepreneur was risk-averse because he had invested previously in the printing 
business and had “got his fingers burnt”. 
 
IS 7 mentioned issue domain ‘Recruitment’, and said that the entrepreneur had 
better insight into the head count than he did.  He felt that the organization was 
risk-averse because they were “cash rich”, and that the entrepreneur’s focus was 
to maintain a profitable organization.  He added that the organization was still 
increasing its head count. 
 
IS 8 continued to believe that the organization’s culture was set by the 
entrepreneur and had helped them to be successful.  He added that each internal 
stakeholder and Group Head had a different view of the purpose of the 
organization, but reinforced his Set I idea that it was about creating an 
environment in which people could create. 
 
10.5 SET III:  SEPTEMBER – DECEMBER 2011  
 
Set III presents the findings of the interviews that took place between September 
and December 2011 with the entrepreneur and four internal stakeholders.   The 
purpose was to track any changes to the interactions over the issue domains and 
included any other new issues that may have arisen since Sets I and II interviews.  
 
10.5.1 Decision-Making and Interaction (Q1 and CF) 
 
The entrepreneur confirmed his Set II comments that he was no longer involved 
in the issue domain ‘Recruitment.’  This was confirmed by IS 7 and IS 8.  He 
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admitted that his level of influence over recruitment was less than it used to be.  
He said that internal stakeholders and Group Heads would continue to ask his 
opinion if they were unsure about a decision to recruit an applicant.  He added 
that some internal stakeholders and Group Heads went through a formal step by 
step process when recruiting staff and looked for evidence of the recruits’ 
abilities.  IS 7 felt that he was more challenging than the entrepreneur tended to 
be in the recruitment process.  As a result he believed that “better people” were 
now being recruited.  IS 7 added that the entrepreneur was more challenging of 
the recruitment decisions for groups that were not doing well, and questioned the 
role the recruit would have in the group.  However, he left IS 7 to make his own 
decisions. 
 
IS 7 said that he learned a lot from the entrepreneur and that he would listen to 
him irrespective of how long he talked.  He confirmed Set II thoughts that the 
entrepreneur did not  “do decision-making and neither did he make quick 
decisions”.  He added that the entrepreneur knew the answer to a decision that 
needed to be made, because he had the experience to support it “and waited for 
people to get there”.   IS 7 confirmed the other internal stakeholders’ views that 
the entrepreneur spent hours talking about a subject without a clear outcome, but 
because they respected him, they therefore “indulged” him. 
 
IS 7 
Given a situation he thinks he knows the answer. And you remember 
there is a generational thing here, so he does view himself as a different 
generation and therefore he has seen all the problems. So given the 
situation he’ll know the answer. 
 
IS 7 felt that the entrepreneur would get angry with people when they didn’t get 
to the decision he wanted, or expected them to, but wouldn’t directly tell them 
what the decision ought to be.  He added that his style was developed from 
working with strong independent people he couldn’t direct when he founded the 
organization.  He believed that this resulted in employees feeling lost and 
uncertain about what to do, but nobody would “dare to tell the entrepreneur that”.  
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IS 8 confirmed that he would prefer a more concise interaction with the 
entrepreneur which gave him insight during their discussions. 
 
IS 7 revealed that people regarded the entrepreneur as a senior person, although 
he had become “softer” over the years with more interaction with junior 
employees.  This awareness of seniority was despite the fact that the 
organizational structure was flat.  The entrepreneur felt that people deferred to 
him less in decision-making.  However, he was still involved in investment 
decisions for ideas that internal stakeholders and Group Heads brought to him 
which contradicted IS 7 thoughts that the entrepreneur was no longer involved in 
opportunity spotting.   
 
Entrepreneur 
They can all create new opportunities, nearly every graduate scientist or 
engineer can create opportunities. So actually trying to get everybody 
thinking about that, and they will have different aptitudes and interests, 
and then the senior people in their particular area that’s part of their job 
to do the same thing. Encourage people to sort of spot opportunities, spot 
trends, pick up intelligence about what is important, transfer technology, 
and be creative. 
 
IS 8 said that the entrepreneur’s decision-making was confined across group 
level activities, and not within their group, and that IS 7 has taken over the day-
to-day running of the organization.  He confirmed his Set II comment that the 
entrepreneur wanted internal stakeholders and Group Heads to take responsibility 
and not to direct them.   
 
10.5.2 Change, Generation and Temporality (Q1, Q2 and CF) 
 
The entrepreneur mentioned that IS 8 was under more time pressure because he 
was closer to the client.  IS 7 confirmed that the organization was under pressure 
to perform now more than when the entrepreneur founded the business, because 
they had experienced, motivated and proactive people at start-up.  He felt that 
now the organization had to have a structure that got employees up to speed with 
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experience much quickly than they needed to when the entrepreneur had founded 
the organization.   
 
IS 7 said that although the entrepreneur was responsible for the change from the 
original founders to a younger generation of recruits, he had not thought about 
how the organization would train and engage these new staff. 
 
10.5.3 Sensemaking and Sensegiving (Q4)  
 
IS 7 noted that the entrepreneur was always making sense of what was needed 
for growth when he started the organization, but that with the younger generation 
of recruits he was not doing the same thing. 
 
IS 8 felt that the entrepreneur made a conscious choice not to answer people’s 
questions, and added that the entrepreneur did not like to communicate how he 
saw things. 
 
BOX 10.9 SENSEGIVING  
 
 
10.5.4 Interaction and Relationships (Q1 and CF) 
 
IS 7 felt that his interactions with the entrepreneur were going through a change 
and he was not “poking about’ and asking questions as much as he used to.  He 
felt that his responses to questions and discussions were shorter than in the past.  
He confirmed his Set II comment that he did not know what the entrepreneur had 
on his mind in terms of succession, and that they both continued to do different 
tasks in the organization without having clearly defined roles.  He suggested that 
the entrepreneur was preoccupied and he missed the communication between 
The previous MD of the organization, I am sure you’ve met him, was very 
fond of saying something like ‘if you’re smart enough to work here you are 
smart enough to understand.’  I have never heard (the entrepreneur) say that 
but I suspect part of that culture is still there. 
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them, which was confirmed by IS 8.  IS 7 felt that the entrepreneur was less 
involved than he was in Set II, but that it was a temporarily distraction. 
 
The entrepreneur said that he was more sympathetic to what employees were 
going through than one of the Group Heads who had more of a threatening 
approach, which confirmed Set II comments that he took people’s feelings and 
views into consideration.  He confirmed his Set I comments that he “nudged” 
people in the direction of a decision, rather than directing them.   
 
Entrepreneur 
Actually, a lot of my job is about forcing people to stand back and see the 
wood from the trees.  Actually stand back and look at what the broader 
opportunities are. 
 
IS 7 believed the employee’s engagement levels were lower than in the past, and 
therefore they needed different management than the relationships the 
entrepreneur had with employees, internal stakeholders and Group Heads when 
he first started the organization. 
 
IS 7 confirmed his Set II comments about Linkedin, that the entrepreneur wanted 
to completely ban employees from using it, but took his advice about considering 
the options first.  IS 7 felt the same as the entrepreneur, that he had also “dropped 
the ball” by letting the instruction to employees go out as a policy rather than a 
set of guidelines.  He added that he spent a lot of time communicating with 
Group Heads about their thoughts, whereas the entrepreneur wanted to make a 
decision and not consider opinions. 
 
IS 7 confirmed his Set II comments that he knew what caused the entrepreneur to 
be angry, but that the entrepreneur had strong views, such as employees should 
be business builders and keep their personal and private lives separate.  He added 
the he could influence the entrepreneur with regards to how systems and 
databases in the organization were run.  He also noted that the entrepreneur was 
not a traditional founder, and was open to change. 
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IS 7 felt that his interactions with the entrepreneur had made his style less 
directive and more questioning.  
 
IS 7 
There’s a lot of value in what (the entrepreneur) does in terms of insight 
in terms of letting people think, and I want to do elements of the same. 
 
IS 8’s interactions with the entrepreneur had decreased even more since Set II.  
He interacted primarily with IS 7 and had “ad hoc” meetings with the 
entrepreneur over strategy, or at monthly management meetings.  He was unsure 
whether the entrepreneur’s “light touch management” had caused the culture, or 
whether it was accidental.   
 
IS 8 
What has (the entrepreneur) done to it?  Well, very difficult thing to say. 
If he’s done anything it’s a very subtle emphasis, and you know 
influencing decisions and sort of setting direction for things in a very 
loose way.  
 
IS 8 noted that the entrepreneur’s interaction with the organization needed to be 
preserved in order for the younger generation to understand how it worked.  IS 9 
also felt that having monthly contact with the entrepreneur in a mentoring and 
guidance role would benefit his learning.  However, IS 9 had little interaction 
with the entrepreneur since the handover of the Japanese work, but said that the 
entrepreneur still maintained an interest in the project.  IS 10 added that he would 
prefer more interaction with the entrepreneur and had seen very little of him 
since Set II.  IS 10 felt disappointed that he had had little interaction with the 
entrepreneur, and would like to understand the way he thought.  He confirmed 
Set II comments that the entrepreneur was not as definitive as he would like him 
to be, and that occasionally he wanted direct guidance from him. 
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10.5.5 Growth (Q1 and CF) 
 
The organization was doing well even though the entrepreneur was not as 
involved as he had been in Set II.  IS 7 added that he could not bounce the 
strategic issues off the other Group Heads in the way he could with the 
entrepreneur, because it sometimes involved them.  He noted that because costs 
were controlled, the organization was on target with profit but down on sales.  He 
added that growth would come from issue domain ‘Recruitment’ and identifying 
new opportunities, although finding suitable recruits had proved to be difficult.  
IS 8 and IS 9 confirmed that they had not recruited new staff to their groups since 
Set II. 
 
IS 7 believed that the motivation to increase the size of the organization now was 
not the same as when the founders started it, and the financial motivation level 
was not the same for the new generation of recruits.  He confirmed his Set II 
thoughts that the entrepreneur was cautious with regards to risks such as a new 
building, which he did not understand.   
 
IS 8 confirmed his Set II thoughts that there was no organizational strategy for 
growth, and felt the entrepreneur would argue that they did not need one.  He 
added that although growth was organic, they would also attempt to license 
technology.    He didn’t think the entrepreneur was “motivated” to discuss how 
they would achieve this, but perceived that they had the freedom to decide 
themselves. 
 
IS 8 
One of (the entrepreneur’s) favourite phrases is “serendipitous 
opportunity”. He sort of feels that if you send enough bright people 
bumping around in the world they’ll find enough interesting things, and if 
they are smart enough they’ll pick up on them. And the business will do 
ok. 
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IS 8 mentioned that issue domain ‘Business Development’ did not have any 
central decision-making function.  However, he added it would be helpful if they 
had more strategic direction from the entrepreneur. 
 
10.6 Summary    
 
This chapter presented the findings of Sets I, II and III using the 19 categories 
derived from the empirical data.  These findings showed the different cognitive 
interactions and perceptions between the entrepreneur and internal stakeholders.  
The temporal changes associated with the entrepreneur’s decision-making and 
communication was highlighted. This included the findings demonstrating the 
interaction over issue domains ‘Recruitment’, ‘Business Development’, ‘Strategy 
and Vision’ which contexualised the different findings.  The next chapter 
presents the analysis and discussion of the empirical findings.	
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Chapter 11 The Icarus Paradox:  An Entrepreneurial Interpretation 
 
 11.1 Introduction   
 
This chapter provides an interpretation derived from the empirical evidence that 
cognitive diversity as well as differences in perception and expectations have an 
impact on entrepreneurial and internal stakeholder interrelationships in 
established entrepreneurial organizations.  In addition, the Icarus Paradox 
(Miller, 1992) metaphor provides cognitive and organizational insight into the 
cognition-success-attribution cycle.  By combining disparate concepts in the 
conceptual framework this chapter presents new meaning and understanding of 
each interrelationship derived from the empirical data. 
  
11.2 Philosophical Assumptions and Interpretive Framework 
 
The ontological approach of multiple perspectives can be seen throughout this 
chapter in the use of direct quotes in italics from entrepreneurs and internal 
stakeholders.  The epistemological aims of this research were achieved through 
working closely with the entrepreneurs and internal stakeholders for twelve 
months to gain knowledge and insight into their interrelationship.   
 
Case studies are suited to investigating patterns of under-investigated 
entrepreneurial interactions in real life settings (Yin, 2003; Creswell, 2007) such 
as the interplay between entrepreneurial cognition and internal stakeholder 
perception.  In this way the grounded theoretical approach captured the success 
of the entrepreneur within the context of the organization across multiple case 
studies (Stake 2006; Denscombe, 2011).  These combined approaches were used 
in this research.  Narrative, phenomenological and ethnographical approaches 
had less utility for this research because the focus was not on exploring the 
individual’s life, understanding how the experience feels or describing a culture-
sharing group respectively. Once the approach to inquiry was decided, the 
question of how to analyse the data was addressed. 
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 Miles and Huberman’s (1994) approach to data analysis discussed in Chapter 6 
was adopted.  Their form of analysis was considered to be more rigorous and 
iterative between phases than those of either Madison (2005) or Wolcott (1994b).  
Sensitizing concepts (Blumer, 1954) developed through my experience as a 
psychologist and business founder, the literature review and the research 
questions influenced the formation of categories during the data collection and 
analysis stages.  However, as Glaser and Strauss (1967) suggested, these 
concepts were used only in a non-prescriptive way.   
 
The first stage of open coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 181) for each case was 
taken from transcribed interviews, email communication, field notes and margin 
notes and organized using Nvivo software.  Following Miles and Huberman’s 
(1994) approach codes were put into categories after a process of identifying the 
similarities and differences.  Through a rigorous inductive analysis process, 
patterns with related “conceptual properties” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 35) for 
each category were developed.   In this way I was able to confirm the story 
(Stake, 1995) of what, how and when interactions between the entrepreneur and 
the internal stakeholders had taken place.   
 
The terms ‘code’ and ‘categories’ are used interchangeably (Creswell, 2007) due 
to the process of moving between the two in interpreting the data and also the 
similarities in meaning.  Reading and re-reading the data identified differences, 
characteristics, commonalities of words and phrases, and connections across the 
cases.  Table 11.1 demonstrates an extraction of the data in categories relating it 
across the cases.  
 
TABLE 11.1 CATEGORY ANALYSIS FOR CASES A, B AND C   
Category Case A Case B Case C 
Decision-Making, Insight 
 Entrepreneur had already made a decision when he 
spoke to internal stakeholders 
 Entrepreneur could see what internal stakeholders 
needed to do/decide 
 Entrepreneur influenced or directed the internal 
stakeholders decision-making 
 Used both analytical and intuitive decision-making 
 Entrepreneur led internal stakeholders to believe 
their input counted before he made the decision  
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
I 
 
Y 
Y 
 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
D 
 
Y 
Y 
 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
I 
 
Y 
Y 
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 Entrepreneur let internal stakeholders make their 
own decisions 
 Entrepreneur would veto something he disagreed 
with 
 Internal stakeholders were influenced by the 
entrepreneurs’ cognitive process and timing 
Y 
 
Y 
Y 
N 
 
Y 
Y 
Y 
 
Y 
Y 
Alert, Information Gathering 
 Entrepreneur used information gathering to justify a 
decision he had already made 
 Entrepreneur controlled information he gave to 
internal stakeholders 
 Lack of information led to internal stakeholders 
frustration and confusion 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Experience, Opportunity 
 Entrepreneur used his experience to make decisions 
while internal stakeholders needed more facts 
 Entrepreneur felt he was still involved in 
opportunity recognition 
 Internal stakeholders felt entrepreneur was not 
involved in opportunity recognition 
 Internal stakeholder felt the entrepreneurs lack of 
experience in new areas limited growth 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y  
 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
N 
 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
Insight, Pattern Recognition 
 Entrepreneur could not get the internal stakeholders 
to see what he could see 
 Internal stakeholders felt they could not see what 
the entrepreneur could 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Change 
 Entrepreneur made changes in the organization 
 Paradoxically internal stakeholders felt the 
entrepreneur did not like change 
 Organization experienced change in Issue Domains 
 
Y 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Y 
 
Y 
Generation 
 Internal stakeholders felt there was a generation gap 
between them and the entrepreneur  
 Entrepreneur ‘mellowed’ with age 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Temporality 
 Entrepreneur felt internal stakeholders should work 
quicker 
 Internal stakeholders felt that the entrepreneur had 
forgotten how long things took 
 Entrepreneur was more relaxed with each Set I, II 
and III 
 Entrepreneur took his time making a decision 
 
Y 
Y 
 
Y 
Y 
 
Y 
Y 
 
Y 
Y 
 
N 
Y 
 
Y 
Y 
Optimism 
 Positive 
 Realistic 
 
Y 
Y 
 
Y 
Y 
 
Y 
Y 
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Sensemaking and sensegiving  
 Entrepreneur felt internal stakeholders did not take 
responsibility, or relate client satisfaction to their 
salaries 
 Internal stakeholders felt that they did relate their 
jobs to their salaries 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Interaction and Relationships 
 Uncertainty between what the entrepreneur was 
doing and what internal stakeholders thought he 
was doing  
 Internal stakeholders wanted more clarity from the 
entrepreneur 
 Entrepreneur was stepping back and internal 
stakeholders wanted more time with him 
 Internal stakeholders felt the entrepreneur was a 
good communicator 
 The entrepreneur had formalized meetings with 
employees, managers, group heads and internal 
stakeholders 
 Succession planning was taking time from 
entrepreneur to Managing Director and CEO (IS 1 
and IS 7) 
 Internal stakeholders tried to please the 
entrepreneur with what they said and did 
 
 Entrepreneur had never been challenged by the 
internal stakeholders 
 Entrepreneur trusted that people would get the job 
done independent of him and to his standard 
 Entrepreneur pushed people to get the job done 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
IS 3 
only 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
 
Y 
(except 
IS1) 
Y 
 
N 
 
N 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
Y 
 
Not 
happen
ing 
Y 
 
 
Y 
 
N 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
N 
 
 
Y 
 
 
Y 
 
Y 
(except 
IS7) 
Y 
 
N  
 
N 
Growth 
 Entrepreneur felt organization should be bigger 
than it was 
 Internal stakeholders felt the entrepreneur did not 
take risks 
 Entrepreneur felt internal stakeholders did not have 
the same vision as he did 
 Growing through recruitment 
 Entrepreneur had a strategy for growth 
 Internal stakeholder felt that he was responsible for 
growth and not the entrepreneur (MD-IS1 and 
CEO-IS7) 
 
Y 
Y 
Y 
 
N 
N 
 
Y 
 
Y 
Y 
Y 
 
Y 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
Y 
Y 
 
N 
N 
 
Y 
 
Key:  Y=yes; N=no; I=influence; D=direct 
 
Stake’s (1995) four ways of interpreting the data provided additional rigour to 
the data analysis process:  
 
 issues related from a number of instances; 
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 direct interpretation from a single instance; 
 establishing patterns from categories; 
 generalizations from the three cases that can be learned.   
 
During the interpretation process, I derived identifiable patterns from the 
interactions between the entrepreneur and the internal stakeholders to ascertain 
the implicit causal relationships.  This led to the emergence of six abstract 
themes:  incongruence; fear; expectations; communication; success and learning.  
Figure 11.1 presents a higher-level abstraction to show the six themes, the 
cognitive psychological and organizational perspectives.   
 
FIGURE 11. 1 THEMES AND LAYERS OF ANALYSIS  
 
Source:  Revised from Asmussen and Cresswell (1995) 
 
The themes and patterns identified regarding the interaction between the 
entrepreneur and internal stakeholders were consistent for the cases over the 
longitudinal interview period of twelve months.  The sample size of three cases 
proved to be sufficient to collect the required empirical data (Denscombe, 2011) 
and theoretical saturation was reached when no new concepts and themes 
emerged (Strauss, 1987) during Sets II and III interviews.   
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11.3 Modes of Analysis 
 
This section introduces the contribution of the cognitive and organizational 
modes of analysis.  The cognitive psychological perspective was used because it 
can be applied at the individual, group and organization level of analysis (Huff et 
al., 2002; Hodgkinson and Healey, 2008) in order to gain insight.    
 
Sarasvathy’s (2001) effectuation theory demonstrated the differences between 
entrepreneurial and internal stakeholder decision-making processes offering a 
conceptual and empirical basis for an argument in cognitive differences.  In 
addition, ESDM (entrepreneurial strategic decision-making), rational and causal 
decision-making theories captured both strategic decisions and more general 
operational decision-making between the entrepreneur and internal stakeholders.   
 
The organizational mode of analysis provided meaning by linking 
entrepreneurial cognition and internal stakeholder perception within a context.  
Configuration theory developed by Miller (1992) resonated with the way that the 
cases were configured.  Differences in perception of success between cases led to 
further analysis using linear lifecycle stage and non-linear stage theories.  In 
order to understand the significance of Miller’s view, organizational learning and 
growth stage theories are presented to analyse the cause of the cognitive 
dissonance from the evidence.  More specifically, through understanding single 
and double loop learning, further insight into the reasons for cognitive 
dissonance in their interrelationships (Argyris and Schön, 1975, 1978; Senge, 
1990) is interpreted. 
 
Lichtenstein and Lumpkin (2005) provided a framework for the analysis of the 
interactions, perceptions and communication between the entrepreneurs and 
internal stakeholders.  In addition, the Politis (2005) model illustrated how 
transformation of entrepreneurial experience into knowledge has an interaction 
effect on internal stakeholders.  Another mechanism for understanding the 
interaction between entrepreneurial cognition and internal stakeholder perception 
is Crossan et al. (1999).  Their model offered an explanation for the barriers and 
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limitations faced by internal stakeholders that subsequently affected the 
interrelationship with the entrepreneurs.  
 
The original conceptual framework using Lumpkin and Dess’s (1996) 
entrepreneurial orientation framework was modified to include the dynamic 
interrelationships reflective of an open system.  In this way the conceptualisation 
of the interrelationships and interdependencies incorporated the five factors in 
open systems (von Bertalanffy, 1968): input; throughput; output; environment 
and feedback to demonstrate both explicit and implicit causality.    
 
Finally, the theory of psychological contracts (Schein, 1988) offered an 
explanation for cognitive misfit between the entrepreneur and internal 
stakeholders with insight into the complexities of expectations in their 
interrelationships.  This theory highlights aspects of roles and responsibilities 
(Handy, 1999) that were then discussed within Likert’s (1967) four systems of 
analysis (exploitive authoritative, benevolent authoritative, consultative and 
participative).   
 
11.4 The Icarus Paradox   
 
Miller (1992) developed the Icarus Paradox to interpret the success and failure of 
corporate organizations in a confidence-success-attribution cyclical model.  He 
argued that success reduced the entrepreneurial incentive to learn.  In my study 
the metaphor includes entrepreneurial cognition and over-confidence bias to 
form the cognition-success-attribution cycle.  This moderate adaption of the 
Icarus cycle is developed on the research assumption that entrepreneurial 
cognition is affected by biases.  The evidence showed that the entrepreneurs had 
experience in building a successful organization, and the cognitive aspects and 
biases contributed to that success.   
 
Attribution theory (Heider, 1958) was applied to this paradox and captured the 
idea of how individuals perceived events (external attributions), thoughts and 
behaviours (internal attribution) and to what their attributions were made.  In 
addition, attribution theory was used to illustrate that entrepreneurs and internal 
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stakeholders in the cases attributed entrepreneurial success to entrepreneurial 
cognition, and failures to external sources.    
 
Specifically, in Case A the lack of profitability of the issue domain 
‘Manufacturing’ was regarded by the entrepreneur as a failure of the managing 
director (MD) internal stakeholder to plan, thoroughly investigate and provide 
accurate financial data.  In Case B, the entrepreneur regarded the failure of issue 
domain ‘Sales and Marketing’ to implement new technology to improve systems 
and processes as the sales manager’s lack of opportunity recognition and 
responsibility.  In Case C, the evidence for the slow profitability of innovative 
technology was attributed to the market not being ready.  In Case C however, 
externalising the failure to the lack of readiness in the market and opinion leaders 
in the environment had some merit according to earlier research undertaken by 
Schein (1987).  It might well be that in Case C, the ‘failure’ could be attributed to 
both internal and external factors.   
 
Potential organizational failure in the Icarus metaphor was conceptualised as a 
reduction in performance in the cognition-success-attribution cycle, represented 
the conflict between the interrelated parts of the system and reduced performance 
with potential for organizational decline.  In Figure 11.2 Miller’s (1992) four 
configurations highlight reduced performance in each of the cases and the 
trajectories that typify success and failure.  
 
FIGURE 11.2 FOUR CONFIGURATIONS AND TRAJECTORIES 
The Decoupling Trajectory 
 
None 
 
Salesman can lead to Drifters
The Venturing Trajectory 
 
Case B 
 
Builders can lead to Imperialists
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The Focusing Trajectory 
 
Case A 
 
Case C 
 
Craftsmen can lead to Tinkerers
The Inventing Trajectory 
 
Case C 
 
 
 
Pioneers can lead to Escapists
Source:  Adapted from Miller (1992) 
 
1. The Focusing Trajectory:  from Craftsmen to Tinkerers.  Miller (1992) 
referred to the view that entrepreneurs sell what they are familiar with as the 
‘focusing trajectory’.  Case A is dominated by quality in all its operations 
because of the highly regulated pharmaceutical environment.  The entrepreneur 
with a technical background was more focused on this aspect than the MD 
internal stakeholder with a marketing background.  As suggested by Miller’s 
(1992) configuration, the MD’s marketing lens dictated what he perceived as 
important, reflecting perceivers expectancy theory (Jones et al., 1984).  These 
findings also support Miller’s view that even though the organization had 
changed over time, the entrepreneur still used pre-existing mental frameworks to 
understand and make decisions.  The conflict in the interactions with internal 
stakeholders was caused by the entrepreneur-as-Craftsman who attributed their 
success to the achievement of high levels of quality.  This is in contrast to the 
MD internal stakeholder who attributed the organization’s success to the strategic 
placement of highly skilled workers in the right market.   
 
In Case A the internal stakeholders with greater technical expertise and 
experience were more aligned with the entrepreneur on attributing success to 
high levels of technical quality.  In this example, the transformation from 
Craftsman to Tinkerer was moderated by the MD internal stakeholder who 
recognised the need for quality and diluted the potential for a monolithic culture 
created by the entrepreneur who used tried and tested approaches to growing the 
organization.  Tinkerers were regarded by Miller (1992) as a decline into a 
narrow focus on specialized quality due to past successes. 
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Case C entrepreneur and MD internal stakeholder did not have this conflict 
because they had a similar scientific background and both could be categorised 
as Craftsmen.  The findings in Case C illustrated the entrepreneur as a Craftsman 
who wanted to spend time perfecting new products but also had the commercial 
focus on growth.  The evidence that the entrepreneur was a Craftsman with 
commercial focus is an entrepreneurial feature that is not considered by Miller 
(1992).  In this way, the evidence showed a commonality between the 
interactions in Cases A and C in terms of the interactions of the entrepreneur as 
Craftsman and the internal stakeholders.  As long as the entrepreneur was the key 
decision-maker rather than internal stakeholders, the decision was respected 
because of historic success, but it moderated their interaction. 
 
In the cases the internal stakeholders’ desire to focus on one core strength was 
clearly an issue that caused cognitive dissonance between the entrepreneur and 
internal stakeholders.  It was unclear from Miller’s (1992) trajectory if the 
founders or the management drove this focus on one core single strength.  
Paradoxically, the internal stakeholders attributed organizational success to the 
entrepreneurial cognition, but simultaneously wanted change.  
 
2.  The Inventing Trajectory:  from Pioneers to Escapists.  While Pioneers took 
the lead with new technologies and created new markets they could also decline 
into Escapists.  The entrepreneurs in Cases A and C focused on futuristic projects 
that the market was not yet ready for which Miller (1992) asserted is 
characteristic of Pioneers.  In Cases A and C, there was a tension between the 
entrepreneurs who developed products that were perceived by internal 
stakeholders to be premature for the market, and the internal stakeholders’ desire 
for a market strategy and analysis before the development of new products. 
 
3. The Venturing Trajectory:  from Builders to Imperialists.  The Builder typified 
the entrepreneur in Case B who pursued growth and expansion with a primary 
goal.  In addition, he showed evidence of declining into an Imperialist through 
acquisition, mergers and fast strategies for growth.  The findings from Case B 
showed signs of the Venturing Trajectory in which the entrepreneur had 
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ambitious goals and was able to raise large investment for potential acquisition 
(Miller, 1992).  However, the conflict in the interactions with the internal 
stakeholders showed how the entrepreneur’s goals transformed the Builder to 
Imperialist at the cost of interrelationships and reduced internal stakeholder 
performance.  This evidence supports the Venturing Trajectory where the 
entrepreneur focused on financial and legal issues rather than the much needed 
production, research and development.    
 
Although Case B is characteristic of the Venturing Trajectory, there was an 
inconsistency with regards to Miller’s assertions on risk and the entrepreneur in 
Case B.  Miller regarded the Builder as taking substantial risk while the evidence 
in this case is that the entrepreneur took less risk as the organization matured and 
became more established financially, operationally and strategically.  
Additionally, the internal stakeholder perception was that the organization should 
take more risks.  Internal stakeholders failed to recognize the temporal aspects of 
growth, and that the entrepreneur did take risks at the start-up level.  This implies 
that the internal stakeholder perception had a temporal bias towards the present 
rather than the past.  The Venturing Trajectory characterised the conflict in Case 
B between the entrepreneur’s view of risk that is based on past experience and 
internal stakeholders view of risk that is based on inexperience and a lack of 
temporal depth. 
 
The changing temporal aspect of entrepreneurial risk from start up to maturity is 
not considered by Miller’s (1992) four trajectories.  My evidence provides 
insight that organizational age had an impact on entrepreneurial and internal 
stakeholder interplay as presented in the conceptual framework discussed in 
Section 11.7.   
 
4. The Decoupling Trajectory: from Salesman to Drifters.  There was no 
evidence that the entrepreneurs in the cases focused on sales at the expense of 
excellence.  The Salesman was characterised by a desire to create an image rather 
than a quality product.  The Salesman also focused on marketing and increased 
product lines much more than the other types, and was eventually a driver for 
decline.   
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5. Miller (1992) identified a lack of organizational learning and a loss of 
flexibility as the final driver for decline.   The evidence is discussed in Section 
11.6. 
 
11.5 Six Themes Identified  
 
The six themes represented earlier in Figure 11.1 are drawn from the analysis of 
the interactions between the entrepreneurs and internal stakeholders, as well as 
the decisions that were made with regards to issue domains.    
 
11.5.1 Incongruent and Communication Themes 
 
Incongruence can be explained using an Effectuation lens (Sarasvathy, 2001).  
Effectuation theory differs from rational choice decision theories since it is 
characterized by uncertainty and rational choice is exemplified by pre-existent 
goals, strategic objectives, (Knight, 1921) and ambiguity.  The entrepreneurs in 
the cases used effectual reasoning but were misperceived by most of the internal 
stakeholders, as making decisions quickly without enough information.  
However, this is incongruent with the entrepreneur’s decision-making processes, 
which was longer than perceived by internal stakeholders.  The internal 
stakeholder perception is also incongruent with their own decision-making 
processes. 
 
The following quote by the entrepreneur’s wife and finance director internal 
stakeholder demonstrated their different perception to the other three internal 
stakeholders due to the close and regular nature of the interrelationship.  The 
analysis illustrated that she displayed an accurate interpretation of the 
entrepreneur’s analytical cognitive process. 
 
Case B, Internal Stakeholder 
He does not make snap decisions.  He is very cautious in his decision-
making process. 
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However, the evidence demonstrated that entrepreneurs used both rational and 
effectual decision-making processing dependant on the situation (Sarasvathy, 
2010).  The temporal aspects of when information was shared with the internal 
stakeholders also caused incongruence. 
 
Internal stakeholder misperception illustrated that they failed to see that unlike 
themselves, who only used causal reasoning (Figure 11.3) that focused on a 
given set of means to achieve results, entrepreneurs used both.  The 
entrepreneurs ‘limited the downside’ of decisions, which was characteristic of 
effectuation (Sarasvathy, 2010) and prospect theory.   
 
Case B, Entrepreneur 
They know never to just bring me one set of answers, or what they think.  
I always look at the ‘what if factor’, what if something goes wrong.  How 
are we exposed, what are the upsides, what are the downsides, to try and 
think about all that before I can make a decision… 
 
These differences contributed to incongruent cognitive processes that moderated 
their interrelationship.  The internal stakeholders then perceived the entrepreneur 
to be risk averse which widened the gap between entrepreneurial thinking and 
internal stakeholder perception. 
 
FIGURE 11.3 EFFECTUATION  
 
Source:  Sarasvathy (2001) 
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Sarasvathy’s (2001) use of effectuation reflected in my evidence of 
entrepreneurial thinking, builds on Mintzberg’s (1979) work that entrepreneurial 
thinking has been learned in successful medium to large organizations.  
Sarasvathy’s and Mintzberg’s approach can be applied to the internal 
stakeholders who switched between entrepreneurial and planning mode in a 
similar way to entrepreneurs.   
 
Case A and C internal stakeholders who interacted more frequently with the 
entrepreneur learned increasingly to think like the entrepreneur and also switched 
to planning mode when necessary in their managerial capacity.  This increased 
communication and regular interaction had positive results because the internal 
stakeholders experienced the temporal aspects of the entrepreneur’s information 
gathering and decision-making processes. Therefore, the perception that the 
entrepreneur made quick decisions with insufficient facts was reduced or 
eliminated.  However, the dominance and success of the entrepreneur’s decision-
making largely influenced the degree to which internal stakeholders were 
cognitively aligned.   
 
The internal stakeholders who communicated less with the entrepreneurs, 
experienced their lack of desire to report their decision-making processes.  This 
evidence contradicted West’s (2007) finding in start-ups that entrepreneurial 
team collective cognition is important because decisions were made at the team 
level through discussion.  The entrepreneurs in this study appear to be more 
single-minded in their decision-making process and controlled the information 
flow.  As Case C internal stakeholder said: “we would start to question his 
decisions if he stopped being successful”.  In this way only positive upward 
feedback was communicated to the entrepreneur and this reinforced his decision-
making. 
 
It is also legitimate that the entrepreneurs were unable to report their mental 
experiences because they did not understand their psychological processes in 
decision-making and therefore were unable to communicate them (Nosek, 2007).  
This finding supports the psychological studies on unconscious cognitive 
processes by Dane and Pratt (2007) and Vermeulen and Curseu (2008).  In 
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addition, the evidence suggested that the entrepreneur lacked sensemaking 
(Weick, 1979), that people were fearful to make decisions independent of him 
because of the challenges associated with accessing intrinsic cognitive processes.  
In some instances the internal stakeholder demonstrated sensemaking when he 
cognitively aligned with the entrepreneur’s thinking. 
 
Case B, Internal Stakeholder   
Rather than me saying this is what I want to do and this is what I’m 
hoping to achieve, I’ll give him an idea or I’ll give him two ideas. 
 
11.5.2 Fear and Success Themes 
 
Prospect theory means that entrepreneurs placed more weight on losses than 
successes (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973).  But by adopting such a position 
internal stakeholders denied themselves the opportunity to gain experience 
(Sarasvathy, 2001).  Adding to this was the internal stakeholders’ lack of 
decision-making experience that acted as a moderator on their interaction.  This 
fear of failure derived from the evidence referred to the internal stakeholders’ 
failing entrepreneurial expectations.  The fear of not wanting to make mistakes 
limited the learning that can transform novice internal stakeholder decision-
makers into experienced entrepreneurial decision-makers.  
 
Mintzberg (1978) and Sarasvathy (2001) have argued that the entrepreneurial 
approach to decision-making can be learned. However, the fear of failure and 
lack of experience influenced the way the internal stakeholders adapted their 
thinking to that of the entrepreneur in the cases.  Successful internal stakeholder 
decisions were therefore limited.  Although, neither was cognizant of how and 
why their respective frame of reference affected their interrelationship and the 
organization, this resulted in internal stakeholder dissonance and misfit at the 
cognitive level.  Fewer cognitive differences between the entrepreneur and 
internal stakeholder resulted in a closer collective focus on OpR and decision-
making.   
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The evidence for this argument was presented in Cases A and C. The internal 
stakeholder, who worked closely with the entrepreneur and acted as the 
managing director, showed lower levels of cognitive dissonance than the other 
internal stakeholders.  It was not observed in Case B because the entrepreneur 
was the autonomous decision-maker and internal stakeholders experienced 
cognitive dissonance due to their interaction.  Although, when they adopted the 
entrepreneur’s cognitive approach it similarly reduced cognitive dissonance.  
This suggests that regular interaction with the entrepreneur as mentor and coach 
helped the internal stakeholder to reduce fear of failure. In addition, it helped 
them to understand entrepreneurial cognitive differences and subsequently learn 
from their successes.  This cognitive alignment process reinforced the cognition-
success-attribution cycle.  
 
Case B, Internal Stakeholder 
I always use the entrepreneur’s thought process when trying to sell him 
an idea. Working with him has influenced and focused my thinking. 
 
The two aspects of fear and success are further illustrated in Case A where both 
entrepreneur and MD internal stakeholder made a manufacturing investment 
decision and used heuristics rather than analytical decision-making.  Their 
decisions were influenced by overconfidence and intuition biases.  Lack of 
planning resulted in increased timescale in building the manufacturing site and 
misjudgement of the finances delayed the return on investment.  Other internal 
stakeholders who were not subjected to the same entrepreneurial biases were 
fearful to confront them on the issue domain ‘Manufacturing’.    
 
In this example, both the entrepreneur and MD internal stakeholder overlooked 
that the MD used the same heuristic decision-making processes as himself.  An 
additional complexity was that the entrepreneur unlike the internal stakeholder 
switched between analytical and heuristic decision-making (Vermeulen and 
Curseu, 2008).  This led to failed expectations on both sides due to a lack of 
communication.  This finding supported earlier cognitive psychology theories 
about differences in cognition between management and entrepreneurs (Busenitz 
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and Barney, 1997; Mitchell et al., 2000; Gaglio and Katz, 2001; Mitchell et al., 
2002).   
11.5.3 Learning and Expectations Themes 
 
The evidence contradicted the argument that entrepreneurial cognition can be 
learned (Mintzberg, 2001; Sarasvathy, 2001).   The entrepreneur in Cases A and 
B felt that internal stakeholders “won’t get it anyway”, and in Cases A, B and C 
the entrepreneurs expected them  “to see it”.  The entrepreneurs were unaware 
that sharing their mental models through communication or training (Argyris and 
Schön, 1975) would have a positive effect on their interaction.  This view has 
implications for entrepreneurs who lack communication skills and the desire to 
learn how to extract and transfer tacit knowledge to internal stakeholders.   
 
Case C, Internal Stakeholder 
He (the entrepreneur) would just say ‘no’ if he thought something was a bad 
idea. 
 
Figure 11.4 illustrates the evidence of the interaction process between the 
entrepreneur and internal stakeholders. 
 
FIGURE 11.4 PERPETUAL CYCLE OF AUTONOMOUS DECISION-
MAKING 
 
The fact that the cases formed a heterogeneous sample from three varied sectors 
meant that the similarities between Cases A, B and C are independent of sector 
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membership and experience. It was not the intention of my research to compare 
entrepreneurial thinking across different sectors but to highlight the effect of 
different cognitive processes on the interaction with internal stakeholders.  Table 
11.2 summarises the cross-case similarities and differences derived from the 
themes. 
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TABLE 11.2 COMPARISON ACROSS CASES A, B AND C 
Factors Case A Case B Case C 
Significance of Age 20 years.  Entrepreneurs allow some 
participative decision-making. 
Established norms 
10 years 
Entrepreneur making autonomous 
decisions. 
 
Norms still changing 
20 years 
Entrepreneurs allow some 
participative decision-making. 
Established norms 
Industry and Size Pharmaceutical 
+70 employees 
Electrical Services 
+80 employees 
Technology Design and 
Development 
+350 employees as shareholders 
Organizational Culture 
(Schein, 1998) 
Well defined duties with a tendency 
towards formal systems and 
processes. 
Well defined duties with a tendency 
towards formal systems and processes. 
Relatively flexible structure; 
lateral rather than hierarchical 
communications and control. 
Incongruent Theme Internal stakeholder’s cognition, 
perception of timing on OpR is 
incongruent with entrepreneur.  The 
closer internal stakeholder cognition 
is to entrepreneurs’, plus high level 
interaction reduces incongruency. 
Internal stakeholder’s cognition, 
perception of timing on OpR is 
incongruent with entrepreneur.  The 
closer internal stakeholder cognition is 
to entrepreneurs’, plus high level 
interaction reduces incongruency. 
Internal stakeholder’s cognition, 
perception of timing on OpR is 
incongruent with entrepreneur.  
The closer internal stakeholder 
cognition is to entrepreneurs’, plus 
high level interaction reduces 
incongruency. 
Communication Theme Lack of ability to communicate 
cognitive processes led to cognitive 
dissonance. 
Lack of ability to communicate 
cognitive processes led to cognitive 
dissonance. 
Lack of ability to communicate 
cognitive processes led to 
cognitive dissonance. 
Fear Theme Internal stakeholder’s fear to make 
decisions the further away the 
communication from the 
entrepreneur. 
Internal stakeholder’s fear to make 
decisions.  
Internal stakeholder’s fear to 
make decisions the further away 
the communication from the 
entrepreneur. 
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Success Theme Evidence of cognition-success-
attribution was slowly being diluted 
as confidence and integration of 
internal stakeholder increased. 
Strong evidence for entrepreneurial 
cognition-success-attribution. 
Espoused Theory rather than theory in 
practice about recognition of internal 
stakeholder contribution to decision-
making. 
Evidence of cognition-success-
attribution was slowly being 
diluted as confidence and 
integration of internal stakeholder 
increased. 
Expectation Theme Expectation of being the dominant 
decision-maker beginning to change. 
Entrepreneur expected internal 
stakeholders to accept autonomous 
decision-making 
Slow incorporation of internal 
stakeholder in decision-making as 
congruence increased. 
Learning Theme Showed signs of beginning to use 
cognitive and action learning. 
Little evidence of double loop 
learning. 
Beginning signs of same-different 
traditional S-R. 
Did not use cognitive and action 
approaches to learning. 
Single Loop learning rather than double 
loop learning. 
S-R was still different-same. 
Showed signs of beginning to use 
cognitive and action learning. 
Little evidence of double loop 
learning. 
Beginning signs of same-different 
traditional S-R. 
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The evidence across the themes showed a lack of sensemaking (Weick, 1979) by the 
entrepreneurs and an expectation that the internal stakeholders aligned with his 
thinking in spite of experience. 
 
Case B, Internal Stakeholder 
I would say “You know I’m concerned about this, how do you feel about it” 
and, try to get him to make the decision. 
 
Internal stakeholder alignment is characteristic of Miller’s (1992) configurations in 
corporate organizations where success is partly due to elements fitting together.  The 
analysis illuminates the tension beneath the surface that is eroding growth and 
performance in spite of the existence of seemingly successful configurations.  
 
Case B, Entrepreneur 
That decision-making process once I’ve decided something, and once we've 
gone through it, then I do expect it to be carried out.  If somebody goes 
against it, then the best for them to do is to take a long vacation from the office 
or out of my vicinity. 
 
This quote is a reflection of the self-centred nature of the entrepreneur that is based on 
successful decision-making and the expectation that the entrepreneur is in control of 
decision-making.  However, the energy and focus required to build an organization as 
the entrepreneur had done, required a single-minded approach at the cost of 
interrelationships (Miller, 1992).   
 
After twelve months entrepreneurial expectations and learning had shifted in Cases A 
and C.  The CEO internal stakeholder had more autonomy and internal stakeholder’s 
cognitive differences became more acceptable.    
 
11.6 The Contribution of Organizational Learning in Interpreting the Findings 
 
Senge (1990: 3) indicated that learning organizations were “Organizations where 
people continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where 
new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured”.  This illustrated that 
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organizational learning can mediate entrepreneurial and internal stakeholder 
interrelationships by learning from each other.  For this purpose, organizational 
learning theory offered valuable insights into decision-making and OpR.  More 
specifically, through single and double loop learning, cognitive dissonance was 
explored in their interrelationships (Argyris and Schön, 1978; Senge, 1990). 
 
The evidence showed that the cognitive capacity and capability of the entrepreneur 
led to success rather than the explicit transfer of entrepreneurial cognitive processes to 
internal stakeholders.  This finding is in contradiction to the overall premise that 
organizations are constantly learning and transmitting information.  However, the 
findings showed that the internal stakeholders adopted entrepreneurial thinking in 
single loop rather than double loop learning which could be an explanation for the 
success of the organization. 
 
The findings showed an ambiguity between entrepreneurs who are constantly learning 
(Daft and Weick, 1984) from the environment but resisted learning from the internal 
stakeholders.  This is caused by the underlying assumptions that the entrepreneur has 
pre-existing experienced mental models, that have led to success and internal 
stakeholders did not feel experienced enough to question them.  Limited examination 
of mental models familiar to the entrepreneur, and limited learning from internal 
stakeholders led to the internal stakeholder feeling demotivated and disillusioned with 
the interrelationship.  This evidence supported Miller’s (1992) argument that the 
development of new mental models to replace existing successful mental models is a 
challenge.    
 
For example the three entrepreneurs would use internal stakeholders to gather and 
provide information to inform a decision, but would not consider their contribution in 
the decision itself.  This temporal aspect is significant because not having an impact 
on the decision itself limited internal stakeholder learning (Senge, 1990).  A 
combination of entrepreneurial autonomous decision-making, experience and the 
influence of biases, contribute to the control of information regarding entrepreneurial 
cognitive processes.  
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Case A, Internal Stakeholder 
He will have the decision made.  He may have the decision a lot earlier than 
he tells you. 
 
This quote supports Bluedorn’s (2002) finding in temporal studies that the 
entrepreneurs based decision-making on their own direct experience rather than on the 
experience of internal stakeholders. 
 
Case B, Internal Stakeholder 
He tells me what I want to hear and doesn’t make changes that make a 
substantial difference to me. 
 
Ignoring the new input by internal stakeholder in favour of ‘accrued experience’ 
(Bluedorn, 2002) moderated the interrelationship.  The dominant position of the 
entrepreneur in organizational learning had an effect on the internal stakeholders who 
had their own perception of the entrepreneur’s OpR decision-making processes.  
Internal stakeholders were also concerned about seeking new opportunities because 
the entrepreneur disagreed if the topic was unfamiliar.  
 
Lichtenstein and Lumpkin’s (2005) framework of behavioural, cognitive and action 
learning in Table 11.3 provides an explanation for inconsistencies in the entrepreneur 
and internal stakeholder interactions.   
 
TABLE 11.3 MODES OF LEARNING THAT GENERATE OPPORTUNITIES IN 
ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRMS 
 Nature of 
Entrepreneurial 
Learning 
Elements Affected By 
Entrepreneurial 
Learning Processes 
Potential 
Opportunities For 
Entrepreneurial 
Learning 
Cognitive learning Identify and alter 
cognitive patterns, 
generate new 
opportunities for 
knowledge and action 
(Nonaka, 1994; 
Crossan et al., 1999) 
Existing and potential 
knowledge.   
Existing and potential 
resources 
Systemic processes 
Design new products 
and services 
Develop new ways of 
doing business 
Attract and retain 
customers 
Apply proprietary 
knowledge in unique 
and innovative ways 
Behavioral learning Alter tangible 
processes through 
Existing and emerging 
routines 
Streamline processes to 
achieve new 
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experience  Adaptive process efficiencies 
Integrate learned 
experience to improve 
tangible processes 
Action learning Transform the context 
by questioning 
assumptions and 
aligning espoused 
belief with actual 
practice (Revan, 1971) 
Argyris, 1992; Pedler 
et al. (2005) 
Underlying norms and 
beliefs  
Interaction, ‘Rules of 
Engagement’ 
Accelerate innovation 
process 
Generate highly 
productive and creative 
organizations and 
collaborations 
Source:  Lumpkin and Lichtenstein (2005) 
 
The contradiction between learning from the environment and learning from internal 
stakeholders can be explained through understanding behavioural learning.  The 
entrepreneur would espouse theory by articulating that internal stakeholders had 
decision-making power, but would veto their decisions.  However, the entrepreneur in 
Case B did eventually streamline the sales and marketing technology process 
suggested by the internal stakeholder months beforehand.   It took a few months for 
the entrepreneur to integrate existing knowledge with new unfamiliar knowledge. 
 
Case B, Internal Stakeholder  
The entrepreneur does not like change. 
 
Through persistence the internal stakeholder demonstrated a desire to achieve higher 
levels of cognitive learning than the entrepreneur.   The entrepreneur’s experience and 
learning from other technology failures potentially moderated organizational 
performance (Huber, 1991) and showed how the representativeness bias (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1982) negatively affected the interaction with internal stakeholders.  
However, the change increased performance and had a positive effect on their 
interrelationship.   
 
Revans (1971), the originator of action learning, began by using the process of 
tackling issues and reflecting on actions with scientists but later used it with managers 
in a variety of  public and private sector organizations by learning through actions and 
practice.   The action learning approach to OpR that focused on alignment between 
expectations, reality and targeting individual assumptions provided further insight into 
the interactions between the entrepreneur and internal stakeholders.  In Case A there 
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was an expectation by the entrepreneur that management meetings successfully 
communicated his thoughts, but the reality was that internal stakeholders did not 
appreciate what he was thinking.  In Case B, the expectation that the internal 
stakeholder had the freedom to make decisions was very different to the reality that 
the entrepreneur was the final decision-maker.  In Case C, the entrepreneur’s 
assumption was that internal stakeholders were free to bring new opportunities to him, 
while in reality the internal stakeholders thought that there was an expectation of what 
was acceptable and what was not.   
 
The frustration felt by internal stakeholders in not knowing what the entrepreneur was 
thinking and why he made certain decisions reflected a lack of cognitive learning, 
misalignment of expectations and reality.  Cognitive learning is a part of 
organizational learning that enables tacit knowledge to be activated to increase and 
share knowledge amongst individuals (Nosek, 2007).  The entrepreneurs’ sharing of 
cognitive schemas and mental models were inconsistent across the organizations.  It 
was mentioned previously that when the entrepreneurial mentoring role in Cases A 
and C with internal stakeholders was more consistent then cognition was more closely 
aligned.  The evidence therefore showed that internal stakeholder cognitive 
dissonance cannot be generalised across all the interrelationships with the 
entrepreneur and depends on the level of interaction mentioned earlier.  Although the 
entrepreneurs in limited examples in Cases A and C recognized that they should 
transfer their knowledge, the internal stakeholders’ lack of understanding of OpR 
illustrated that entrepreneurs were still not sharing their knowledge to improve 
interactions.    
 
A cognitive and action learning approach (Revans, 1971, 1978) was gradually being 
adopted in Cases A and C through interactions in which the entrepreneur and internal 
stakeholders would learn from the decision-making process and exchange thinking on 
what worked and what didn’t.  The challenges faced by the entrepreneur about issue 
domain ‘Succession’ showed a gradual increase of confidence as the internal 
stakeholders made more successful decisions.  In this way the internal stakeholders in 
Cases A and C delivered on the entrepreneur’s expectations and tested assumptions 
about their role in decision-making. 
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Although the finding that acceptance by the entrepreneurs is partly because the 
internal stakeholders who interact more closely and regularly with them had learnt to 
think more like the entrepreneurs, learning was slow.  The dichotomy in the findings 
was that the entrepreneur allowed internal stakeholders the freedom to learn and make 
decisions while their contribution and involvement in decision-making was limited.  
This reflected the contradiction between Senge’s (1990) espoused theory and theory 
in practice in which the entrepreneur said one thing and behaved in a different way. 
 
These findings supported the proposition that previous entrepreneurial events are 
related to how experience is transformed into knowledge (Politis, 2005) in Figure 
11.5, that either moderated or mediated entrepreneurial decision-making.  The 
frustration of the internal stakeholders to undertake new approaches and decisions to 
grow was fuelled by the entrepreneur’s generalizations in applying the same way of 
thinking to subsequent issue domains.  This is regarded as path dependency and meant 
that the entrepreneurs in Cases A and B found it a challenge to adapt to new changes 
in customers, technology and regulation because of the cognitive persistence of 
previous success (Levinthal and March, 1993).  Highlighted earlier, the previous 
experience of the entrepreneurs in Case A and C was a major contributing factor to 
the cognitive misfit between the entrepreneur and internal stakeholders. 
 
Case A, Internal Stakeholder 
Obviously you wouldn’t hand over your baby after 20 years and say there you 
go, you look after it now and get on with it.  I think again it’s quite an 
interesting situation to manage, it requires management of both the founder 
and the company. 
 
A contradiction to path dependency and Politis’ (2005) entrepreneurial learning and 
OpR framework in Figure 11.5 is seen in Case A.  Even though the entrepreneur had 
20 years of start-up and specific pharmaceutical industry experience his over-
confidence and reasoning led him to explore the new manufacturing opportunity to 
grow the organization.  The evidence from Case B also provided a challenge to 
Politis’ (2005) framework.  In Case B there was an opportunity to increase 
performance but the entrepreneur was reluctant due to the negative outcome of 
previous sales and marketing technology.  This showed that previous experience did 
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not always lead to the exploration and exploitation of an idea without the interaction 
with, and intervention by, internal stakeholders in established entrepreneurial 
organizations.  
 
This was similar in Case C where the transformation process of new opportunities 
was influenced by the entrepreneur’s previous outcomes in the new product  
development and his early career.   
 
FIGURE 11.5 ENTREPRENEURIAL LEARNING AND OpR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Politis (2005)  
 
The cognitive dissonance therefore between the entrepreneur and internal 
stakeholders in the cases can also be explained as a difference in the level of prior 
information and knowledge in recognizing opportunities.  This is also explained 
through the five stages of OpR in which prior knowledge is referred to in the 
‘preparation’ phase (Shane, 2000; Lumpkin and Lichtenstein, 2005).  
 
Crossan et al. (1999) used the influence of intuition and experience as a mechanism 
for understanding the interaction between individual, group and the organization.  In 
this way, insight into entrepreneurial cognition and internal stakeholder perception is 
illustrated by their 4I model in Figure 11.6 of intuiting, interpreting, integrating and 
institutionalizing reflecting organizational learning as a dynamic process.  The 
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entrepreneurs had developed intuition on the basis of their experience and used their 
existing knowledge to interpret new information.  This dynamic process shows that 
due to different interpretations of what and how entrepreneurs were thinking, the next 
phase of integrating knowledge was challenging for the internal stakeholders.  As a 
result, a possible shared understanding was undermined.   
 
FIGURE 11.6 ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS 
 
Source: Crossan at el. (1999) 
 
In each case shared practices in terms of strategy development and performance was 
not institutionalized because of differences in approach to strategy development and 
growth between the entrepreneur and internal stakeholders.  Internal stakeholders 
proceed through their own learning that they do not share with the entrepreneur for 
fear of his reactions.  However, towards the end of the interviews, entrepreneurs in 
Cases A and C had identified that their own cognitive processes potentially limited 
the organization’s growth.   
 
Institutionalized learning through consistent internal stakeholder feedback was not 
embedded since evidence showed inconsistencies and contradictions within and 
across the cases.   The degree to which the 4I process can be applied to the findings 
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depends on the perception of the internal stakeholders to the entrepreneur’s decision-
making and exploitation of new opportunities.  
 
The contradictions identified above of entrepreneur and internal stakeholder 
interrelationship in terms of cognitive differences, biases, communication and 
organizational learning, can be further explained by exploring individual aspects of 
learning in more detail.  Underpinning organizational learning in the cases is single 
and double-loop learning (Argyris and Schön, 1978) developed primarily on case 
study research (Huber, 1991).  The Argyris and Schön (1978) model in Figure 11.7 
demonstrated how single-loop learning took place and it was possible for the 
entrepreneurs to think that internal stakeholder decisions were congruent to theirs.  
Single-loop learning took place because the internal stakeholders improved systems 
and processes as it existed and was developed by the entrepreneur, rather than 
changing it radically.  A double-loop approach to learning meant that the internal 
stakeholders would have to fundamentally question entrepreneurial decision-making 
and OpR processes.  The evidence for entrepreneurs and internal stakeholders double-
loop learning was limited.   
 
FIGURE 11.7 SINGLE AND DOUBLE LOOP LEARNING  
 
 
Source:  Adapted from Argyris and Schön (1978) 
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Fear was found to be a barrier to double-loop learning opportunities for entrepreneurs 
and internal stakeholders.  This fear is exacerbated by the lack of internal stakeholder 
counterfactual bias.  The influence of a counterfactual bias meant that the 
entrepreneur was able to look forward after a failure, rather than spend time thinking 
about why it happened.  
 
Case A, Internal Stakeholder   
He (the entrepreneur) does not look back and reflect on whether he made a 
wrong or right decision.  It is not part of this thinking process. 
 
The evidence for single loop learning was observed in Case B when the entrepreneur 
found several thousands of pounds worth of sales overlooked in archived client files 
by the sales force.  The entrepreneur’s response in telling internal stakeholders to 
become more efficient can be interpreted as “just fixing the problem”, rather than 
questioning the underlying assumptions of what and why it happened, and how the 
existing system caused the failure.  In addition, internal stakeholders did not 
communicate their conflicting view about why and how this error occurred which 
they believed was due to a lack of autonomy and employee motivation.  There was no 
internal stakeholders’ participation in the decision to implement the action dictated by 
the entrepreneur to fix the problem.  Using existing systems and processes dictated by 
the entrepreneur to resolve the problem reflects single loop learning.   
 
The perceptions of the internal stakeholders that the entrepreneurs made decisions 
with regards to new opportunities only if they were familiar with the area confirmed 
previous studies that entrepreneurs preferred OpR when they have existing knowledge 
(Baron and Ensley, 2006; Mitchell and Shepherd, 2010).  This approach had a 
negative influence on their interactions because internal stakeholders wanted to learn 
and explore new and different opportunities.  The entrepreneurs’ reluctance was a 
barrier for expansion and growth.  It also meant that change and adopting new 
processes was a challenge for internal stakeholders in each of the cases.   
 
Another reason for single loop learning is that by making entrepreneurial cognitive 
processes explicit, entrepreneurs exposed their ideas, intentions and choices, and so 
could make themselves vulnerable (Argyris, 1992 and 1993) to internal stakeholder 
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criticisms and perceptions.  Entrepreneurs admitted to doing things instinctively 
without “training” and with a fear that they might get “caught out”.  This defensive 
mechanism meant that internal stakeholders perceived the entrepreneur as controlling, 
reinforcing their fear of failure and incorrect perceptions.  The entrepreneurs seldom 
cognitively adjusted if they believed they had made the correct decision.  This 
supports the illusion of control bias theory (Langer, 1983), that entrepreneurs looked 
for confirmation of their hypothesis and ignored disconfirming evidence.   
 
Argyris and Schön (1978) argued that organizations used double loop learning in 
order to grow.  However, double loop learning meant that internal stakeholders 
questioned underlying principles and successful entrepreneurial decision-making.   
Instead, single loop learning was more evident than double loop learning in all cases 
because of established entrepreneurial cognition and practices.  In addition, Weick’s 
(1979) argument that organizational learning was infrequent was evident in the cases.   
 
11.7 Modification of the Conceptual Framework based on Open Systems 
Thinking   
 
The original conceptual framework provided an empirically validated model for this 
research.  The entrepreneurial orientation configuration sought to show the interplay 
between entrepreneurial orientation, performance, organizational and environmental 
factors.  However, it failed to capture the reciprocal relationships between 
entrepreneurial cognition and internal stakeholder perception, temporality, biases and 
specific performance measures indicated by the evidence in a conceptual manner.   
 
In order to gain further insight into the implicit causal interrelationship between the 
entrepreneur and internal stakeholder perception, I referred back to organizational 
literature.  This section shows how the conceptual framework was modified to 
incorporate the open systems concepts of input, output and transformation in a 
feedback loop (von Bertalanffy, 1968; Senge, 1990) that reinforced growth as a 
system of interlinking parts. 
 
Three of the core assumptions of open systems thinking are used to provide insight 
into the interrelationship between the entrepreneur and the internal stakeholders.  The 
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first assumption is that changes in one variable caused change in another variable, the 
second is that all components of an organization were interrelated, and the third is the 
relevance of communication of information with interlinked variables.  The evidence 
shows that individuals interacted with mutual benefit as new information between 
entrepreneurs and internal stakeholders affected each other.  The new information was 
then fed into the system.   
 
In addition, an open systems approach highlighted how the interrelationships between 
growth and performance could be recognized by managers, and the effect of longer 
communication chains as organizations increased in size.  In an open system 
information is input to the organization , interacts with the environment, and ensures 
the organization’s survival because it is able to convert this information and produce 
an output (von Bertalanffy, 1968).  The longer flow of feedback and information in 
the communication chain in the cases was found to subsequently limit performance. 
The links in the modified conceptual framework are feedback or causality loops and 
the interrelationships are dependent on each other.  
 
Open systems thinking reflected how input generated by environment factors are 
converted into new products and services in the throughput phase in the cases. 
Through a feedback mechanism with internal stakeholders these outputs were fed 
back into the system.  This exemplified how organizational learning is a key 
component of an open system and illustrates how new information may be used to 
create increased growth.  In this way, the modified conceptual framework reflected 
the evidence that feedback processes between the entrepreneurs and the internal 
stakeholders affected the system and resulted in a change in performance.   
 
The conceptual framework modifications in Figure 11.8 are discussed using the open 
system characteristics of causality, interdependence and synergy to demonstrate the 
implicit causal interrelationship between the temporal dimension of entrepreneurial 
cognition, biases and internal stakeholder perception.  The feedback loops in the 
conceptual framework illustrate the interaction effect between entrepreneurial 
cognition and internal stakeholder perception.  The link between the entrepreneurial 
cognition and biases to performance and the interdependency between organizational 
factors are represented in the modified conceptual framework.   
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The modifications of Figure 4.2 include the performance and organizational factors 
dimensions in order to represent the findings.  In the performance dimension, 
profitability and market share has been replaced with recruitment, technology and 
long-term value.  In the organizational factors dimension age has been added. 
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FIGURE 11.8 MODIFIED CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK    
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The entrepreneurial orientation concept was extended to include biases, temporality 
and entrepreneurial cognition.  The original performance concept (Lumpkin and Dess, 
1996) included sales growth, market share, profitability, overall performance and 
stakeholder satisfaction.  This empirical research for established entrepreneurial 
organizations extended the performance concept to include technological 
advancement and long-term value because they were regarded as important in each 
case.  Industry-specific definitions of growth and performance, such as increased 
manufacturing (Case A and C) and the acquisition of intangible assets and spin-outs 
(Case C) have not been included because of the specificity to one case. 
 
Organizational factors have been extended to include the age of the organization, but 
top management team characteristics were not considered in this research and 
therefore do not appear in the conceptualisation.  However, top management 
cognition and expectancy was found to affect the interaction, and the conceptual 
framework has been modified to include this aspect.  Age is characteristic of the 
lifecycle models and the evidence in this research demonstrated that age made a 
difference in the entrepreneurial cognitive approach to growth and performance.  For 
example, the entrepreneur in Case B had an aggressive sales approach, compared to 
the entrepreneurs in Cases A and C, indicative of the differences in age and size.  
Organizational age and size were variables mentioned in 74 of 104 stage models 
investigated by Levie and Lichtenstein (2010).  The evidence also showed that the 
dynamic tension and entrepreneurial passion to enact an opportunity in pursuing 
growth is higher for the entrepreneur in Case B than entrepreneurs in Cases A and C, 
extending the Levie and Licthtenstein’s model to established entrepreneurial 
organizations. 
 
11.7.1 The Interdependence of Temporality and Entrepreneurial Cognition 
 
There are two points here that reflected the systems approach of “circles of causality” 
(Senge, 1990: 73).  The first circle causing conflict between entrepreneurial cognition 
and internal stakeholder is that entrepreneurs were unaware of the significance of 
sharing decision-making processes and information with internal stakeholders earlier 
in the process.  The second circle of causality was the entrepreneur’s ability to make 
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quick decisions and lack of desire to indulge in consensus seeking, in case the 
window of opportunity closed.  The example below represents the entrepreneur’s 
thoughts about how the internal stakeholders should be undertaking decisions. 
 
Case A, Entrepreneur  
They need to be moving on and moving upwards in terms of their thinking and 
what they are doing. 
 
So although this interrelationship appeared to be a linear cause-effect process, the 
influence of the temporal dimension showed how the entrepreneur’s cognition 
reinforced the perception of the internal stakeholder in a downward reciprocal loop. 
 
11.7.2 Interplay between Entrepreneurial Cognition with Internal Stakeholder 
Perception and Expectation 
 
The entrepreneur’s decision-making and OpR in the conceptual framework affected 
the interaction between the entrepreneur and internal stakeholder perception.  Based 
on the assumption that entrepreneurial OpR consisted of a synthesis of stages (Shane, 
2003; Lumpkin and Lichtenstein, 2005), the entrepreneur’s OpR process only 
included internal stakeholders in the information gathering phase and once they had 
formulated their ideas and not before.  Characteristic of open systems thinking, 
change is represented by the interplay of entrepreneurial cognition and internal 
stakeholder perception, although the evidence illustrated that it is not at the point 
when internal stakeholders expect it.  These unmet expectations result in dysergy in 
this dynamic interrelationship.  
 
The open system model of causality can be traced through a sequence of actions.  At 
each step the entrepreneur drew on experience, pre-existing mental models, and 
knowledge and information from the internal stakeholders.  The processes were 
interrelated, but in some of the evidence the thinking process of the entrepreneur was 
only partially communicated to internal stakeholders.  Because relationships between 
the entrepreneur and internal stakeholders were nonlinear (von Bertalanffy, 1968), a 
small change in entrepreneurial decision-making had a large effect on the internal 
	 255
stakeholder.  In other examples, a large change in entrepreneurial decision-making 
had a nominal effect on internal stakeholders.   
 
These findings illustrated the contrast between internal stakeholders who preferred 
less uncertainty in favour of planned strategies and entrepreneurs who sought 
opportunities and made decisions in a non-linear way.  These differences are viewed 
as an emergent strategy and entrepreneurial mode rather than planning mode 
(Mintzberg and Waters, 1982).  The evidence demonstrated the causal effect that 
these differences had on the interrelationships between entrepreneur and internal 
stakeholders.  Emergent strategy in which patterns are unintentionally realised caused 
frustration with internal stakeholders who wanted planned progression.   
 
The evidence in the cases supported Mintzberg and Water’s (1982) argument that 
growth in entrepreneurial business occurred as a pattern of sprints and pauses.  This 
was incongruent with internal stakeholders’ expectations of more consistent fast 
growth.  Entrepreneurs saw this way of thinking as overextending their resources and 
finances, and reinforced the internal stakeholder view that the entrepreneurs were 
risk-averse. 
 
The evidence in Cases A and C revealed that interactions between the entrepreneur 
and internal stakeholders influenced and possibly changed the assumptions each had 
derived about the other’s cognition.  The findings thus supported research that 
entrepreneurial organizations are not “strategically managed by consensus” but by 
autocratic entrepreneurial decision-making processes (Covin et al., 2006).  Autocratic 
entrepreneurial decision-making caused cognitive dissonance.  This is an example of 
the ‘Pygmalion Effect” (Senge, 1990; Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1992) in which the 
entrepreneur rewarded the internal stakeholders who thought like him but did not 
realise that his expectations influenced internal stakeholders who were eager to 
please.   
 
Equity Theory (Adam, 1965) provided further insight into internal stakeholder 
cognitive dissonance who perceived their interrelationship to be inequitable and 
expected that their contributions would be rewarded.  The evidence illustrated that 
cognitive dissonance resulted when the expectations of internal stakeholders were 
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unmet.  The practical components of psychological contracts (Schein, 1987) were 
traditionally used to explain mutuality of expectations in the relationship between 
employees and management in organizations.  The cases provided evidence for both 
the mutuality of expectations and the consequences of unmet expectations in 
interrelationships.  In terms of the exchange of technical information and decision-
making, tasks and roles, the cases demonstrated a level of mutuality between the 
entrepreneur and internal stakeholders.  Specifically, mutuality that led to a decision 
was achieved by the horizontal flow of technical information (Handy, 1993) between 
the entrepreneur and internal stakeholders.  However, when decision-making was 
directly related to growth and OpR, a lack of mutuality was evidenced.  This was 
explained earlier through different cognitive processes of effectual versus causal 
reasoning (Sarasvathy, 2001), and Likert’s (1968) four systems of thinking that are 
discussed later. 
 
The notion of unwritten psychological expectations was apparent.  This was 
evidenced through entrepreneurs expecting internal stakeholders to perform their roles 
and responsibilities and internal stakeholders expecting that their working 
environment would enable them to perform their jobs.  The evidence illustrated that 
internal stakeholders expected entrepreneurs to communicate their thoughts about 
decisions and opportunities, and to transfer relevant information and expertise in order 
for them to perform their roles.  Unmet expectations resulted when this did not 
happen.  The entrepreneurs in all cases still controlled the flow of information which 
created an environment that the internal stakeholders perceived to make their jobs 
more challenging to undertake.    
 
The other aspect of the psychological contract relevant to the interrelationship 
between the entrepreneur and internal stakeholders is ‘charisma’ (Schein, 1987).  
Charisma means that internal stakeholders followed the entrepreneur because the 
entrepreneur  reflected a mystery of success.  The evidence in the cases reflected this 
mystery in that internal stakeholders felt that “people followed him anyway”.  
Entrepreneurial charisma caused a problem with issue domain ‘Succession’ because 
as Schein (1987) argued, charisma is not a basis for succession and is only stable for 
as long as the perceived charismatic leader is the decision-maker.   
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At this point, it is timely to introduce additional classic organizational theorists who 
have contributed to our present day understanding of decision-making and 
organizational behaviour. Simon (1959, 1979) argued that decisions are central to 
effective organizations and that electronic communication and information processing 
changed decision-making.  Rostow (1960), McGregor (1960), Likert (1967), Schein 
(1987) and Argyris (1992), each argued for clarity and explicitness of interrelatedness 
for employee roles and responsibility, decision-making and organizational 
effectiveness.  While another organizational theorist, Handy (1993), suggested that 
aspects of power through information control offered additional insight into the 
acceptance of entrepreneurial decision-making by internal stakeholders. 
 
Rostow (1960) claimed that organizations needed to translate from psychological 
orientation to working organizations with procedures in order to be successful.  
However, a psychological factor contributing to how this change took place could be 
self-efficacy, the belief in one’s own ability to control and complete a task, which has 
been shown to be higher in entrepreneurs than non-entrepreneurs.  A contemporary 
view is that entrepreneurs have a bias and perceived that they have the ability to 
control the outcome, and that following procedures was limiting.  Conversely internal 
stakeholders believed they did not have the same ability to control the task and 
complete the task successfully in the way the entrepreneur did. 
 
Schein’s (1987) degrees of participativeness helped to explain the cognitive 
dissonance in entrepreneurial and internal stakeholder interactions.  In participative 
decision-making, entrepreneurs still treated internal stakeholder motivation and 
commitment with suspicion even when internal stakeholders had more information 
and knowledge to perform their role than the entrepreneur.  Likert (1967) and 
McGregor’s Theory Y (1960) supports Schein’s argument that allowing employees 
latitude in their roles and routines is potentially more beneficial to the organization.  
Handy (1993) supported this argument adding that role strain, overload and 
misperception, which were all evidenced in this research, contribute to unmet 
expectations and are therefore dysfunctional features of an organization. 
 
The evidence suggested that an entrepreneur’s lack of confidence in the internal 
stakeholders resisted a participative approach because of cognitive differences.  The 
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evidence contributed new insight to classic organizational theory, by demonstrating 
that the lack of cognitive understanding and communication in their interrelationship 
limited the entrepreneur’s transition from autocratic to participative (Schein, 1987) 
decision-making.  
 
McGregor’s (1960) Theory Y assumes that employees prefer autonomy in decision-
making and have the information to fulfil their role requirements.  The evidence 
demonstrated that the cognitive dissonance between the entrepreneur and internal 
stakeholders was caused by limited information flow that Simon (1959, 1979) 
suggested was only ascertainable at the point of decision-making.  The entrepreneur’s 
view was thus more characteristic of Theory X that had negative implications for a 
successful psychological contract and mutually met expectations.  It is also worth 
recalling Likert’s (1967) argument that a lack of accurate information is often the 
cause of systems thinking failure and Handy’s (1993) argument that vertical and 
horizontal information flow represents important features of synergy.  In this way, 
Likert and Handy’s arguments could be used to explain the negative impact on the 
psychological contract caused by the lack of information flow.   
 
Likert (1967) captured the continuum of autocratic and participative theory in 
Systems 1, 2, 3 and 4 analysis represented in Table 11.4.  These four systems can be 
used to understand the causal effect of the interrelationship between the entrepreneur 
and the internal stakeholders.  Theory Y assumption is that organizations operating in 
Systems 3 and 4 will have a power base of decision-making that is much broader and 
included the internal stakeholders.  The idea of the entrepreneur relinquishing control 
in order for internal stakeholders’ thinking to be harnessed to organizational goals and 
not entrepreneurial thinking is not yet visible in the cases.  If this shift occurred, the 
psychological contract between the entrepreneur and internal stakeholder would shift 
to the entrepreneur providing information and a context for the internal stakeholders, 
which would reinforce their interrelationship in positive ways.   The internal 
stakeholders’ expectations would then be met through consensus with the 
entrepreneur.  The analysis using Theory Y assumptions meant that the misfit in their 
interaction was caused by internal stakeholders’ lowered expectations because they 
could not challenge the entrepreneur and they had less perceived role autonomy.   
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Table 11.4 shows Likert’s (1967) view of how entrepreneurs in system 1-4 can be 
either authoritive or participative when interacting with the organizational variables of 
leadership, communication and decision-making. 
 
TABLE 11.4 FOUR SYSTEMS OF ANALYSIS  
Organizational 
Variable 
System 1 System 2 System 3 System 4 
 Authoritive Participative 
 Exploitive 
Authoritive 
Benevolent 
Authoritive 
Consultative Participative 
Group 
 System 1 and 2 reflects 
entrepreneurial decision-making 
in all the cases  
System 3 and 4 reflects 
perceived entrepreneurial decision-
making in all the cases 
1. Leadership 
processes used 
    
Extent to which 
superiors have 
confidence and trust 
in internal 
stakeholders. 
Have no 
confidence and 
trust in internal 
stakeholders. 
Have 
condescending 
confidence and 
trust. 
Substantial but 
not complete 
confidence and 
trust. 
Complete 
confidence and 
trust in all 
matters. 
Extent to which 
entrepreneurs behave 
so that internal 
stakeholders feel free 
to discuss important 
things about their 
jobs. 
Internal 
stakeholders do 
not feel free at 
all to discuss 
things about 
their job. 
Internal 
stakeholders do 
not feel very free 
to discuss things 
about their job. 
Internal 
stakeholders feel 
rather free to 
discuss things 
about their job. 
Internal 
stakeholders feel 
completely free 
to discuss things 
about their job. 
2. Character of 
communication 
process 
    
Amount of 
interaction and 
communication 
aimed at achieving 
organization’s 
objectives. 
Very little Little Quite a bit. Much with both 
individuals and 
groups. 
Extent to which 
downward 
communications are 
accepted by internal 
stakeholders. 
Viewed with 
great suspicion. 
May or may not 
be viewed with 
suspicion. 
Often accepted 
but at times 
viewed with 
suspicion; may or 
may not be 
openly 
questioned. 
Generally 
accepted, but if 
not, openly 
questioned. 
Psychological 
closeness (how aware 
is entrepreneur of 
cognitive dissonance 
faced by internal 
stakeholders). 
Has no 
knowledge or 
understanding 
of problems. 
Has some 
knowledge and 
understanding. 
Knows and 
understands 
problems. 
Knows and 
understands 
problems. 
3. Character of 
decision-making 
processes  
    
At what level are they 
made. 
Bulk of 
decisions made 
by the 
Policy at top, 
many decisions 
within prescribed 
Broad policy and 
general decisions 
at top, more 
Decision making 
widely done 
throughout 
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entrepreneur 
(at the top). 
frameworks made 
at lower levels. 
specific decisions 
at lower levels. 
organization, 
well integrated 
through linking 
process. 
To what extent are 
entrepreneurs aware 
of problems. 
Often are 
unaware or 
only partially 
aware. 
Aware of some, 
unaware of 
others. 
Moderately 
aware.  
Generally quite 
well aware.  
Source: Adapted from Likert (1967: 4) 
 
The evidence on the imprinting of entrepreneurial cognition in the cases as presented 
in Table 11.4 supported Likert’s (1967) argument that top management System 1 style 
of leadership resulted in System 1 organizational characteristics.  The entrepreneur’s 
cognitive process reflected Likert’s continuum of System 1 and 2, but was perceived 
by them as System 3 and 4.  Internal stakeholders’ perception and descriptions of 
entrepreneurial decision-making authority reflected more of System 1 and 2.  Internal 
stakeholders therefore behaved in a way that reflected what they perceived to be 
correct.   The evidence of entrepreneurial leadership is a secondary finding that 
provides further insight but is outside of the boundaries of my research. 
 
11.7.3 Linking Interplay To Growth and Performance 
 
The modification to the performance concept supported Wiklund and Shepherd’s 
(2005) argument that the EO conceptualisation of performance was incomplete and 
more complex than the indicators in the original Lumpkin and Dess (1996) model.  In 
addition, the concept now reflects the varied growth definitions of the entrepreneurs 
and the internal stakeholders, and the growing heterogeneity of entrepreneurial 
growth in academic literature noted by Wright and Stigliani (2013).  The differences 
in growth definition in Cases A, B and C also support Levie and Lichtenstein’s (2010) 
arguments that patterns and rates of growth varied in entrepreneurial organizations.   
 
When entrepreneurs and internal stakeholders used a sensemaking approach when 
faced with growth decisions, then the differences between entrepreneurial effectual 
reasoning and internal stakeholder resulted in cognitive dissonance.  This 
interpretation of the interaction between the entrepreneur and internal stakeholder 
supported the effectual elements of isotropy, that entrepreneurs were not clear what 
elements of the environment to pay attention to or to ignore.  Consequently, the 
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development of new mental models such as market, product and organization was 
approached through an effectual process for entrepreneurs and causal for internal 
stakeholders.   
 
The central systems thinking argument in this research is that organizational 
performance is mediated by positive feedback and moderated by negative feedback.  
The conflict in the interrelationships meant that the organizational system was out of 
balance because the conversion processes of entrepreneurial decision-making to 
output affected performance and organizational factors.   
 
Although Cases A and C were not underperforming at the time of this analysis, there 
was internal stakeholder frustration about the amount of financial resources of one 
particular project in Case C.  This was reflected in organizational theory which 
suggested that the consequence of technology investment is seldom immediately 
enjoyed (Senge, 1990).  However, the age and maturity of the organization coupled 
with the experience of the entrepreneur meant that the entrepreneur had a greater 
awareness than the internal stakeholders of the temporal dimension to success and 
building value.  Cognitive conflict between the entrepreneur and internal stakeholders 
demonstrated that unless the system was rebalanced and a modified representation of 
success was established, their interrelationship would affect performance.  
 
Case B displayed a period of underperforming and resorted to autonomous decision-
making.  The organizational system returned to a balance by reinforcing the same 
system of autonomous entrepreneurial decision-making.  This input was converted 
into increased sales output.   
 
The entrepreneurs in all cases raised the issue domain ‘Recruitment’ as a significant 
contributor to growth.  In Case C there was a pattern of different recruitment 
decisions made by the internal stakeholder in comparison to the entrepreneur.  The 
recognition of the diversity in experience and cognition of the internal stakeholders 
was more evident in entrepreneurs in Cases A and C.  This meant that the dilution of 
the entrepreneur’s recruitment decisions by the internal stakeholders had slowly 
started to change the thinking created by the entrepreneur and reflected more of the 
internal stakeholder thinking.  
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Internal stakeholders perceived that a new cognitive approach to the market, structure, 
strategy and growth was needed. Organizational learning researchers have argued 
through action learning, that if organizations are not adapting then they are failing.  
Revans (1971, 1978) argued earlier that in a situation such as this, then managers 
needed to be constantly learning from each other.  However, the evidence suggested 
that the entrepreneurs found it a challenge to adapt to internal stakeholder cognition.   
This research showed that although in the short term the performance of the 
organization increased with autonomous entrepreneurial decision-making, other 
elements of performance were reduced, such as overall performance, stakeholder 
satisfaction and employee numbers.   
 
The question of whose cognitive processes to adopt to increase and maintain 
performance seemed to underlie the interpersonal conflict that was apparent within 
the cases although it appeared to be implicit rather than explicit.  There was evidence 
of hidden balancing processes (Senge, 1990) in which the entrepreneur established the 
norm, with subtle attempts at maintaining the traditional ways of doing things.  The 
balancing processes are a way of interpreting internal stakeholder cognitive 
dissonance and frustration between what is expected and explicit, and the hidden 
processes that are expected and implicit by the entrepreneur.  In Cases A and C, 
balancing is being attempted by adopting the entrepreneur’s successful cognitive 
processes. 
 
The evidence in Case A illustrated that the interrelationship was improving because 
the entrepreneur was starting to encourage shared communication about the strategy 
that increased performance (Harrison and Leitch, 2005; Wang, 2008) and 
counteracted the Icarus decline.  The quote below demonstrated that the entrepreneur 
and internal stakeholder were beginning to share performance information.  
 
Case A, Internal Stakeholder   
I think there’s an interest in how you change pace of growth. Can you do it in 
a company that is mature?  Does the size of the company become naturally 
limiting at some point? 
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11.7.4 Linking Interplay to Organizational Factors 
 
The modifications to the conceptual framework included organizational factors that 
emerged out of the data analysis of age, size, strategy and firm resources.  
Organizational age was found to have an important influence on performance in all 
the cases, which in turn had a moderating or mediating effect on the interrelationship 
between the entrepreneur and internal stakeholders.  The concept that age affected 
performance is also supported by Rosenbusch et al. (2011) meta-analysis of the 
influencing factors on organizational performance.  Entrepreneurial and 
organizational age is discussed in life-stages’ literature on growth (Greiner, 1972; 
Churchill and Lewis, 1983; Levie and Lichtenstein, 2010) but is not reflected in 
research on cognitive differences (Mitchell and Shepherd, 2010).  The evidence in this 
research is that the age of the entrepreneur and the organization affected the 
interrelationship because of the entrepreneurs pre-existing mental models and 
experience.  The cognition-attribution-success cycle discussed earlier was developed 
over a period of time in which the entrepreneur was making decisions that led to 
success.  Consequently, the older the entrepreneur and the organization were, then the 
more evident the cognition-attribution-success cycle became   In this way having 
more experience, and successful decision-making and opportunity, can be attributed 
to the age of the entrepreneur and the organization. 
 
The entrepreneur in Case B had more of an autocratic cognitive style when changing 
strategy than the entrepreneurs in Cases A and C who were ten years more 
experienced and were considering succession.  However, the internal stakeholders felt 
that they did not have the experience to decide strategy without the entrepreneur’s 
consent and participation.  The decision to allocate firm resources was made by the 
entrepreneur and discussed earlier with regards to investment decisions in Case A and 
issue domain ‘Recruitment’ decisions in Cases A, B and C.   
 
Case C, Internal Stakeholder   
So actually what we want, what excites someone to want to join this company, 
and what excited people twenty five years ago, will be different. 
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The increasing size and complexity in Cases A and C also made it difficult for 
entrepreneurs and internal stakeholders to have as many informal interactions 
compared to what occurred during earlier stages of the organization’s growth.  This 
reinforced how a change in entrepreneurial mindset affected organizational learning.  
As the size of the organization increased, both in terms of the number of internal 
stakeholders and the increase in systems and processes, the communication chain 
between the entrepreneur and internal stakeholders increased.  In this way 
organizational theory offered a valuable insight as these entrepreneurial organizations 
became more like large classic organizations with more complex systems and 
processes.    
 
11.8 Summary 
 
The Icarus Paradox demonstrated how the dominance of entrepreneurial cognition 
was linked to success, which either reinforced the interrelationship of organizational 
parts in a system or counteracted it.  The complexities of these interrelated parts were 
interpreted by using organizational learning and an open systems thinking approach to 
illustrate the contradictions between entrepreneurial cognition and internal 
stakeholder perception.   
 
Through the cognitive psychological perspective, the analysis has demonstrated that 
established mental models and cognitive differences reinforced the cognition-success-
attribution cycle that led to the Icarus demise.  Additionally, from an organizational 
and management perspective, the findings showed that although entrepreneurial 
cognition was dominant, the interdependency of individual concepts in the conceptual 
framework all work together to either moderate or mediate the interaction.  The final 
chapter draws conclusions from the empirical findings and discusses the contribution 
to knowledge. 
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Chapter 12 Conclusion 
12.1 Introduction   
In this chapter, conclusions are drawn from the evidence, highlighting their 
contribution to knowledge.  In addition, the research questions are answered and 
future research opportunities are identified.  The chapter also introduces research 
propositions for others to test as hypotheses in their respective contexts.  The 
significant feature of this research applies to the new ways in which disparate 
concepts were used to investigate the interrelationship between entrepreneurial 
cognition and internal stakeholder perception in established entrepreneurial 
organizations.  In this way, the new combination of the concepts that were 
identified in the conceptual framework provide original insight into how these 
interrelationships work.  The chapter draws on these original insights and the 
conclusions present factual and conceptual conclusions that highlight the existing 
configuration in the cases underlined by the dominant cognition of the 
entrepreneur. 
 
12.2 Contribution to Knowledge   
 
My evidence from investigating the interrelationship between entrepreneurial 
cognition and internal stakeholder perception makes a contribution to knowledge 
that bridges entrepreneurial cognition and organizational literature.  This 
contribution to knowledge is based on “combining disparate concepts in new 
ways to investigate a conventional issue” (Trafford and Leshem, 2008: 141) from 
a cognitive perspective. The scope and dimensions of the analysis of the linkages 
between the concepts of entrepreneurial cognition, biases, temporality, internal 
stakeholder perception, organizational factors and performance provide original 
empirical evidence.  The factual conclusions derived from the evidence that I 
discovered and analysed, answer my four research questions.  A summary of the 
original contributions to knowledge is presented in Table 12.1.   
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The conceptual conclusions in Section 12.4 supplement the factual conclusions 
reflecting the contribution to knowledge by linking the significance of my 
findings back to the modified conceptual framework. 
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TABLE 12.1 FACTUAL CONCLUSIONS LINKED TO CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
Research Questions Factual Conclusions Drawn from 
Evidence 
Contribution to Knowledge 
Q1.How and why does 
entrepreneurial cognition 
affect the interaction with 
internal stakeholders 
perception in the 
organization?  
Changing entrepreneurial cognition 
moderates the interrelationship. 
Advances knowledge that entrepreneur’s switching decision-
making styles moderates the development of shared cognition. 
Perceivers Expectancy theory explains 
internal stakeholder perception. 
Advances understanding of the moderating effect of cognitive 
differences on interrelationships, growth and performance. 
Entrepreneurs do not adapt cognitive 
processes to enable shared cognition. 
Advances knowledge that shared cognition is achieved through 
internal stakeholders alignment and not through consensus.  
A lack of open and honest 
communication reinforces the 
cognition-attribution-success cycle. 
Extends configuration theory to entrepreneurial organizations 
highlighting the decline in performance.  Advances knowledge 
that success reduces learning in established entrepreneurial 
organizations. 
Q2.What are the temporal 
factors regarding the 
interaction between 
entrepreneurial cognition 
and internal stakeholders?  
Entrepreneurs engage internal 
stakeholders late in information 
gathering and decision-making 
processes.   
Explicitly addresses temporal factors in entrepreneurial 
cognition and interplay with internal stakeholder perception. 
Short, medium and long-term nature 
of decisions mean that entrepreneurs 
switch between different cognitive 
processes. 
Advances knowledge on the temporal nature of entrepreneurial 
cognition on growth and performance.   
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Entrepreneur switch speedily between 
heuristic and analytical cognition 
compared to the internal stakeholder. 
Confirms individual differences in cognition. 
Q3.How do biases affect 
the interaction between the 
entrepreneur and internal 
stakeholders?  
 
There is limited comprehension and 
awareness that biases cause conflict.  
Advances knowledge that different levels of biases affect 
interrelationships, growth and performance.  
Lack of sensemaking and sensegiving 
has a negative and implicit causal 
effect.  
Advances knowledge demonstrating that entrepreneurial 
sensemaking and sensegiving is not used in uncertain and 
ambiguous interactions with internal stakeholders. 
Entrepreneurial biases have a negative 
reciprocal effect on internal 
stakeholder perception. 
Reinforces entrepreneurial cognition literature across levels and 
suggests link between entrepreneurial cognition, biases and 
internal stakeholder perception. 
Q4.How does this 
interaction occur within the 
context of organizational 
growth?  
 
Entrepreneurial cognition 
demonstrated that internal stakeholder 
input and feedback is necessary to 
drive growth and performance is 
inconsistent. 
Advances knowledge on open systems thinking by linking 
entrepreneurial cognition to growth.  Confirms input, 
conversion, output and feedback loop are positive for growth 
and performance in established entrepreneurial organizations. 
Different expectations led to 
differential allocation of resources to 
achieve growth and performance 
outcomes. 
Advances knowledge on established entrepreneurial 
organizations confirming differences in experience and 
expectations.  Advances understanding of different definitions of 
growth and performance on interaction. 
Contributes to knowledge that entrepreneurial team collective 
cognition impedes or facilitates performance. 
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Similar backgrounds mediate the 
interaction effect. 
Advances knowledge that internal stakeholders align their 
growth ambitions to entrepreneurs in a cognition-success-
attribution cycle. 
Open and honest participation in the 
integration of new knowledge builds 
growth and performance appropriate 
for the lifecycle of the organization.   
Confirms the relevance of age to organizational life-stages.  
Advances knowledge that age affects the interplay between 
entrepreneurial cognition and internal stakeholder perception 
because of experience and pre-existing schemas. 
Prevalent authoritative systems 
mediate growth and performance. 
Advances knowledge that the psychological contract is relevant 
in established entrepreneurial organizations. 
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In Table 2.1 I have consolidated the relationship between the research questions, the 
factual conclusions drawn from the evidence and the contributions to knowledge. 
12.3 Answers to the Research Questions  
This section provides answers to the four research questions showing how the original 
combination of the concepts provides insight to each interrelationship.  
12.3.1 How and why does entrepreneurial cognition affect the interaction with 
internal stakeholders perception in the organization? (Q1)  
 
Entrepreneurial cognition significantly affects the interaction with internal 
stakeholder perception in the organization.  This research provides two reasons as 
explanations to the first research question.  The first reason is the entrepreneurs’ 
complex cognitive processes that are due to experience and the cognition-success-
attribution cycle.  The second reason is the impact of the internal stakeholder’s 
perception, expectation and lack of experience of this interrelationship.   
Entrepreneurial complex cognitive processes are reflected in how the entrepreneurs in 
my research switched between heuristic and analytical decision-making (Vermuelen 
and Curseu, 2008); causal and effectual reasoning (Sarasvathy, 2010); and planning 
and entrepreneurial modes (Mintzberg, 1978).  The duality of these cognitive 
processes sometimes confused internal stakeholders and resulted in complexity in 
shared cognition.  This confusion led to internal stakeholder perception that 
entrepreneurs made autonomous decisions by ignoring disconfirming evidence.  The 
contribution of this research is that these perceptions moderate and mediate their 
interrelationship, depending on the type of the interrelationship and the alignment of 
internal stakeholder to entrepreneurial cognition.   
In addition, through internal stakeholder feedback, the interaction reinforces 
entrepreneurial cognition because it lacks open and honest communication.  This 
evidence is reinforced by the entrepreneurial and internal perception that their success 
is attributed to their decision-making.  My finding of external attribution to success 
supports Heider’s (1958) external and internal attribution theory, which has 
previously been used in larger systems before this research.  This evidence reflected 
by Schein’s (1987) psychological contract contributed valuable insight into the nature 
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of unmet expectations and misperception of entrepreneurs and internal stakeholders in 
the cases.   
My findings confirm existing entrepreneurial decision-making literature that 
entrepreneurs are more prone than other individuals to use heuristic information 
processes trigged by higher levels of uncertainty and ambiguity and results in 
automatic information processing (Vermeulen and Curseu, 2008).  In addition, my 
findings extend the understanding of complex cognitive processes acknowledging the 
impact it has on internal stakeholder interrelationship and shared cognition.   
Dane and Pratt (2007) argued that experienced entrepreneurs have pre-existing mental 
representations.  My research extends Dane and Pratt’s research demonstrating a 
contribution to knowledge that the differences between mental representations derived 
from entrepreneur’s experience and less experienced internal stakeholders cause 
cognitive dissonance.  Additionally, the evidence from my research extends Miller’s 
(1992) configuration theory to established entrepreneurial organizational knowledge 
by showing how the interaction is affected by temporal factors (Miller and Lloyd-
Reason, 2013).  
However, along with decision-making literature and classic organizational theories, 
the interplay theories discussed in Chapter 3 have provided some insight into the 
interdependent concepts of entrepreneurial cognition and biases with internal 
stakeholders.  In particular Mintzberg’s (1978) argument regarding configuration, 
represents the reciprocal and non-linear nature of the interrelationship between the 
entrepreneur and the internal stakeholders.  In the same way, the influence of the 
interrelated parts in open systems (von Bertalanffy, 1968) reflects how entrepreneurial 
processes are mutually reinforcing.  
In conclusion, the answer to the first research question is that entrepreneurial 
cognition affects the interaction by switching between decision-making styles and 
automatic information processing.  The reason their interrelationship is affected is 
because of imbalances in cognitive complexity, entrepreneurs pre-existing mental 
representations and other interrelated parts discussed in the research questions below. 
 
	 272
12.3.2 What are the temporal factors regarding the interaction between 
entrepreneurial cognition and internal stakeholders? (Q2)  
 
My evidence shows that there are three temporal dimensions that affect the interaction 
between entrepreneurial cognition and internal stakeholders.  This finding applies in 
similar ways in each of the cases.   
 
The first dimension is the length of time that entrepreneurs take to involve internal 
stakeholders in their information gathering and decision-making processes reflects 
Bluedorn’s (1987) theory on the entrepreneur’s perception of time.  My research 
contributes to knowledge by demonstrating that engaging internal stakeholders late in 
the decision-making or information gathering process has a moderating effect on their 
interaction.  
 
The second is that short, medium and long-term decision-making means that 
entrepreneurs switch between different cognitive processes when making decisions 
depending on its strategic or operational context.  My evidence supports existing 
literature by Bird (1988), Busenitz and Barney (1997) that there is a contrast between 
entrepreneurial quick decision-making with incomplete information versus managers 
who have access to specific and more comprehensive market information.  My 
research contributes to decision-making knowledge by demonstrating that these 
differences results in entrepreneurial frustration and internal stakeholder 
misperception.  
 
The third temporal factor affecting the interaction is the speed with which the 
entrepreneur switches between heuristic and analytical thinking compared to the 
internal stakeholder.  My research shows that the entrepreneurs use mental shortcuts 
while the internal stakeholders spend more time gathering facts and information 
which has a negative impact on their interrelationship. 
 
In answering the second research question these three temporal factors of the timing 
surrounding inclusive entrepreneurial decision-making, short, medium and long-term 
decision-making and the speed with which entrepreneurs switched offer original 
insight into entrepreneurial and internal stakeholder interrelationship. 
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12.3.3. How do biases affect the interaction between the entrepreneur and 
internal stakeholders? (Q3) 
 
The evidence demonstrates that cognitive biases affect the interplay between 
entrepreneurial decision-making and internal stakeholders.  My evidence supports 
Tversky and Kahneman (1973) arguments on biases that entrepreneurs making 
decisions are influenced by over-confidence and intuition biases.  The influence of 
these biases are perceived as a lack of information by internal stakeholders with a 
moderating effect on their interaction.  The entrepreneurs’ use of intuition biases 
cause the internal stakeholders to question their decision-making process because it is 
in conflict with their use of analytical thinking which is not as affected by biases.    
 
My evidence shows that when entrepreneurs deployed over-confidence in their 
decision-making it reinforces the cognition-success-attribution cycle with internal 
stakeholders and has a positive effect on their interaction when growth and 
performance is positive.  Conversely, when the planning fallacy bias is exercised, and 
entrepreneurs expect internal stakeholders to be quicker at decision-making, their 
interrelationship is tense.   In addition, when entrepreneurs’ decision-making is biased 
with counterfactual thinking they are only looking forward in decision-making, 
ignoring past mistakes, and this results in cognitive dissonance with internal 
stakeholders.   
 
The entrepreneurs’ lack of cognitive adjustment due to illusion of control bias theory 
(Langer, 1983) and the search for confirmation of their hypothesis moderates their 
interaction with internal stakeholders.  The evidence shows that the effect of these 
entrepreneurial biases on internal stakeholders, is that they become lacking in 
confidence and fearful to make incorrect decisions, or decisions with which the 
entrepreneur would not agree..  Additionally, the effect of these biases is to produce 
internal stakeholder confusion about their role and responsibilities.  This reciprocal 
interaction results in a lack of honest and open upward communication.  
 
Therefore, in answering research question three, biases affect the interaction between 
the entrepreneur and internal stakeholders by influencing entrepreneurial decision-
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making, reinforcing internal stakeholder misperception of these entrepreneurial 
cognitive processes. 
 
12.3.4 How does this interaction occur within the context of organizational 
growth and performance? (Q4) 
 
Interaction between entrepreneurial cognition and internal stakeholder perception 
occurs within the context of organizational growth and performance by interrelated 
concepts influencing each other.   The evidence in my research demonstrates that the 
interaction is dependant on individual perceptions of how the organization is growing 
and performing.  These different perceptions of growth support and contributes to the 
research that entrepreneurs define and operationalize growth differently to academic 
researchers (Achtenhagen et al., 2010). 
 
An entrepreneurial decision that leads to positive increase in growth and performance 
reinforces a positive interaction, but conversely, when the entrepreneur makes a 
decision that leads to financial and operational losses, their interaction becomes top-
down and non-transparent.  In both instances the cognition-success-attribution cycle 
and Miller’s (1992) System 1 and 2 thinking is reinforced.   
 
12.4  Conceptual Conclusions  
It is now possible to link the relevance of my findings back to the modified 
conceptual framework that was presented in the previous chapter.  The conceptual 
conclusion is that the interrelationship between the concepts of biases, temporality, 
performance and organizational factors exhibit reciprocity between entrepreneurial 
cognition and the perceptions of internal stakeholders.    The feedback from the 
internal stakeholders to entrepreneurial decision-making resulted in a cognition-
success-attribution cycle reinforcing the Icarus Paradox.  This shows that as 
entrepreneurial confidence biases increases, internal stakeholder perception and 
expectations become more aligned with entrepreneurial cognition.  Cognitive 
dissonance is therefore reduced and the integration of internal stakeholder new 
knowledge and information is limited.  
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Theories which highlight cognitive differences between entrepreneurs and managers 
(Markman and Baron, 2003; Curseu and Vermeulen, 2008; Vaghely and Julien, 2011) 
and biases (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, 2008; Casson, 2009) on their own do not 
explain how entrepreneurs and internal stakeholders interact.   As a school of thought, 
they underscore the differences which this research confirms, and form a research 
basis to explore how it affects communication between them.   
Building on cognitive psychology, interplay theories which look at the dynamic 
interaction of interrelated parts of an organization (von Bertalanffy, 1968; Senge, 
1990); organizations as conversation systems (Covin and Slevin, 1991) and person 
and entrepreneurship fit (Markman and Baron, 2003) underpin this research.  In 
addition, growth stage and dynamic theories (Greiner, 1972; Adizes 1979; Churchill 
and Lewis, 1983; Levie et al, 2010; Wright and Stigliani, 2013); entrepreneurial 
mindset and culture (Shepherd et al., 2010); configuration theory (Witmeur and 
Fayolle, 2011) underscore the combining of different concepts or constructs. 
The application of open system theory (von Bertalanffy, 1968; Senge, 1990) to 
explain the interplay between entrepreneurial cognition and internal stakeholder 
perception as a system, helped to formulate conceptual explanations for the 
dominance of entrepreneurial cognition.  This approach clarifies the reinforcing 
interrelationships.  The conceptual framework is used as a basis for the conceptual 
conclusion that the interdependent nature of each concept has an implicit and explicit 
causal impact.  This means that a change in each concept affects the interaction 
between the entrepreneur and the internal stakeholder, and in turn affects both the 
input and the output of the organization.  
Specifically, the conceptual conclusions are that by linking the individual concepts of 
biases and temporality to entrepreneurial cognition, the implicit causal impact on 
internal stakeholder perception is evidenced.  In turn, the impact of internal 
stakeholder perception is fed back and reinforces entrepreneurial thinking.  
Additionally, the conceptual framework illustrates how the reciprocal causal effect of 
performance  links with organizational factors on the interaction.  Existing models on 
interrelated theories are too general and linear to apply to the interplay of 
entrepreneurial cognition and internal stakeholder perception in established 
entrepreneurial organizations.  By drawing together disparate concepts, my 
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conceptual framework underpins the empirical data that provides specific insight into 
these interrelationships. 
The conceptual framework also justifies the underlying assumptions about individual 
and organizational norms.  In this way the conceptual conclusion that entrepreneurial 
organizations are in a dynamic state of change, and the pattern of interrelationships 
are always changing, can be made.  Thus my conceptual conclusion is that a change in 
performance and organizational factors affect the interrelationship between the 
entrepreneur and internal stakeholders.  
 
12.5 Significance for Established Entrepreneurial Organizations 
 
This section highlights the practical implications for established entrepreneurial 
organizations, experienced entrepreneurs and management.  The findings of this 
research underscore the importance of an open systems thinking approach to 
explaining and understanding organizational growth and performance.  The 
interdependencies of entrepreneurial cognition with internal stakeholder perception, 
has direct causality between these two variables for organizational factors and 
performance.  The dominance of entrepreneurial cognition and the aligning of internal 
stakeholder perception to entrepreneurial cognition have reinforced the cognition-
success-attribution cycle. 
 
The significance of this alignment for practice involves communication and feedback, 
the psychological contract and entrepreneurial leadership.  The lack of open and 
honest communication, that is both top down and bottom up, reinforced cognition-
success-attribution that led to organizational decline as shown in my research.  The 
contribution to practice therefore is that when entrepreneurs in established 
entrepreneurial organizations understand the cause and effect influence of their 
cognitive processes, they can better manage their interactions with internal 
stakeholder perception. 
 
In this way, entrepreneurs can focus not only on their individual thinking but can 
share and transfer crucial mental models and expectations to the internal stakeholders.  
Senge (2006) calls this process ‘generative learning’ which can help entrepreneurs 
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and internal stakeholders learn and shift their awareness towards a systems thinking 
approach.  
  
12.6 Research Propositions  
Since I adopted an inductive approach for my research methodology, it is not possible 
to generalize from my conclusions. Propositions are therefore suggested that others 
can test as hypotheses in their respective contexts; 
1 The interplay between entrepreneurial cognition and internal stakeholder 
perception is directly affected by cognitive complexity and biases;  
2 A temporal dimension to entrepreneurial cognition affects the interplay 
between entrepreneurial and internal stakeholder perception;  
3 The interplay between entrepreneurial cognition and internal stakeholder 
perception is moderated and mediated by organizational factors;  
4 The interplay between interdependent concepts of entrepreneurial cognition, 
internal stakeholder perception and performance are cyclical and reinforcing. 
Each proposition is linked to my research questions and the combination of these 
constructs conceptualizes the interplay between entrepreneurial cognition and internal 
stakeholder perception. 
2.7 Critique of Research 
A social constructionist framework and case study methodology was a suitable 
perspective to adopt to access and collect my data.  The research approach I used was 
appropriate because it’s ability to provide insights on a number of complex 
conceptual issues.  This enabled me to make a contribution to knowledge.    
 
Adopting a deductive research approach would have resulted in the derivation of 
different conclusions that were not part of my intended research design and 
methodology.  Thus, my research approach was appropriate for the investigation and 
this allowed me to generate evidence that provided answers to my research questions.  
By adopting an inductive approach, research propositions were developed which other 
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researchers could use to test the interconnected and interdependent concepts through a 
deductive approach.  
 
It is also worth noting that my working definitions of the entrepreneur and the 
established entrepreneurial organization were supported throughout my research. 
 
12.8 Implications for Future Research   
At the close of my research it is possible for me to propose four research foci that 
merit investigation.  The significance of both items emerged as my research 
progressed but each was outside the boundaries of this investigation.  Thus, they are 
proposed as secondary outcomes from my research that warrant investigation.   
Firstly, this research demonstrates that internal stakeholders perceive and interpret 
entrepreneurial cognition in different ways to the entrepreneur.  Future research could 
explore how these differences in background, education and behavior affect not only 
the interaction, but the other interlinking aspects of performance and organizational 
factors.  This would add value to the issue domains raised in this research such as 
‘Succession’ and ‘Recruitment’.  It will also add to knowledge of the contribution of 
internal stakeholders to organizational success and failure in established 
entrepreneurial organizations in which growth and performance was found in the 
evidence to be defined differently. 
Secondly, this research made a contribution to explaining and understanding the 
temporal dimension of decision-making and cognition.  A perspective for future 
research is how temporality in cognition affects the configuration of entrepreneurial-
led organizations on a larger scale rather than for three cases.  In this way established 
entrepreneurial organizations in which the entrepreneur is still the decision-maker for 
several industries other than pharmaceutical, electrical services and technology can be 
studied.  The effect on the interrelationships can then be explored further to see how, 
and if, a different configuration evolves over time from nascent to mature 
organizations that would increase the generalizability of the findings in a deductive 
research approach.  
Thirdly, a longitudinal approach that follows-up on how these established 
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organizations continue to grow and perform (Davidsson and Wiklund, 2001) in spite 
of cognitive misfit, would benefit the literature on dynamic state theories on 
organizational growth.  This inductive study has shown that the entrepreneur and 
internal stakeholders define growth differently, and yet these organizations are 
successful.  An investigation into how these organizations self-regulate (von 
Bertalanffy, 1968) could provide this insight. 
A longitudinal study that is longer than the 18 months used in my study could 
examine if the growth trajectory continues or whether the speed and nature of growth 
and performance could be improved through enhanced communication of 
entrepreneurial cognition to internal stakeholders.  In this way our knowledge of how 
these entrepreneurial organizations progress through different stages of growth 
through improved communication and understanding could be examined for a longer 
period. This would contribute to the research agenda on organizational lifecycles 
about why and how mature organizations decline into failure.  
Fourthly, as a by-product of my research, my secondary findings unveiled 
entrepreneurial leadership thinking, in Chapter 11 Section 11.6.2, that could form the 
basis for further exploration in terms of their interrelationship with internal 
stakeholders.   By researching Likert’s (1967) System 1 and 2 entrepreneurial 
leadership in more detail, researchers could add to the knowledge about the influence 
of personality and behavior on the interrelationship between internal stakeholders, 
organizational factors, growth and performance.  In this way the study could extend 
our understanding of how individual concepts influence each other in such 
organizational settings.  This in turn could contribute to the entrepreneurial leadership 
research agenda.  
12.9 Research Reflections 
This research process has been a demanding and intellectually stimulating journey 
that has questioned some of my professional assumptions and the assumptions of 
antecedent research in the area of entrepreneurial cognitive and organization research.   
The iterative loop of the research process has meant that I revisited these assumptions 
and some were changed after having studied a particular theory as well as the 
analyses of the empirical findings.  Other theories about cognition and behavior have 
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confirmed my understanding and experience as a business founder and organizational 
psychologist with regards to differences in individual thinking and the 
interdependencies with others.  
In particular, the process of developing the conceptual framework gave me 
confidence that what I was doing had higher conceptual value.  It was clear from the 
beginning of my doctoral journey that the research was new and dynamic.  This view 
was validated by my acceptance as an early-researcher at international conferences 
and resulting from the RENT 2012 conference my article, entitled ‘The interplay of 
entrepreneurial cognition and internal stakeholders’ was published by the Internal 
Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Business (Miller and Lloyd Reason, 2013).   
This research has been presented at conferences over the past three years.  In this way, 
the gap in knowledge, conceptual framework and contribution to knowledge have 
been modified on the basis of feedback that has strengthened and reinforced the 
arguments presented in this chapter.  Personal reflection on this process is considered 
in the conclusions chapter and the timetable of conferences can be reviewed in 
Chapter 5.  The following feedback was given on my paper submitted to ISBE, 
Dublin, 2012:   
 
“An excellent paper on entrepreneurs' cognition and internal stakeholders.  The 
paper commences with a helpful and informative review of the salient literature and 
some coherent and well conceived propositions. The approach is well documented 
and justified, and the results are comprehensive, and the implications and value are 
excellent. Whilst I don't have any specific suggested changes to the paper (which is 
nearly journal-ready once it has been polished), it looks like being a great refereed 
paper and presentation/discussion in Dublin.” 
 
The research has been received with interest from researchers such as Professor 
Tripsas from Harvard University and Dr. Levie from Strathclyde whose work I have 
extended.   As well as this academic support for my research, I was appointed to a full 
time Lectureship at CEDAR (Centre for Enterprise Development and Research), Lord 
Ashcroft International Business School, Anglia Ruskin University in International 
Business and Entrepreneurship, September 2012.   
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As an applied psychologist who in the past has focused on quantitative scientific 
research, I found that the knowledge gained from an exploratory qualitative approach 
has enhanced my learning.  I am able to contribute with insight to the conversations 
with academic peers and entrepreneurs that helps them to understand the 
interrelationships, and how entrepreneurial decisions are perceived by internal 
stakeholders.  My pedagogic approach is more holistic which means that I engage 
directly with aspects of research and practice to help students understand how, what 
and why interrelationships form in established entrepreneurial organizations.  This 
includes responding to diverse individual learning and thinking styles, and the 
evolving needs of students and businesses. 
My original contribution of this research is that entrepreneur’s interaction with 
internal stakeholder perception is largely affected by top down communication and 
autonomous entrepreneurial decision-making, restricted upward feedback, and lack of 
sense-making.  This provides exciting opportunities for my ongoing academic career. 
From a practical perspective, the research was validated by entrepreneurs and internal 
stakeholders who were my respondents.  Their observations were significant for me 
because they were professionals in the field who understood the significance of my 
findings to the ongoing growth and success of their organizations.  Feedback from 
these entrepreneurs was that they related to my interpretations and had already started 
using the findings to improve their interactions with positive results.  My research has 
been shown to have impact on the interrelationships that have been confusing for both 
the entrepreneurs and internal stakeholders.  By answering the research questions and 
reflecting on their answers, the participants had begun to change their thinking and 
interaction with each other.  My research also offered insight into the entrepreneurs’ 
specific concerns about the impact of the different ways of thinking between 
themselves and the internal stakeholders.  As a result of my findings, the feedback 
from the entrepreneurs is that they have a better understanding of how to conduct 
succession planning.  
The handling of diverse theories and large quantities of data meant a focused, 
disciplined and tenacious attitude was the only way to reach a meaningful outcome.   
This meant the difference between superficial and deep learning by embedding myself 
in a three-year process has significantly increased my intellectual capacity and 
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capability to critically assess new and existing knowledge.  The inductive research 
approach meant that I was consistently testing my assumptions about entrepreneurial 
and internal stakeholder thinking, perceptions and expectations.  In this way, the 
process challenged my existing knowledge and contributed to my development of 
new interpretations as well as consolidated existing knowledge.  
Finally, this research provides empirical evidence using cognitive and organizational 
theory to understand more clearly the interplay between entrepreneurial cognition and 
internal stakeholder perception.   
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Appendix 1 Research Consent Form 
 
Part 1:  Research Description 
 
Principal Researcher:  Lianne Miller 
 
Research Title: WORKING TITLE:  ENTREPRENEURIAL PROCESSES-THE 
INTERPLAY OF ENTREPRENEURIAL THINKING PROCESSES AND THE 
BUSINESS 
 
Your are invited to participate in a research study that explores the way in which 
entrepreneurial thinking process (cognition) interacts with internal stakeholders and 
its impact on growth over time.  The duration of the interview will be approximately 
60 minutes.  With your permission, the interview will be audio taped and transcribed, 
the purpose thereof being to capture and maintain an accurate record of the 
discussion.  Your name will not be used at all.  On all transcripts and data collected, 
you will be referred to only by way of a pseudonym.  
 
Data Storage Confidentiality: 
 
Under no circumstances whatsoever will you be identified by name in the course of 
this research study, or in the publication thereof.  Every effort will be made that all 
information provided by you will be treated as strictly confidential.  All data will be 
collected and securely stored, and will be used for professional purposes only. 
 
How the results will be used: 
 
This research study is to be submitted to fulfill a Doctorate within Ashcroft 
International Business School, Anglia Ruskin University, Cambridge, UK.  The 
results of this study will be published as a dissertation.  In addition, information may 
be used for educational purposes in professional presentations (s) or/and educational 
publication (s). 
 
Part 2:  Participant’s Rights 
 
 I have read and discussed the research description with the researcher.  I have 
had the opportunity to ask questions about the purposes and procedures 
regarding the study. 
 My participation in this research is voluntary.  I may refuse to participate or withdraw 
from participation at any time without jeopardy to future employment or other 
entitlements. 
 The researcher may withdraw me from her research at her professional discretion. 
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 If, during the course of the study, significant new information that has been developed 
becomes available that may relate to my willingness to continue to participate, the 
investigator will provide this information to me. 
 Any information derived from the research that personally identifies me will not be 
voluntarily released or disclosed without my separate consent. 
 If at any time I have any questions I may contact the researcher.  The researcher’s 
phone number is 07825225811 and email lianne.miller@anglia.ac.uk. 
 Audio taping is part of this research.  Only the principal researcher and the members 
of the research team will have access to written and taped materials.  Please complete 
the following:- 
 
 
(  )  I consent to be audio taped 
 
 
My signature means that I agree to participate in this study. 
 
 
 
 
Participant’s signature:______________________________ Date: ________ 
 
 
Name: (Please print) _______________________________ 
 
 
Researcher’s Verification of Explanation 
 
 
I, Lianne Miller, certify that I have carefully explained the purpose and nature of this 
research to ___________________________.   
 
 
Researcher’s signature: ___________________________ Date: __________ 
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Appendix 3 Phase II Interview Questions (Entrepreneur) 
 
 
 Research Questions for Entrepreneurs  
Interview Questions 1:   
How do entrepreneurs’ 
cognitive processes 
interact with stakeholders 
in the business? 
 
1a. How do entrepreneurs 
recognize opportunities? 
1b. How do you interact 
with the business with 
regards to these new 
opportunities? 
1c. How does the iterative 
process of your decision 
making with the business 
work? 
2:   
What are the temporal 
issues surrounding the 
interaction between these 
cognitive processes and 
stakeholders? 
 
2a. How do entrepreneurs 
perceive time? 
2b. How does 
entrepreneurs perception 
of time interact with key 
internal stakeholders? 
 
3: 
How do biases affect the 
interaction between 
temporal issues and the 
cognitive processes? 
 
3a. How does timing 
affect entrepreneurs 
biases in spotting 
opportunities?  
3b. What role do cognitive 
biases have 
entrepreneurial decision 
making? 
 
4. 
How does the interplay 
affect growth? 
 
4a. What are the key 
factors between the 
entrepreneur and key 
internal stakeholders that 
will affect decision 
making?  
4b. How do these factors 
affect growth?  
Themes Cognitive style 
Decision making (strategic) 
Opportunity recognition 
Alertness 
Schemas 
Communication 
Behavior 
Sense making/giving 
Cognitive style 
Time taken 
Concept of time 
Experience of time 
Perceptions of time 
Planning fallacy 
Over confidence 
Representativeness 
Familiarity 
Optimistic 
Confirmation bias 
 
Growth intention 
Growth perception 
Performance perceived  
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Analytical vs holistic 
Risk averse/conformity vs 
less risk averse/quantum 
approach to decision making 
Heuristic vs analytical 
thinking 
Counterfactual thinking 
 
 
 1.  How do you go about 
making decisions? 
2.1. How confident are 
you that the decisions you 
make are made at the right 
time? 
3.1  How optimistic are 
you in your decision 
making ability?  
4.1.  How would you 
describe your growth 
strategy now and for this 
year? 
 1.2.  How do you gather the 
necessary information? 
2.2.  How long do you take 
when making decisions?   
3.2  How optimistic are 
you?  Are you positive all 
the time? 
4.2 How do you define 
growth for your business? 
 1.3.  What kind of 
information do you regard 
as important when making a 
decision? 
2.3. How do people 
respond to your timing 
when you make decisions? 
3.3. Do you find you make 
quicker decisions when 
you are familiar with the 
subject? Give me an 
example? 
4.3 How much of are your 
decisions are affected by 
the relationship between 
yourself and key internal 
stakeholders (KIS) 
 1.4.  How do you judge new 
information? 
2.4. Do you take the same 
length of time when 
making decisions?  Which 
ones differ? 
3.4 How confident are you 
when you spot a new idea 
that it will successful? 
Give me an example? 
(optimistic bias) 
4.3. How do you consider 
economic gains or losses 
with regards to growth? 
(prospect theory) 
 1.5.  What type of 
information would you need 
before you make a decision? 
2.5  What do you think of 
the timing of key internal 
stakeholders (KSI) in the 
3.5. To what extent do you 
think knowing a 
lot/experience reflects on 
4.4. How do you 
communicate this to the 
KIS? What factors 
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business when it comes to 
getting things 
done/decisions? 
your decisions?  influence sense giving? 
 1.6.  How does the way you 
make decisions influence 
your environment? 
2.6. Talk me through the 
timing of when you first 
spot an opportunity and 
discuss it with your 
employees and 
management? 
3.6. Do you believe you 
can achieve more in a 
given time? In which 
ways? (planning fallacy) 
4..5.How does your 
decision making affect 
growth in the business? 
 1.7.  What are the kinds of 
opportunities you have 
identified?  How have you 
identified them?  
2.7. How long does it take 
your key internal 
stakeholders to take a new 
idea on board? How do 
you communicate it to 
them? 
3.7. How much time 
would you say you spend 
thinking about how new 
experience compares with 
your existing experience? 
4.6. What are the factors 
that contribute to whether 
KIS adopt your new idea?  
Does it affect the growth 
you identified earlier? 
 1.8.  How has your 
experience affected your 
ability to spot new 
opportunities? 
2.8. How do you perceive 
time?  
3.8. What is your thinking 
process when you become 
alert to a new product or 
service? 
4.8. How does being alert 
affect the business 
growth?  What is your part 
or KIS part in the process? 
 1.9.  What kind of past 
experience do you draw on 
when making decisions? 
2.9. In what ways do those 
around you respond to 
your perception of time? 
3.9. Are there times when 
you would use your 
intuition to make a 
decision ? Can you explain 
at which stage and how? 
4.9. How do KIS reflect 
your interpretation of 
growth opportunity? Your 
ability to give sense? 
 1.10.  Do you imagine what 
might have been when 
making decisions? 
(counterfactual thinking) 
2.10. Is there more time to 
think careful and 
analytically or do you have 
to process information 
quickly?  
3.9. How does you interact 
with your KIS when you 
use intuition to make a 
decision? 
4.0 Do you think the flow 
of events leading to a 
decision with yourself and 
KIS affect the business? 
How? 
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(sense making) 
 1.11.  How do you decide 
whether a new idea is worth 
pursuing?  
2.11. What process do you 
go through in making 
sense of your (business) 
environment? How long 
does it take you? 
4.0.  How does the flow of 
events leading up to a 
decision differ between 
yours and KIS? (sense 
making) 
 
 1.12. When you notice 
change in the market place 
(disequilibria), how do you 
go about communication it 
to your KIS?  Are you and 
others alert to these 
changes(KIS)? 
2.12. Thinking about sense 
making (organizing, 
interruption, recovery).  
What are the factors 
between yourself and the 
KIS that hold things 
together in a crises? 
  
 1.13. Do you sometimes 
think ‘what might have 
been’ or ‘a different 
outcome’ to the one 
achieved? How do your KIS 
respond to this? 
2.13. How much time 
communicating what is 
happening in the 
(business) environment 
take?  Give me an 
example? (sense making) 
  
 1.14. How would you 
describe your thinking 
process in decision making?  
Is this reflected in the 
business? 
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Appendix 4 Phase II Interview Questions  (Internal stakeholders) 
 
 
 Research Questions for Key internal stakeholders 
Research Questions 1:   
How do entrepreneurs’ 
cognitive processes 
interact with 
stakeholders in the 
business? 
 
1a. How do entrepreneurs 
recognize opportunities? 
1b. How do you interact 
with the business with 
regards to these new 
opportunities? 
1c. How does the iterative 
process of your decision 
making with the business 
work? 
2:   
What are the temporal 
issues surrounding the 
interaction between these 
cognitive processes and 
stakeholders? 
 
2a. How do entrepreneurs 
perceive time? 
2b. How does 
entrepreneurs perception 
of time interact with key 
internal stakeholders? 
 
3: 
How do biases affect the 
interaction between 
temporal issues and the 
cognitive processes? 
 
3a. How does timing 
affect entrepreneurs 
biases in spotting 
opportunities?  
3b. What role do cognitive 
biases have 
entrepreneurial decision 
making? 
 
4. 
How does the interplay 
affect growth? 
 
4a. What are the key 
factors between the 
entrepreneur and key 
internal stakeholders that 
will affect decision 
making?  
4b. How do these factors 
affect growth?  
Themes Cognitive style 
Decision making 
(strategic) 
Opportunity recognition 
Alertness 
Schemas 
Communication 
Behavior 
Time taken 
Concept of time 
Experience of time 
Perceptions of time 
Planning fallacy 
Over confidence 
Representativeness 
Familiarity 
Optimistic 
Confirmation bias 
 
Growth intention 
Growth perception 
Performance perceived  
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Sense making/giving 
Cognitive style 
Analytical vs holistic 
Risk averse/conformity vs 
less risk averse/quantum 
approach to decision 
making 
Heuristic vs analytical 
thinking 
Counterfactual thinking 
 
 
Interview Questions 1.  How do you think  
(name) goes about making 
decisions? 
2.1. How confident is 
(name) in making 
decisions at the right time?  
Do others have the same 
time awareness?  
3.1  How optimistic is 
(name) in his decision 
making ability? How does 
this come across to kis? 
4.1.  How would you 
describe your growth 
strategy now and for this 
year? How would (name)?  
How is this 
communicated? 
 1.2.  How does (name) 
gather the necessary 
information? 
2.2.  How long does 
(name) take when making 
decisions? How does this 
compare with kis?   
3.2  How optimistic is 
(name) as a person 
generally?   
4.2 How do you define 
growth for your business? 
 1.3.  What kind of 
information does (name) 
regard as important when 
making a decision? 
2.3. How do people 
respond to (name) timing 
when you make decisions? 
3.3. Do you find (name) 
makes quicker decisions 
when familiar with the 
subject? Give me an 
example? Is kis as 
familiar? 
4.3 How many of (name) 
decisions are affected by 
the relationship between 
himself and kis? 
 1.4.  How does (name) 2.4. Does (name) take the 3.4 How confident is 4.3. How do you consider 
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judge new information? same length of time when 
making decisions?  Which 
ones differ? 
(name) when spotting a 
new idea that it will 
successful? Give me an 
example? (optimistic bias) 
economic gains or losses 
with regards to growth? 
(prospect theory) How 
does (name) see them? 
 1.5.  What type of 
information would (name) 
need before you make a 
decision? 
2.5  What do you think of 
the timing of key internal 
stakeholders (KSI) in the 
business when it comes to 
getting things 
done/decisions? 
3.5. To what extent do you 
think knowing a 
lot/experience reflects on 
your decisions?  And 
(name) in your opinion? 
4.4. How does (name) 
communicate this to the 
kis? What factors 
influence sense giving? Do 
kis respond in the same 
way? 
 1.6.  How is the 
environment around 
(name) influenced by his 
decisions? 
2.6. Talk me through the 
timing of when you first 
spot an opportunity and 
discuss it with (name) and 
other kis? 
3.6. Do you believe 
(name) can achieve more 
in a given time? In which 
ways? Does he? (planning 
fallacy) 
4..5.How does (name) 
decision making affect 
growth in the business? 
 1.7.  What are the kinds of 
opportunities (name) has 
identified?  How has he 
communicated these to 
kis? 
2.7. How long does it take 
your key internal 
stakeholders to take a new 
idea on board? How does 
(name) communicate it to 
them? 
3.7. How much time 
would you say (name) 
spends thinking about how 
new experience compares 
with his existing 
experience? 
4.6. What are the factors 
that contribute to whether 
KIS adopts your new idea?  
Does it affect the growth 
you identified earlier? 
 1.8.  How has (name) 
experience affected his 
ability to spot new 
opportunities? 
2.8. How does (name) 
perceive time? What is his 
relationship with time? 
3.8. What is (name) 
thinking process when he 
becomes alert to a new 
product or service? 
4.8. How does being alert 
affect the business 
growth?  What is your part 
or KIS part in the process? 
 1.9.  What kind of past 
experience do think 
(name) draws on when 
making decisions? 
2.9. In what ways do those 
around (name) respond to 
your perception of time? 
3.9. Are there times when 
(name) would use your 
intuition to make a 
decision ? Can you explain 
4.9. How does KIS reflect 
your interpretation of 
growth opportunity? Your 
ability to give sense? 
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at which stage and how? 
 1.10.  Does (name) 
imagine what might have 
been when making 
decisions? (counterfactual 
thinking) 
2.10. Is there more time to 
think careful and 
analytically or do you have 
to process information 
quickly?  What about 
(name)? 
3.9. How does (name) 
interact with kis when 
using intuition to make a 
decision? How do you 
explain your decision? 
4.0 Do you think the flow 
of events leading to a 
decision between (name) 
and KIS affect the 
business? How? 
(sense making) 
 1.11.  How does (name) 
decide whether a new idea 
is worth pursuing?  
2.11. What process does 
(name) go through in 
making sense of your 
(business) environment? 
How long does it take? 
4.0.  How does the flow of 
events leading up to a 
decision differ between 
(name) and KIS? (sense 
making) 
 
 1.12. How alert is (name) 
compared to kis about new 
ideas? How do people 
respond to this?  
2.12. Thinking about sense 
making (organizing, 
interruption, recovery).  
What are the factors 
between (name) and the 
KIS that hold things 
together in a crises? 
  
 1.13. Does (name) 
sometimes think ‘what 
might have been’ or ‘a 
different outcome’ to the 
one achieved? Are the 
people around him the 
same?  If not, how do they 
responsde?  
2.13. How much time 
communicating what is 
happening in the 
(business) environment 
take?  Give me an 
example? (sense making) 
  
 1.14. How would you 
describe (name) thinking 
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process in decision 
making?  Is this reflected 
in the business? 
 1.15 How would you 
describe the relationship 
between yourself and kis? 
   
 1.16.  What factors 
influence this relationship?
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Appendix 6 Email Exemplar from Case A 
 
 
 
 
RE: Moving forward??? 
(Entrepeneur).. 
 
Thanks for this, its brilliant….just what I need, I know that you support me on these 
and it really helps to vent frustrations with you – I too felt low on Friday but after our 
meeting had renewed vigour to get this sorted…. 
 
I agree it will be slow (and that is what causes a lot of the frustration) but think the 
time is now here where we have to start making things ‘stick’ and this will take some 
time.. 
 
I think this also leads into the whole planning area and how this probably needs to 
grow up and be somewhat less flexible than current. 
 
Lets work through the plan the first week May 
 
Cheers, (CEO internal stakeholder) 
 
  
From: Entrepreneur  
Sent: 25 April 2010 10:32 
To: CEO internal stakeholder 
Subject: Moving forward??? 
 
  
(CEO internal stakeholder) 
 
 
Firstly we need to identify where forward is?  I think both of us have a good idea of 
the standards to which the company should operate and we need to get there.  I have 
just spent a hour or so going back over some of my old documents which set out the 
way forward for us to achieve delivery and good communication and response to 
clients.  Some of these you will have received yourself but with one thing and another 
– distractions such as moving premises and just getting on with growing the business 
the momentum was lost and these initiatives took a back seat. 
 
The biggest obstacle to achieving the objectives we talked about last Friday is that we 
have been very successful.  Some commentators would say it is not broken so why try 
to fix it as you may lose something.  I think you may have even said similar things a 
From Case A, CEO Internal Stakeholder 
To Entrepreneur 
Cc  
Subject RE: Moving forward??? 
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few years ago.  However as we both now understand it will eventually be a barrier to 
our progress and in that I am convinced, as you are.  I will dig the old documents out 
(unless you still have them) when we chat about this subject when you return.  
Unfortunately I was a voice of 1 (2 if you count ‘internal stakeholder’) but we were 
moving forward so stop complaining comes the plaintive cry, however I think in your 
new role it is providing you with the clarity required for us to finally get more 
momentum going.  I am very keen to get involved in this and with the extra push we 
should be able to progress. 
 
Some thoughts on this reveal that we may have to start from the ground up and 
identify some of the issues, which are fundamental and as we both know may be 
cultural within the company.  Changing this will be relatively slow and methodical 
and will take planning.  But if we don’t have an action plan for this then perhaps we 
have failed to understand what is required – it is the fact that others don’t have action 
plans that is part of the issue!!! 
 
I mentioned time-management courses and instruction and it has been a long-held 
belief that if we cannot get the fundamentals correct such as how everybody should 
operate Outlook and set out our criteria for responses then perhaps we should not 
expect to succeed. 
 
Can I suggest the following.  If we understood how key personnel (TLs/SAs and 
above operated their Outlook or other time management system then I think we will 
gain a far better understanding of where we may be going wrong.  Do staff have a 
time management system?  Do they know what they need to do?  Do they know the 
standards required? 
 
 The first questions could be sent out simultaneously with a timed response request 
and that will probably reveal a lot of information, although there will be a lot of 
serendipity involved if someone just happens to be on-line or others are in client 
meetings.  We can then discuss the results and work from there. 
 
Following Friday’s meeting I felt quite low, especially as you were coming up with 
the same issues I had some years earlier.  However I have a lot of time to think about 
matters and now feel quite positive as there is additional momentum and I think we 
can move forward – it was a rather lonely and frustrating journey – but we were still 
growing and succeeding !!!  lets make this subject the focus of our meetings in the 
coming weeks and perhaps even devise an agenda and start coming up with an action 
plan – presumably this will form a cornerstone for the BP? 
 
 Have a good trip. 
 
(Entrepreneur) 
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Appendix 7 Phase I Case A Selection Themes 
Phase I:  Case A Categories 
Entrepreneur   
 Company information  
   
 Entreps Background Lasted 1-2 years at University of Brunell.  Told I wasn’t bright enough. 6 month placement as trainee 
manager with building company, then HNC with day release, chartered institute building exams-
5years. Left building company, joined a subcontractor, after 8 months got offered my boss position. 
Looked after 30 million pounds. Left there to become self employed. Worked as freelance 
construction manager for 7 years til last recession in 80s-90s.  Packed up work for 2 years as market 
wasn’t boyant. Bought a local school and converted into couple of properties. Bought other properties 
as recession prices fell-bought at fraction of price. Thought after 2 years I should be doing something 
   
 Style Enjoyed building-its very practical. Can see what you’ve done at the end of the day. See the progress 
which if found rewarding. 
 Motivation to set up 
business 
I thought about what sort of company would probably be less affected by recession, didn’t cost a lot 
to set up. Hopefully generate a revenue stream fairly quickly.thought about electrical safety testing 
which I knew nothing about. 
 Setting up the business Put myself on a course. Asked 5 friends, relatives whether they wanted to invest and they all said yes.  
When it came, people fell away, so I put the lion share of money into the business. 
 Business growth Turned over 17 000 in the first year 
 Employees skills But now we have people that are very very experienced in electrical engineering and electronics. 
Entrepreneur 
Transcript 
  
 Entrepreneur thinking I thought we were going to turn over 100 000 in the first year, we turned over 17 000 
 Self awareness I realised I knew very little about sales and marketing.  I suppose its traits I wouldn’t like to think I 
have but apparently I have got. 
 Problem solving I found it very difficult to pick up the phone and actually ask people for business.  So I developed a 
system that I never had to do that. It was fax back mailout system.   
	 330
 Knowledge/skills I knew very little about electronics, very little about electrical works.  I know a little about the 
legislation.   
I bought the guidance notes, the health and safety guidance notes.   
 Risk But it was an industry that I looked at, I knew about health and safety, it was compliance. I looked at 
targeting those sectors that I thought I would have better response, so schools, uni, colleges, the 
education sector.   
 Entreps self perception Different to how others would describe me. Had psychometrics test.  Some of the traits I’ve got, I 
wouldn’t say are the ones I would be particularly proud of. 
I think I’m fairly easy going.   
I don’t’ think I’m as demanding as people think I am.   
I think I give a lot, I expect a lot. But I also give a lot in all aspects of life.  
If I’m putting a lot of effort into something, I expect someone to also put the same effort into the 
other side so that it balances. 
 Mothers view I don’t tolerate fools and that was the nicest thing she said about me. 
 Others view But people would say im quite demanding of them.  
 Employee  relationships In business I can be very hard. I can be very provocative to get a result.  . So I will work 24 hours a 
day to actually get somebody to get to a stage when for instance that sales manager produces results. 
The ways of actually getting people to respond and the speed I need people to respond has changed. 
I must say I can’t be that bad cos they all still here after u know its 10 years on.  
But my main job is to make sure people get paid at the end of the month and the company is 
successful.  
What I have learned is that not everybody has had that security in their previous employment. 
 Experience /knowing If something is going right, I know the repercussions of something.  To get them to achieve it is not 
going to benefit me directly, but its going to benefit  them by keeping their jobs 
 Changes over time I’ve mellowed, as the company has and that partly because this company has grown. 
 Timing When a company is very young, you need to have results pretty quickly.  If people are wailing around 
debating whether they are going to follow you or not really its too late by the time…you cant allow 
that.  
 Behaviour In certain circumstances, I’ve literally thrown everything up in the air to provoke a reaction, in some 
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cases to pull a team together to unite against me. I didn’t enjoy doing it, I didn’t’ feel very good, 
but…my telephone didn’t ring for 3 days. No one in the company spoke to me. I think I was a figure 
of hate.  
I needed to provoke a situation and be so dramatic that people did actually sit up.  
But they actually understand more about me and the effect it had on me and that their view is they 
don’t want to see that again, and neither do I.  
 Financial 
performance/productivity
We had the company sales had gone into free fall, the productivity started to unravel,  because we 
weren’t being firm enough, managing the business through the different levels. We all knew how to 
do it, but sometimes people take the path of least resistance. I literally turned out all the final cabinets 
and said I’ve asked nicely, I’ve asked repeatedly, now all the files everything are all scattered across 
the sales floor.  Now pick up each one and telephone the person and see if we can do business with 
that person. Gradually over the next month everything our sales figures just shot up again and they 
carried on going up for the next 6 months.  They carried on going and going and they were reaching 
higher and higher levels. We were making more profit than ever making before.  
 Communication After 3 days one of the senior sales managers rang up and said I’d like to come and talk to you.  They 
came over and said the way you dealt with that was outrageous.  I let her say exactly what she had to 
say and ok, you think I enjoy it.  
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Appendix 8 Phase II Set III Case C Exemplar Transcript  
 
Has anything changed in your interaction with (entrepreneur)? 
 
Not a huge amount. He is distracted on other things right now I think. So largely 
we’ve been left to our own devices which is fine actually. So I tend to get him 
involved when I need to and not when I don’t. so he still maintains the same 
organizational input, when there’s a meeting he’s there when it includes him. On a 
day to day interaction is less because he has other things on his plate. But that is sort 
of part of the general process. When someone backs away from the activities for a 
given reason or a give time you just fill the gap and that’s fine.  
 
In that sense its probably change slightly but that’s a temporal blip, but I don’t think 
its changed drastically anyway.  
 
You mean you think he will be back involved more? 
 
What tends to happen is he tends to poke things when he feels he wants to know more 
about something or ask more questions. Be more proactive and suggestive and when I 
do ask him something he tends to more comprehensive in his response/discussion. At 
the minute it is very limited to the specific of what I ask. And sometimes limited in 
terms of the response at all and also he is not poking so much. So will he go back to 
being perhaps more involved? Probably yes I think he will. I don’ t think its an 
evolution particularly.  
 
I don’t really know whats on his mind. You talk about succession and things like that. 
We don’t really have an open succession discussion or anything else. All we have is 
we sort of both know we running the business and therefore I go and do whatever I 
want to get on with and he does whatever he wants to do. And if either of us spots a 
gap then we try and fill it ourselves if either of us wants the opinion of the other 
person then we ask it. So all that happens at the minute is that his input is reduced so I 
fill the gap, if he wants to put more input in then that’s great I don’t have a problem 
with that actually.  
 
So yeah its interest, its interesting not having him quite so involved in the business at 
the moment simply because we’re surviving. We doing reasonably well. Its always 
useful having someone to bounce ideas off so I sort of miss a bit of that actually. 
Because I don’t feel like with (internal stakeholder and other group managers that I 
can bounce quite so many of the more strategic issues off. Sometimes cos its 
including them and also sometimes because its including their peers. So I don’t really 
want to discuss those with them. So its hard when (entrepreneur) is not so involved to 
have someone to bounce some of those ideas off. We don’t really, you now our board 
is not really functional in that way. Its (entrepreneur) and me really. 
 
You know the finance director doesn’t really have a view. So that…I do think that’s 
temporary blip. I do think he’s got other things on his plate right now to deal with.  
 
In terms of growth in terms of growth compared to the beginning of the year? 
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We are roughly on target in terms of profit. We down on overall revenue, we down on 
sales but profit we’ve maintain cos we’ve handled the costs. We put a reasonably 
aggressive budget in the beginning of the year. So in the context of the last 5 years we 
doing very well on a yearly basis. We slightly below on revenue not profit. So ok. In 
terms of growth our growth will come primarily from recruiting people to get head 
count growth but it also comes from identify new things and maybe setting it up to be 
separated or to be something different.  
 
We only have a couple of those activities, they not making great progress primarily 
because we want to do them in  partnership with somebody else and those other 
people are not really willing to put much money in right now. That will probably 
change and we taking a relatively cautious approach to how we separate those out. So 
we don’t invest a huge amount in them and lose it all. But we’ll get there. But those 
are the engines of growth for us. 
 
We not looking to double in head count or anything like that. So we doing ok, we still 
not growing head count as fast as wed like to and we knew that at the beginning of the 
year and we budgeted for it. we knew that recruitment would be hard and low and 
behold its been hard. We have not, I think we 10 down on where we should be in 
terms of head count.  
 
And that’s due to? 
 
We just cant’ find the recruits. We set an extremely high bar here for recruits, 
extremely high bar. They have to be technical brilliant and they have to be aware. 
And they have to show signs of creativity innovation, in a package then you asking 
quite a lot of somebody. So we see lots of people but they not must haves. So 
generally if they not a must have we just think we won’t bother. Because theres 
nothing worse than getting somebody in who is average. You know you don’t really 
want that you want to maintain the bar. What we are doing is changing our strategy in 
terms of how we try and recruit people. So we focusing a lot more on the university 
departments where we know we want people. 
 
So take specific departments from the university target recruitment activities at that 
department. So at least if they don’t join you after university they still remember you 
name and so maybe 5 6 years after that you get the best ones joining. That works 
much better for us than wait for people to get out into industry and then encourage 
them to join us then. We doing ok, in summary we doing ok. I think we set ourselves 
hard targets and in the kind of business we are, we don’t look to make incremental 
growth, we look to maximize opportunities. And sometimes that maximization of 
opportunities means that theres a..you don’t chuck it out the business straight away 
you hold it in and you take a cautious approach to actually realizing it. 
 
And that’s sort of where we are right now. 
 
So whose making the decision on recruitment at the moment? 
 
Me. Final decision. Me was probably a bit pompous actually. The company makes the 
decision on recruitment. Its initiated by people within the groups, the group manager 
and it comes to me for a final interview. If I think it’s the wrong decision then I tend 
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to steer people away from it. if I think it’s the right decision I tend to give it a 
blessing. And so take James at the minute, he’s had a few recruits. I allow him to try 
and be persuasive on things like recruitment, but also the same time have to, I 
sometimes have concerns about the directions he takes and .. a few instances recently 
ive encouraged him not to make a decision. Or I encouraged him to think about it in a 
different way, so rather than just saying I don’t think you should, it almost has the 
opposite effective than encourage him to try and find reasons why you should and 
then it becomes a who can win the argument which is bad. 
 
To the way I tackle it right now is to lay out all the reasons positives and negatives 
and then get him to give a view on that and to give his opinion. If in spite of these 
things he still wants to recruit then if set up the questions in the right way, then he 
either answers my concerns in which case I feel happy about the recruitment taking 
place or actually he convinces himself that actually it’s the wrong recruit. So that 
actually works quite well whereas previously whats happened with him and with 
some of the other group managers, id just say no I don’t think so and we’ve either had 
an argument which ive won and they’ve just felt a bit annoyed about or you know 
they just accepted the view. In which case its actually a bad thing cos they not really 
making the decision. 
 
I realize what I want, while I have this notion of final check, I want it to their decision 
really and I’m really just there to gate keep the standards, the direction of the 
business. You know that part of it. (entrepreneur) isn’t really involved in that 
anymore. And that’s quite an interesting decision for him actually. He gets to see 
them all when they come in. so when they come in he makes sure he sees them for 15 
minutes or something to get to know them. But it’s a bit of a fait a comple by then 
they already in the business. 
 
That’s a bit strange that’s he’s willing to let go of that somehow when he’s actually 
not happy to let go of other things which seem much smaller. Given the fact that you 
know we a people business. That is the sort of way it goes. If you look at it generally 
then I have the last say but actually the group themselves should have the ability to 
make the decision. But you don’t want a situation where I disagree. So I guess could I 
sustain a situation where a group is recruiting someone who I thought was wrong? 
And the answer has to be no. and then its up to me to influence them rather than just 
try and wield some kind of axe to say no you cant’ recruit. 
 
So are you recruiting the same sort of person that (entrepreneur) would have 
recruited? 
 
I don’t really know actually. Because it’s a very interesting question. I think so. But I 
don’t know so. So how do we correlate what..i think we actually recruiting better 
people. I think im a bit more challenging in the recruitment process. 
 
I think (entrepreneur) was probably more challenging of people, groups that didn’t 
have a strong revenue. Groups that clearly need to recruit. My experience of 
(entrepreneur) influence on the groups was that for me when I was recruiting for my 
group at the time, he would be remarkable yeah fine, very easy. He’d focus on what 
projects are they going to do when they come in and the revenue aspects of it. and 
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he’d made up his mind from seeing them and him and were very never ever miss 
aligned on the person themselves.  
 
There were some people he was more enthusiastic than I was, but I wanted them 
anyway so id go in with someone he was over the moon about and id be thinking mm. 
they weren’t that good. Maybe slightly visa versa. Id be enthusiastic and he’d be 
accepting of them. So I saw it from that end of things, but when I look at people he let 
through in other groups there were a number of very poor recruits into one group. 
That I would never have let in but maybe he was persuaded by that group that it was a 
reasonable thing.  
 
So I find myself in a situation of being a little bit harsher with people and forcing the 
group to challenge themselves with is that guy really great you know. What made you 
think they are going to be the creative inspirational business leader that we want? And 
I find a lot of the group managers turn around and say yeah you know he’s not that 
good or she’s not that good and so we don’t recruit. There are very rarely situations 
that I really like somebody and they don’t but that’s usually the way the process 
works. I don’t get to see them unless they like them so its never going to be the other 
way around. The only situation its that way around a sort of a senior recruit sort of 
business developer that ive spotted or something.  
 
Do I recruit differently, or do I have a different judgement…I don’t think so. I think 
the essense of what the recruits are are probably similar. And probably Peter in my 
position would be as diligent about things.  
 
The project leaders course they go on when they arrive? 
 
Its not when they arrive. They usually here for a year or two before they go on that 
course. They often, the training course is our presentation course and then a project 
leadership course. The project leadership course is usually a year to two years. They 
have to be running or thinking about running a project. 
 
How much of that course shapes the employee and manager they become? 
 
I think it does do quite a lot of shaping. I would say that it should complement the 
shaping it shouldn’t be the only part of shaping so you could never rely on the training 
course to drive the culture or to drive what people are about. People should pick how 
it is to work here and what the key things are from people around them and from how 
the things go, how works happens and talking to their colleagues. The course should 
be there to reinforce formalize it.  
 
We have done and are in the process of changing the project leadership, so and this is 
again part of the thing that (entrepreneur) has delegated to me is the training and we 
are going through a process of changing. So we have this project leadership course is 
facilitated by external people but mostly contributed to by people who work in the 
business. Last year and the years before that it was a few ex employees who ..the old 
founders and things like that, people who were in the spin outs so I sought of pushed 
it back to bring a new breed of people in there so the next generation of people. James 
is one of those whose contributing to it. 
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And task them with the challenge of saying ok what should the course look like. So 
they’ve sat in on the current course that’s just run. Starting next year we’ll starting 
working out how the course should be reformed and the key thing is for them to 
actually step back and say how they think it should be. And for me and them to then 
work up a course that’s fit for today and fit for the people we have. Not one that was 
fit for the people we had 10 years ago and was probably evolved in a slightly different 
way.  
 
So put in place the right people to control that course. Again it will be externally 
facilitated but the content will be controlled by us. And you know the group managers 
and some of the senior people will basically dictate the content. So that’s useful in 2 
ways. The reason for doing that is mostly to make the people, senior people and group 
managers think harder about what they want. So asking them to do it rather than me 
do it, is to make them hard about what they want in their groups and to have the 
conversation. And then once weve got that conversation we distil what we want.  
 
Actually the course is almost you know another benefit. Another major benefit of 
actually having that discussion. And for people thinking hard about it. cos its too easy 
to drift into doing things how you’ve done them, how previous people did them or just 
not think about them. So that will be a very useful learning experience for everyone 
including myself. We’ll have that new course or the revised course and it will filter 
through so you know talking about new joiners they’ll get the benefit of that straight 
away because everyone will be thinking about what it means to be a project leader, 
what it means to be a client manager from just the fact that everyone is thinking about 
that a different way. 
 
You spoke about the course reflecting the changes..what do you man by that? 
 
If you think of the origins of the business. The business was founded by 20 people 
who were very well trained. So they were consultants, consultants from up the road. 
They’d had all the training courses that a very expensive management consultancy 
can throw at you. So they had a lot of training, they had already done a lot of business 
so they were very experienced. A lot of chiefs and then they eventually filled in with 
Indians if you like over time. Now what’s happened over time those guys have gone 
and we find ourselves with a less deeper level of experience in the business.  
 
So we have a group of id say 10 best maybe people who really know which way is up. 
And then maybe a broader group of 30 who knows roughly which way is up and then 
you have maybe another 50 who are you know probably on the right track, and then a 
large bunch of people who view it as a job. And those people who are just to young to 
really know which way they want to go. So we’ve less experience within the business 
and historically we used to learn a lot by just speaking to people.  
 
But if you don’t have the high level of understanding within the business with a small 
number of people just speaking to people doesn’t give you quite the same you know 
knowledge capture than if you had half the business being very experienced people. 
So there’s been quite a reasonable shift in people, the younger generation and that 
puts an emphasis on making sure the 10 the 30 think hard about things. And you 
challenge them with the thinking and they develop a view and they try to get better 
quickly. And then they push it out to people more coherently and they more proactive. 
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So it’s a slightly different business, perhaps a little more forceful communication than 
otherwise you used to when you had a high density of experienced people. We have 
more of a traditional density of experienced people, those learning, those who don’t 
care, those that you know will eventually be stars. We had that density of those than 
this business had when it first started. I think as a result you need to have a slightly 
different attitude with how you communicate those messages. So one thing I know 
(entrepreneur) is very aware of concerned about is you know that level of expertise. 
He wants more people to be off the cuff business people, and we need to push for that. 
 
But that is a symptom of the fact that across the business the expertise level is slightly 
lower. Were a bit more stratified as an organization than we were when you just shoe 
horn in 20 people who are very well trained. And you know you grow it from that 
point. So then again hopefully as an organization cos we relatively young. We not 
going to have a huge turnover of the senior people, and experienced people. So maybe 
actually we can get up to speed 50 people who are all seeing, who all have the 
direction of the business clearly. They understand all the issues clearly. They all you 
know more experienced and trained in the way that business is done here. 
 
And the way we do business best. 
 
You mentioned speed..is there more pressure, does it have to happen quicker? 
 
I think I mean patience. I think generally here, the difference in speed now than 
perhaps earlier is there is an impatience to change. If you see a problem then just fix 
it. or do something about it. I don’t think, there isn’t a huge change. Again 
(entrepreneur) and people who founded the business were I guess quite proactive and 
in a business sense they moved as fast as they wanted. Now do people, people still 
probably ..progress the business things as fast as possible.  
 
I think historically there probably wasn’t the pressure on the structural changes. 
People didn’t think hard about the structure and how you know we get more people 
up to speed probably cos they just didn’t have that issue. We have the issue where we 
have too may inexperienced people or not enough experienced people. So there is a 
pressure now on that and to do that. And to do that reasonably quickly. But that was  
pressure that didn’t exist 20 years ago. 
 
So is it different, do you have to think about it quite differently to 
(entrepreneur)? 
 
I think it is quite different, I think its very different. I think that..this is my 
interpretation and some discussion with him. I think that he had a bunch of 
experienced people who were quite well, intrinsically motivated. Don’t forget this 
was a start up business that people were highly invested in. we have an organization 
now where even the most bought in people of my generation own a small fraction of 
the business. So are not quite so financially motivated or bonded to the business.  
 
The community spirit is less cos again its not a small founder organization. So 
peoples engagement with the business is lower. So when you’ve got the situation 
when you have a certain level of less expertise less engagement, then you have to 
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manage in a different way. Just expecting people to be more engaged, expecting 
people to be bought in and to be good is not a way to run it. so I think when 
(entrepreneur) was involved, to some extent when (entrepreneur) first started and 
Gerald was running it then it was one way which was basically (other founder) 
stopped everyone from killing each other.  
 
Because they were highly competitive and then when (entrepreneur) had taken over 
he probably kept the blood bath to a minimum. (entrepreneur) was basically largely 
responsible for the evolving that change of generations of which I’m part and James is 
part. So (entrepreneur) was doing much more of a transition. But I don’t think he gave 
as much thought and hasn’t given as much thought as he will now and I will now to 
actually how we bring on this next generation. And how we train and engage them in 
an organization that isn’t, we often say we employee owned, and that’s true but the 
vast majority of people don’t feel as engaged as they used to do. 
 
Even when I joined it was all about the company and the share price. It was just 
automatically assumed youd be buying shares and this kind of thing. It had some 
momentum of its own, now there’s less interest in that side of things. People don’t 
feel quite as engaged. And we need to handle those issues so it has changed. And how 
we manage has to change with it as well. You know so..question yourself about how 
you engage people. I don’t think the managers typically questioned that in the past. 
They just said you going to be engaged, you came here to ..get on with it and just be 
better.  
 
You know the appraisal process is non existent really. Its just a series of questions. So 
how do we actually performance manage people better.  
 
How do help them to be better, open their eyes a bit more. I think there’s a 
generational change as well. I think today’s generation of people are very different 
from the previous one. So take (entrepreneur) generation and his peers, you know 
they were thinking very hard about what they were going to do in business and what 
they wanted to do and you didn’t have to sort of open their eyes to things. They 
scrabbled to find things. Even people of my generation we thought hard about being 
successful in business, it seems the new generation are a little more expectant of the 
things to be opened to them.  
 
And you know for example and they communicate more freely in less controlled way. 
An instant about a year ago when one of the new joiners sent around a ..presentation 
material, including the chairman. It was rubbish. I would never have sent round 
information to anyone, if I had just joined the business let alone the chairman without 
making sure that it was spot on. I probably would never have done it actually so there 
is a generational…and that’s not just the person being daft or anything else. Hes 
probably more extreme but as a generational change of people and how they behave. 
And I think we’ve got to change a bit as well to manage that. 
 
Did you have to upward manage (entrepreneur) in that or did he recognize on 
his own? 
 
There is a recent instance, so the Linkd in thing…disaster. So (entrepreneur) wanted 
to ban it. and doesn’t perceive this private business overlap and ..it must be about a 
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year ago. It was raised to his attention by one of my helpful colleagues and he sort of 
had a very allergic reaction to it. and I had to hold him back from that. And to his 
credit he held back from it. I then had to walk him through how we should do things 
and it was quite annoying actually and ..he asked our marketing team guys to sort of 
take leadership of it. In delivering in working what a policy should be and how we 
should tell people about the policy. And that person is not very much in tune in 
understanding peoples feelings or you know trying to avoid conflict. He quite likes 
conflict.  
 
So he was the wrong person to do it.  (entrepreneur) appointed him, I didn’t like it but 
it happened. I then tried to work with both of them.  (entrepreneur) to his credit was 
engaged in that process. I pushed more for a guideline than a policy. And we ended up 
with a guideline. However at the last hurdle I dropped the ball, I let this marketing 
person just put out some material and it read like a policy as opposed to a guideline. 
And so it was the wrong thing to do. We should have made the group managers 
disseminate it more informally within their groups. Maybe with a document 
attachment.  
 
That would have been the right way to do it. but you know I do ..influenced. In that 
case I managed to achieve some things I didn’t achieve very much when it came to 
the final dissemination. Since then I’ve worked to recover it in certain areas.  (internal 
stakeholder) has an interesting point actually cos (internal stakeholder) doesn’t 
believe in the policy and he went along with it eventually. But him and I had quite a 
few discussions about it.  
 
So I ..having had..(entrepreneur) wanted this policy imposed. He wanted the group 
managers to sign up to it but it wasn’t really accepting the fact that they would 
disagree. So I spent a long time with each of them getting their concerns out 
addressing their concerns. Essentially trying to get a consensus and we got to a view 
of consensus within the group managers. But it was a consensus of the worst, I mean 
compromise not a consensus. It was  compromise about what people would basically 
accept. But they didn’t like it. so it was ok and if that would have been handled 
correctly it would have been reasonably well done. But he delivery was the poor 
thing.  
 
And (internal stakeholder) still hasn’t quite bonded to ..although he agreed with the 
consensus he hasn’t quite changed his profile.  
 
So he wanted to have freedom with the profile? 
 
No he wanted less of a lock down than we eventually got to. So theres disagreement. I 
do sit neatly between (entrepreneur) and his view and the other guys in that I don’t see 
linkd as..is see linkd in as a dangerous thing I see it as a thing that doesn’t help out 
business. Broadcasting your background is not helpful both from a recruitment point 
of view but also it doesn’t come across as necessarily right with our clients. You 
know facebook just doesn’t have a place in our business. 
 
So I want to manage it carefully but I want to provide people some individual 
freedom.  (internal stakeholder) wanted much more individual freedom than I did and 
certainly (entrepreneur) did. The actually point, there are situations of upward 
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influencing (entrepreneur), there aren’t that many cases where I have to upward 
influence him. Because I said early on his not been very proactive in terms of the 
business right now and that means I can largely get on with it. however I think what 
..we’ve got a slight confusing situation where is sort of probing somewhere I don’t 
know where he is probing or what he is asking to happen. And this is the situation 
with linkd in he asks (employee) who is this marketing guy. Can you just do another 
recruitment brochure, ive no idea its happening. 
 
All of a sudden this recruitment brochure pops up and its rubbish and its like oooh 
wouldn’t have done that. And I can’t..had no opportunity to influence. 
 
Where along the process you find out about it you mean? 
 
Exactly and it ..theres not..we’re not very cohesive at the moment. That’s the point 
and I think its sometimes hard to be cohesive when your role is not very clear. The 
delineation of our role is not very clear. Im sort of quite happy with that cos it means I 
can get on and do what I like but at the same time I suddenly find that something has 
happened over here and its not the way I would have done it.  
 
But you know (entrepreneur) is very experienced and he has a lot of value and im 
happy for him to get on with doing some stuff. Like I said at the moment its not that 
bad. 
 
You hoping that that is going to change at some stage? 
 
I don’t want (entrepreneur) not to have an influence on the business. But I think a 
greater delineation at some point is what needs to happen. And whenever he feels 
comfortable with that fine. Im not even sure you may find delineation just happens 
cos he is no longer involved in things or stops commenting on them in which case that 
side, its not a question about me stop being the deputy and being the managing 
director, im not even concerned about that anymore. I used to be concerned about that 
from the point of what it meant. 
 
But actually its more about what I do not what I call myself. So if I feel I have 
responsibility over the remit and get on with it, then that matters to me more. I don’t 
want a situation where im not controlling things. A situation where you notionally 
responsible for something but you cant control it or even worse you not sure whether 
you responsible or not for it so you don’t do anything. And then you don’t do 
anything and actually someone thought you were responsible for it and so..so the 
minute I have notionally no responsibility I just point to (entrepreneur) and say aren’t 
you picking that up? 
 
So actually in principle its quite a nice place to be from that point of view but at the 
same time there are things happening that I would not necessarily agree with. but not 
many as I said there aren’t that many. Now if he returns to an actively poking 
suddenly I find all these 4 or 5 streams of new things going on I don’t know about I 
might be a bit annoyed about things. It probably makes me focus on different areas to 
… 
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You do speak about being able to influence his decisions and shift his mindset. Is 
it with some things and not others? 
 
So that’s an interesting point, ive not really thought about..i know his touch points and 
things he doesn’t like. So he has very much a view on individuals. A bit like..the view 
of how people used to be so he has a very strong view that people should be business 
builders and things like that. Which is true which is right. But he is very adamant on 
that. He is a bit black and white about this private personal thing. Private vs business. 
And he is less influenceable there which is why I tried very hard on the linkd in thing 
and we actually had some success. 
 
He’s very influenceable on how we organize the business with..for example the 
systems we run on databases the systems we run on ..that he is very influenceable, 
that he abdicates responsibility for. I think he..he is influenced over a large proportion 
I would say. His not a sort of traditional founder who has got very stuck in the ways 
on things. I think he has a strong view on what the culture should be. And the way he 
does see it is that he should be responsible for the maintaining the culture and keeping 
the culture aligned. 
 
And you know I think that’s fine actually. As a someone who has a longevity in the 
business who understands ..culture is one of those things that adapts over time so 
you’ve got to have a reasonably history to know which way it was headed, and how it 
was. 
 
You just take a snapshot of the culture you can’t really get your bearings. So and 
that’s fine. So cultural things, he keeps a very strong hold on facilities, which is just 
daft. Its just daft so he spent a long time with this lecture theatre. And he dragged me 
in to that project as well and so I was involved in that project. I think he dragged me 
in cos he wanted my opinion. And so I gave him my opinion and so we ended up with 
you know a nice facility but we spent an awful lot of money. 
 
But he’s very cautious about things for example if I want to put a building up or 
something theres material adjustments he’s been quite careful about it. he did let me 
run riot on the area that’s been developed down there. Did you walk past it? theres an 
area at the bottom of this building that’s being developed as office space. A new 
coffee area. He said we want some ..you know area here, (CEO internal stakeholder) 
I’ll leave it up to you. So I spoke to some architects and I kept him in the loop a bit.  
 
And I changed things a bit, and he’s not really objected. In fact his not, until last week 
when I took him down there he said that’s not on brief. It really annoyed me actually. 
He didn’t like it… 
 
What where the changes you made? 
 
These long bead things, they not right, I knew they weren’t right. And I was in 2 
minds about them and (employee) whose assisting she was sort of really liked them so 
I called (entrepreneur) down to get a judgment and he was just a bit scathing about 
things. But I think he was in a bad mood but anyway that he did let me get on with it 
and actually it will be cheaper and nicer than the lecture theatre. (laughs)  
 
	 342
He didn’t like..given what he spent on the other place, it was 3 times more expensive. 
Same square foot. Anyway..he has certain strange things he keeps hold of. But I think 
to some extent he also uses it as an exercise to try and get across the importance of 
things so he tends to be quite slow to make decisions questions an awful lot when he 
thinks something is important you should think about. Rather than just saying its your 
decision he will question you a lots about it. so for example if you want to put up a 
building he will or put up a new interior space he holds on to it to make sure you think 
long and hard about it.  
 
Cos he regards it as important so he makes sure you’ve thought about it. so it’s a way 
of him exercising or transferring what he views as important. And so in the future 
when I think about interior space I’ll spend a long time thinking about it cos ive had 
to when ive been dealing with him. So even long after he’s had actually out of the 
control he’s let go of the control of the interior space, I’ll still spend a long time 
thinking about it.  
 
Because that’s what he’s made me do. Now I would probably go through an evolution 
from that and probably impose on it to some extent my view on the priority how much 
time do I want to spend thinking about that versus the revenue generating aspects of 
the business.  
 
But you know across the board you learn from people around you and I learn a lot 
from Peter so when he does say some things like that I tend to pay attention. And 
think about it and if he wants to spend an hour talking about it I’ll spend an hour 
talking about it. because I’m sure he’s got very good reasons and I’ll learn from them 
what I can. I won’t sort of say this is a waste of time or I’m only doing it because you 
my boss and I’ll do what you say. I’ll do it because I respect his judgment for 
focusing on those kind of things.  
 
And you know I’ll try and get what I can from it. If at the end of the day from our 
session I ended up walking away saying I’m not sure what I got from that, then ok 
maybe I will compartmentalize that one and forget it usefully. But ..file that one..i 
often get things from it. 
 
You spoke about the slowness in decisions? Is that the case across the business? 
 
He doesn’t do fast decision-making. (entrepreneur) doesn’t do decision making. His 
method of decision-making is to try and get someone else to make the decision that he 
wanted.  
 
Does that mean that he has made the decision but he hasn’t communicated it? 
 
Often. I think that’s the impression he gives. He ..given a situation he thinks he knows 
the answer. And you remember there’s a generational thing here so he does view 
himself as a different generation and therefore his seen all the problems so given the 
situation he’ll know the answer. He probably doesn’t think that completely but he 
probably thinks he knows roughly which way it lies. But he doesn’t like giving you a 
direct answer.  
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He likes talking around it and talking about examples and whatever else. It frustrates 
the hell out of some people. And someone recently went into his office and asked him 
a question about a contract. And hour and a half came out and he said I should never 
do that. Ive had 15 separate tangential and he hasn’t answered a bloody thing. You 
know I know what he means in that ive had several conversations with Peter and you 
know you have to work hard sometimes to distill from it you know what he is trying 
to get at.  
 
With the best will in the world (entrepreneur) has gone off on a tangent. You know 
cos if you do talk around things sometimes you just go off on a tangent. And so he 
can lose it and I think you’ve got to be patient. And again because I have a great deal 
of respect for him I sort of indulge him his tangent walks and sometimes I find his 
tangential walk quite useful. Sometimes I find them annoying and think I’m quite 
busy today you know I’ve only got.  But actually I’ve got quite used to say actually 
I’ve got a meeting in 10 minutes and just drawing to a close.  
 
And you know sometimes I’m doing it as much for information telling him things. So 
he is aware, in the loop. Generally if I don’t get insight from him then either I’ve 
already received insight in the past and so I’ve already got it so that’s fine there’s not 
additional new insight to get. Or he doesn’t have any insight or he gives it to me 
quickly. Either way he knows where I’m going he’s had an opportunity to influence 
what I’m doing and he either has or hasn’t and so I’ll go away and do what I’m going 
to do.  
 
So its that interaction that is fine. I don’t need a decision from him. Some of the group 
managers look for decisions. And he doesn’t give them. Now people have contrasted 
my style in that I’m more directive sometimes. And I do walk a bit of a line between 
(entrepreneur) no direction requiring people to get from his conversation the insight to 
the some partial direction and a lot of questions. And my style has changed in that I 
do tend to ask a lot more questions. And ask people why they doing this or why they 
doing that.  
 
What do you think about this and that forces them to think and answer questions. But 
when they ask me a direct question I do try sometimes to give a direct answer. Does 
that make me more directive? Probably a little bit. Im trying to balance the two there’s 
a lot of value in what (entrepreneur) does in terms of insight in terms of letting people 
think and I want to do elements of the same. I think sometimes its useful to have a 
direct..what you find that with a direct approach you sometimes have an argument so 
you will maybe have an argument about something cos it’s a specific..cos you can 
actually discuss a specific. So if you’re given an opinion, if I give a direct opinion, 
that’s something we should do. And then the other person can dispute it. if you never 
give a direct opinion no one can dispute it. 
 
So I do find I have a few more arguments with the group managers for example about 
things. And that’s sometimes helpful sometimes not. Some of its frustrating and you 
can’t persuade them, you having an argument you can’t persuade them. But that’s just 
life I think. So there’s slightly different styles there and I’m not sure whether that is 
just generational or whether that is just characters.  
 
	 344
You said that he doesn’t make decisions but later on you said that he just waits 
for you to get there? 
 
He’s made a decision about how he would do it in that circumstance. What he doesn’t 
done is and so he’s made the decision about how it would be. So you’ll put something 
in front of him he’ll know how he things it should be and he wont necessarily tell you 
straight away if at all actually. Now but because he is happy for you to go off and do 
something different anyway, and you know unless it is something critical, health and 
safety or you haven’t done something. If you go and ask him explicitly about a 
business developer not performing, he won’t say what you need to do is this this and 
this to get them doing more. He’ll talk around the subject he’ll have in his head what 
he would do but he won’t necessarily tell. He’ll let you go away and try whatever you 
want to do having had the conversation with him and taken from it what you want.  
 
But there’ll often be a difference and he’ll say why the hell did they not do that. And 
now on the other hand if he had said to that person you should’ve done this this and 
this, in that first meeting. That person would’ve have gone off done this this and this. 
Now (entrepreneur) point and I think generally is a influencing style of management. 
I’m reading this book by Mintzberg that talks about influencing versus directing 
management stuff and we definitely take the influencing style here we don’t take the 
directing style. 
 
You’ve got to accept that there’s a difference in what you influenced and what was 
done. And now if that difference is huge your influence is very good and it can be 
quite frustrating and that’s why I do often see when I see (entrepreneur) frustrating 
about what’s going on in other parts of the business that he thinks his influenced and 
its not responded to. Now in that situation you should be much more directive 
probably with directive is that often it doesn’t help people learn. So if you tell 
someone what to do, they would just go and do what you told them. And then it 
doesn’t work they come back and say it didn’t work.  
 
You tell them again, do a different thing..it doesn’t help stimulate the learning 
process. So theres good logic there and I think theres a balance and knowing when to 
walk that line between influencing and directing is important.  
 
So why does he do it? do it that way? 
 
Well I think two reasons. He found Mintzberg before I did actually. And he read a 
paper, ad hocracy term comes from and so he does understand about that. He hasn’t 
read the recent book, in fact I pointed at it. he hasn’t read it yet. Why does he do it? he 
is a strong believer in not directing people that’s just his ..i think he does it because 
historically again he had lots of strong people around him anyway so he couldn’t 
direct them. Actually to tell people to do something he would’ve found quite hard in a 
group of peers which essentially they were.  
 
He probably evolved it over that time anyway. I think he also now whether this is a 
retrospective belief. He believes it is a better way to manage than a more directive 
approach. Now I agree that we don’t want to be overly directive but I also.. so when I 
first ran a big group it was formed from the one group was split into two. And this 
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guy called (employee) running one half and I ran the other half and he was completely 
hands off. Didn’t direct anyone didn’t do anything really, almost imploded.  
 
I on the other hand got my hands around everything, was controlling this thing that 
thing, talking to everyone about the way everything was done. So some extend I was a 
bit micro managing. I was, it was a small group 15 16 people, I was all over it. the 
other guy was a group of 20, I was reflecting about a few months in and his going to 
end up with a real easy job cos his going to force everyone to think for themselves 
what they doing and they going to find the right answers.  
 
And then his got this self sustaining business that people just got better on the other 
hand I’m going to be telling people what to do and this gets bigger and I have to tell 
more people what to do so its self limiting as an organization. But its not quite that 
way cos is imploded basically and started infighting and people just thought he was 
useless and so it just didn’t’ work. And so I think that’s what you’ve got to get the 
balance right between knowing when to make clear directive decisions about things 
and when you ask questions and help people get to the right decision point.  
 
And so come back to your point about recruitment, sometimes you know I will say no 
because of these reasons this is why we do not want to recruit this person. But most of 
the time I should be saying these are the attributes of the person I’ve spotted this is 
what it might cause and then a discussion with the group manager coming to a 
conclusion. Or them coming to a conclusion about whether that’s the right fit or not 
and hopefully that conclusion will align with my  conclusion or we’ll find it together. 
That’s the ideal way it should work but there’ll be sometimes those opinions deviate 
and then if it’s a critical deviation then you know as ..if you have a responsibility you 
have to say no. 
 
And Im not sure (entrepreneur) takes two hands off sometimes. Maybe ..he’ll let it..let 
people wallow around in their own uncertainty not providing people any markers on 
the path to come to a conclusion. So that they just feel a bit lost and they never come 
to a conclusion.  
 
Has anybody made him aware of that? 
 
No. (laughs) I wouldn’t dare. Imagine going into his office and saying sometimes you 
just meander around and never get to the point. (laughs). And people come away 
confused??? When he is doing it with me I tend to punctuate it. and I said sometimes I 
find the meanders very useful and I have a very respectful ..in the meanderings theres 
gonna be something interesting.  
 
Is that one of the issues with founders no one really tells them..? no one feeds back 
how their thinking is affecting others? 
 
I think it’s a good point. He does have (other founder) who is chairman is very well, 
his been in the business longer and … 
 
But would (other founder) pick this up? 
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Maybe, I don’t know…so if no one feeds back to him? I wonder if its not just a 
founder, if it’s a generational thing actually because the reason people don’t argue so 
(entrepreneur) sort of meanders, they don’t feed back to him or if (entrepreneur) puts 
across a view they don’t necessarily strongly argue with him is because there is a 
generational gap. And is it a founder thing, possibly a founder thing..there is an 
element of that as well.  
 
Theres also an element of generational gap. So with me and the group managers for 
example theres not the generational gap.  
 
I’ve been in the business longer than some of them. And they vary in their robustness 
in when we arguing about things. Some of them are quite forthright and I simply 
match them and I’m forthright back. Some of them are very passive in which case I 
try not to be forthright because of cause it doesn’t result in any ..you squash them 
rather than encourage them. And some of them quite feedback to me.  
 
About what I’m doing and I do get more feedback from people. And I think it’s a 
generational proximity. They feel that they can do that. With (entrepreneur) you know 
when we were in the business (entrepreneur) was always a senior person, so even 
when we joined he was always a senior person. Ok? So we’ve grown up with him 
being that senior person always. Whereas others we are peers in the business ok? So 
it’s a slightly different arrangement. Does anyone give him that feedback? NO? and is 
that an issue? It depends on your view. 
 
It depends on if you have someone who is willing to understand and take the time to 
take the time to understand the founders view points. If they allowed to influence and 
change the direction as they see fit, so you take the point of the linkd in exercise. I’ve 
steered it away a bit from what it would have been so he wasn’t effectively forcing 
action. He was expressing an opinion that was filtered. If you can do similar things 
and re contextualise what they saying, or convert the knowledge into something that is 
a bit more communicable to people then its ok. 
 
And if you’ve got a team that’s willing to listen understand and take from it, what you 
want then its … 
 
I’m looking at sense making and sense giving, but it sounds like the md, CEO is 
giving sense more so than the founder? 
 
Again I’ve only got the context of this business, but I would imagine that you often 
get people who interface more affectively with them and translate the insight more 
effectively. There’ll be translation but also making it make sense for todays people 
because this generational gap is an issue as well. There is an issue that I perceive 
which is …Stockholm syndrome, because you get very close to that person you can 
get absorbed into their way of thinking, their way of doing things. So you’ve gotta to 
make sure you maintain your external references. 
 
And your other internal references. So I’m ..I attend this Cambridge leaders academy 
which is this sort of group of CEOs from the Cambridge area who get together once a 
month and talk about issues you face in the business and its very useful because some 
of the perceived wisdom that you get here is good to just expose it to the light of day. 
	 347
And other people say what the hell are you talking about that’s rubbish. I mean that’s 
the biggest issue for me. I need to understand (entrepreneur) and what he thinks. And 
why he thinks that but I then need to challenge it and you know the best way of doing 
it is with other people.  
Then if I then challenge it directly back with him that’s a different question. I’m not 
sure if I would do that or just get on with it doing it differently.  
 
Cos to (entrepreneur) credit if I think it should be done differently and get on with it 
he probably won’t challenge me on it. he would just let it. 
 
It’s the fact that the adjustment he makes, whether that is really worth doing?  
 
I don’t know, if he is making adjustments. To some extent he has changed over the 
years. He has become softer, but that I think is just old age. You know people get 
softer as they get older. So more relaxed.  
 
Any other changes in interaction? 
 
As I said he’s not so involved if we met 3 months ago 4 months ago, I think at point I 
had already changed the recruitment so id already doing the recruitment. Id acquired 
all the salary information. But then that was nothing to do with him. I just got it. I just 
asked one of the people in payroll lady she gave me the whole list. And (entrepreneur) 
asked me one day he said yeah I probably should tell you about this. I said don’t 
worry I already have the list.  
 
The funny thing is it has his pay on it, everyone’s pay on it. even people who aren’t in 
the group, in the company.  
 
END. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
